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33 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2003–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nashgreen2 sentences2026Our supreme court has recognized three nonexclusive factors a reviewing court should consider when determining whether a trial court should have granted a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State’s proof.” Bell, 512 S.W.3d at 188 (quoting State v. Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009)). 2025Our supreme court has recognized three nonexclusive factors a reviewing court should consider when determining whether a trial court should have granted a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness -7- of the State’s proof.” Bell, 512 S.W.3d at 188 (quoting State v. Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009)). | 19 | 26 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2024In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury, this court should consider the following non-exclusive factors: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State’s proof.” Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541 at 547 (citing State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Tenn. 1994)). 3. 2022While declining to mandate a rigid formula for all situations, our supreme court has outlined three nonexclusive factors which may be appropriate in considering whether manifest necessity exists for a mistrial: (1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State’s proof. -33- See, e.g., State v. Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Tenn. 1994). | 11 | 17 |
State v. Mouncegreen2 sentences2018Even though “‘no abstract formula should be mechanically applied and all circumstances should be taken into account,’” Nash, 294 S.W.3d at 546 (quoting State v. Mounce, 859 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tenn. 1993)), the Tennessee Supreme Court has identified three nonexclusive factors for determining whether a mistrial was warranted because of inappropriate testimony presented to the jury: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the S 2018Even though “‘no abstract formula should be mechanically applied and all circumstances should be taken into account,’” Nash, 294 S.W.3d at 546 (quoting State v. Mounce, 859 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tenn. 1993)), the Tennessee Supreme Court has identified three nonexclusive factors for determining whether a mistrial was warranted because of inappropriate testimony presented to the jury: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the S | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hallgreen1 sentence2011The determination of whether to grant a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and should be granted “only in the event of a ‘manifest necessity’ that requires such action.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 147 (Tenn. 1998) (appendix). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Philpottred1 sentence2003App. at Knoxville, June 2, 2003); State v. Philpott, 882 S.W.2d 394, 404 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences2026Our supreme court has recognized three nonexclusive factors a reviewing court should consider when determining whether a trial court should have granted a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State’s proof.” Bell, 512 S.W.3d at 188 (quoting State v. Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009)). 2025Our supreme court has recognized three nonexclusive factors a reviewing court should consider when determining whether a trial court should have granted a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness -7- of the State’s proof.” Bell, 512 S.W.3d at 188 (quoting State v. Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009)). | 7 | 2019–2026 |
State v. Adkins
green
1 sentence2026This court has recognized that [i]n determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury, this court should consider the following non-exclusive factors: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State’s proof.” Id. (quoting State v. Nash, 294, S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009) (citation omitted)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State of Tennessee v. Noura Jackson
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Burns
green
1 sentence2008As explained in Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462 , “[c]onduct that is unreasonable under the facts of one case may be perfectly reasonable under the facts of another.” A. Lost Evidence The petitioner argues that “[t]he blood samples which the State lost were central to the petitioner’s argument that his intoxication rendered it impossible for him to be guilty of premeditated murder.” He contends that trial counsel should have argued to the court that the loss of the evidence entitled him to either dismissal of the charges or a curative jury instruction, citing State v. Ferguson as authority. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Ferguson
green
1 sentence2008He contends that trial counsel should have argued to the trial court that, based on State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), he was entitled to dismissal of the indictment or a curative jury instruction because the State failed to preserve his blood samples. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Bruton v. United States
green
2 sentences2003Ed. 2d 162 (1987) (holding that where a nontestifying co-defendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission in a joint trial, despite a curative jury instruction); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 , 88 S. Ct. 1620 , 20 L. 2003Ed. 2d 162 (1987) (holding that where a nontestifying co-defendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission in a joint trial, despite a curative jury instruction); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 , 88 S. Ct. 1620 , 20 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.