community standard in California

2025When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.’ ” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977 , 984–985.) A party opposing a summary judgment motion may use an expert’s declaration to raise a triable issue of fact “provided the requirements for admissibility are established as if the expert were testifying at trial.” (Towns v. Davidson (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th

2023When, as here, a defendant in a medical malpractice case moves for summary judgment and supports her motion with expert declarations that her conduct fell within the community standard of care and did not proximately cause the resulting injury, “ ‘[s]he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.’ ” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 985 , italics added.) We turn to Plaintiffs’ opposition evidence, specifically Dr. Ingaglio’s declaration, to determine whether it sufficiently created a conflict in the

2026When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”’” (Powell v. Kleinman, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 .) Here, defendants each submitted expert declarations stating they met applicable the standard of care.

2025When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”’” (Powell v. Kleinman, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 ; accord, Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 607 .) Guarino cites no authority (and this court has found none), stating a plaintiff may rely on medical records without expert testimony to prove professional negligence in a medical malpractice case.

2025When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”’” (Powell v. Kleinman, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 ; accord, Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 607 .) Guarino cites no authority (and this court has found none), stating a plaintiff may rely on medical records without expert testimony to prove professional negligence in a medical malpractice case.

2025“Where, as here, the material issues framed by the complaint are whether the conduct of a medical professional fell below the standard of care and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, expert testimony is required to 7 establish the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession under similar circumstances [citation], as well as whether the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries within a reasonable medical probability [citation].” (Zaragoza v. Adam (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 113 , 118– 119; accor

2015(Ibid.) It explained: “[T]he question of what is ‘“patently offensive”’ under the community standard obscenity test is essentially a question of fact. [Citation.] Thus, we consider whether a rational trier of fact could have found the television clips viewed by A.S. to be patently offensive under contemporary statewide 15 Section 313, subdivision (a), “essentially ‘tracks’ the three-prong test for obscenity articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15 , 24” ( Dyke, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1382-1383) with some exceptions.

2014The evidence that the images met the test for harmful matter is insufficient.” In support, defendant cites Dyke, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 1377 . 26 Under Miller, the determination of what is patently offensive under the community standard obscenity test is a question of fact.

2018Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1239, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 565 ( Unigard ); see Sanchez v. Brooke (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 126 , 127, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 ["Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care that applies to a professional."].) " ' "When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard *289 of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence." ' " ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601

2018Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1239, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 565 ( Unigard ); see Sanchez v. Brooke (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 126 , 127, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 ["Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care that applies to a professional."].) " ' "When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard *289 of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence." ' " ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601

2010(Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 408-10 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 551 P.2d 389 ].) *1548 Scott requested the court give CACI No. 413 which states: “You may consider customs or practices in the community in deciding whether defendant acted reasonably.

2010(Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 408-10 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 551 P.2d 389 ].) *1548 Scott requested the court give CACI No. 413 which states: “You may consider customs or practices in the community in deciding whether defendant acted reasonably.

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

1976It is presumed that it was his intention “to advance the money for the benefit of his wife’s estate and that it was to accrue to her interest.” (Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300 [ 101 P. 923 ].) The reasons given for this holding are two, viz.: (1) he is presumed to have intended a gift because (2) he had authority to control the disposition of community funds. {Dunn v. Mullan, supra.)' The court then refers to the statement in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1170, to the effect that the general rulé is that the community has a claim against the eparate estate of either spouse for expenses proper

2016When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985 (Munro).) More recently, this court put the plaintiff’s burden this way: “[W]here the conduct required of a medical professional is not within the common knowledge of laymen, a plaintiff must present expert witness testimony to prove a breach of t

2015When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985 (Munro).) More recently, this court put the plaintiff’s burden this way. “[W]here the conduct required of a medical professional is not within the common knowledge of laymen, a plaintiff must present expert witness testimony to prove a breach of t

2025Those recommendations are only prerequisites for obtaining a hearing.” ( Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 628; see § 1063, subd. (a).) Rather, “[t]he court’s role is to apply a community standard to the release decision” (Sword, at p. 628) and consider “whether outpatient treatment will pose an undue risk to the safety of the community” (People v. McDonough (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1490 (McDonough)).

2025Those recommendations are only prerequisites for obtaining a hearing.” ( Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 628; see § 1063, subd. (a).) Rather, “[t]he court’s role is to apply a community standard to the release decision” (Sword, at p. 628) and consider “whether outpatient treatment will pose an undue risk to the safety of the community” (People v. McDonough (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1490 (McDonough)).

2018Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1239, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 565 ( Unigard ); see Sanchez v. Brooke (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 126 , 127, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 ["Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care that applies to a professional."].) " ' "When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard *289 of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence." ' " ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601

2018Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1239, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 565 ( Unigard ); see Sanchez v. Brooke (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 126 , 127, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 ["Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care that applies to a professional."].) " ' "When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard *289 of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence." ' " ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601

2017(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 754 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 161 P.3d 1095 ].) “Whenever the plaintiff claims negligence in the medical context, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert that the defendant breached his or her duty to the plaintiff and that the breach caused the injury to the plaintiff.” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 123 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 618 ] (Powell).) “ ‘ “When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entit

2017(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 754 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 161 P.3d 1095 ].) “Whenever the plaintiff claims negligence in the medical context, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert that the defendant breached his or her duty to the plaintiff and that the breach caused the injury to the plaintiff.” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 123 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 618 ] (Powell).) “ ‘ “When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entit

2014(See Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 468 [medical expert’s declaration that the defendants “acted reasonably and appropriately and that [their] actions were within the community’s standard of care” was sufficient to shift burden on summary judgment to the plaintiff]; Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 934-935 [defendant in medical malpractice action met his initial “statutory burden of proof” on summary judgment by submitted declaration of medical expert on standard of care].) Chiaramonte in his opening brief does not argue otherwise.12 12 Chiar

2013(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 .) While the qualification of an expert witness requires the trial court to exercise its discretion, the court abuses its discretion by denying qualification if the witness demonstrates sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his or her opinion to go before the jury.

2025Those recommendations are only prerequisites for obtaining a hearing.” ( Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 628; see § 1063, subd. (a).) Rather, “[t]he court’s role is to apply a community standard to the release decision” (Sword, at p. 628) and consider “whether outpatient treatment will pose an undue risk to the safety of the community” (People v. McDonough (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1490 (McDonough)).