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33 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brick v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); accord Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (requiring analysis of the Brick factors to determine “whether the taint stemming from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated” to render consent voluntary). 2012Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); accord Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (requiring analysis of the Brick factors to determine “whether the taint stemming from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated” to render consent voluntary). | 10 | 16 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). 2007See Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). | 4 | 4 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 609 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The point at which the taint can be said to have dissipated should be related, in the absence of other controlling circumstances, to the nature of that taint.”). . 2007See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 609 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The point at which the taint can be said to have dissipated should be related, in the absence of other controlling circumstances, to the nature of that taint.”). . | 4 | 4 |
Grimaldo v. Stategreen2 sentences2008However, the Brick factors are used in cases in which “the legality of the search is dependent upon the consent of the detainee.” Grimaldo v. State, 223 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (emphasis added). 2008However, the Brick factors are used in cases in which “the legality of the search is dependent upon the consent of the detainee.” Grimaldo v. State, 223 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (emphasis added). | 3 | 5 |
Bell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The State argues, though, that the trial court weighed the factor too heavily because temporal proximity “is perhaps the least important of the Brick factors.” In support of this assertion, the State cites Bell v. State, in which the court of criminal appeals held that temporal proximity of an unlawful arrest to a confession is generally not a “strong determining factor per se” in determining whether the “causal chain” between an illegal arrest and a confession is broken so that the confession is considered voluntary. 724 S.W.2d 780, 788 (Tex. Crim. 2015The State argues, though, that the trial court weighed the factor too heavily because temporal proximity “is perhaps the least important of the Brick factors.” In support of this assertion, the State cites Bell v. State, in which the court of criminal appeals held that temporal proximity of an unlawful arrest to a confession is generally not a “strong determining factor per se” in determining whether the “causal chain” between an illegal arrest and a confession is broken so that the confession is considered voluntary. 724 S.W.2d 780, 788 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Bagbygreen2 sentences2015See Bagby, 119 S.W.3d at 14 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 29 454. 2015See Bagby, 119 S.W.3d at 14 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 29 454. | 3 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2015Contrary to the lower court’s holding, a majority of the Brick factors favor 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 14 suppression. 2015Contrary to the lower court’s holding, a majority of the Brick factors favor 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 14 suppression. | 3 | 3 |
Cooksey v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Cooksey v. State, 350 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. App.—San Antonio A-15 2011, no pet.). 2015See Cooksey v. State, 350 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. App.—San Antonio A-15 2011, no pet.). | 3 | 3 |
Beaver v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc) (requiring analysis of the Brick factors to determine "whether the taint stemming from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated" to render consent voluntary); Beaver v. State, 106 S.W.3d 243, 250 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). 2011Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc) (requiring analysis of the Brick factors to determine "whether the taint stemming from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated" to render consent voluntary); Beaver v. State, 106 S.W.3d 243, 250 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). | 3 | 3 |
Crain v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. 2015Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Leal v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); accord Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (requiring analysis of the Brick factors to determine “whether the taint stemming from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated” to render consent voluntary). 2012Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); accord Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (requiring analysis of the Brick factors to determine “whether the taint stemming from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated” to render consent voluntary). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2015The Brick factors by which attenuation of the taint is measured are: (1) the proximity of the consent to the illegality; (2) whether the seizure was brought about by police observation of the particular object for which they sought consent to search; (3) whether the illegal seizure was the result of flagrant police misconduct; (4) whether the consent was volunteered rather than requested by the detaining officers; (5) whether the defendant was made fully aware of the fact she could decline to consent and thus prevent an immediate search; and (6) whether the police purpose underlying the illega 2015The Brick factors by which attenuation of the taint is measured are: (1) the proximity of the consent to the illegality; (2) whether the seizure was brought about by police observation of the particular object for which they sought consent to search; (3) whether the illegal seizure was the result of flagrant police misconduct; (4) whether the consent was volunteered rather than requested by the detaining officers; (5) whether the defendant was made fully aware of the fact she could decline to consent and thus prevent an immediate search; and (6) whether the police purpose underlying the illega | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Martinez v. State
green
2 sentences2015In light of all the Brick factors, deferring to the trial court’s fact findings but reviewing its legal conclusions de novo, see Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923 , we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Pena’s consent was given involuntarily. 2015In light of all the Brick factors, deferring to the trial court’s fact findings but reviewing its legal conclusions de novo, see Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923 , we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Pena’s consent was given involuntarily. | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Reasor v. State
green
2 sentences2007The present case is significantly different in that our analysis reveals only two of the six Brick factors favor suppression of the evidence. [1] Grimaldo v. State , No. 223 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) [2] In its supplemental brief, the State argues Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000), provides a standard for analysis of the attenuation issue, noting that it dealt with a consensual search following an unlawful protective sweep of the same premises. 2006And, while it did say that the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure because the officers had not found any contraband during the protective sweep, id. at 818 , we hesitate to read Reasor as eviscerating the applicability of all the other Brick factors via that one conclusory statement. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Juarez v. State
red
2 sentences2006One of the cases considered in forming our analysis is Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). 6 Looking at the Brick factors, (1) there is no evidence that appellant was read his Miranda rights; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and search was less than thirty minutes; 7 (3) the intervening circumstances consisted of Officer Romano’s approach to talk with appellant and appellant’s insistence on speaking privately with Officer Romano; (4) the purpose of Officer Galligan’s conduct was simply to stop appellant and detain him until Officer Romano arrived; there was no flagranc 2006One of the cases considered in forming our analysis is Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). 6 Looking at the Brick factors, (1) there is no evidence that appellant was read his Miranda rights; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and search was less than thirty minutes; 7 (3) the intervening circumstances consisted of Officer Romano’s approach to talk with appellant and appellant’s insistence on speaking privately with Officer Romano; (4) the purpose of Officer Galligan’s conduct was simply to stop appellant and detain him until Officer Romano arrived; there was no flagranc | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.