32 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc.green2 sentences2024He relies on Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1330 (Colo. 1986), which concluded that when “a specific evidentiary issue is presented to the trial court in advance of trial,” then “the primary purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule — to permit the trial court to accurately evaluate the legal issues and to enable the appellate court to apprehend the basis of the objection — are satisfied.” But the parties’ “thoroughly litigated” scope of the testimony dealt with the expert’s status as a generalized expert and the parties knew the testimony should not “go beyond the forensi 2003See Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo.1986)(specific objections made in motion in limine to specific items of anticipated evidence satisfy the purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Pahlgreen2 sentences2015The Peopleâs narrow reading of the record is unwarranted. ¶18       âThe purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to . . . alert[] the trial court to a particular issue in order to give the court an opportunity to correct any errorâ and âput the trial court on notice of [the partyâs] position.â Pahl , 169 P.3d at 183 . 2015A. The Error Was Preserved 117 Citing the contemporaneous objection rule, see People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57, ¶ 59 , 296 P.3d 234 , the People argue that, by agreeing that the definition of security was correct, defense counsel approved or accepted the trial court's" defimtlonal instruction, thus . precluding ainy review other than for plain error. 'The People s narrow readlng of the record is unwarranted 1 18 "The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is. to ... alert[ ] the trial court to a particular issue in order to give the court an opportunity to correct any error" and "put the t | 3 | 5 |
Domingo-Gomez v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2015See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1054 ("The lack of an objection may demonstrate the defense counsel's belief that the live argument, despite its appearance in a cold record, was not overly damaging." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2012These errors must therefore "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Young, 470 U.S. at 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391 , 80 L.Ed. 555 (1986)); see also Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1053 (Colo.2005) ("A reviewing appellate court must inquire into whether the errors seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the trial."). {19 Plain error casts serious doubt on the judgment of conviction. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Younggreen2 sentences2015This exception arose because "[a] rigid and undeviating judicial[ ]" application of the forfeiture doctrine "would be out of harmony with ... the rules of fundamental justice." Olano, 507 U.S. at 731 -32 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Young, 470 U.S. at 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 ("The plain-error doctrine ... tempers the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement."). ¶ 77 Appellate courts-including those in Colorado-have recognized exceptions to forfeiture other than plain error. 2015This exception arose because "[a] rigid and undeviating judicial[ ]" application of the forfeiture doctrine "would be out of harmony with ... the rules of fundamental justice." Olano, 507 U.S. at 731 -32 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Young, 470 U.S. at 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 ("The plain-error doctrine ... tempers the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement."). ¶ 77 Appellate courts-including those in Colorado-have recognized exceptions to forfeiture other than plain error. | 2 | 4 |
Wilson v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2024Plain error addresses error that is both “obvious and substantial , ” and the standard is “calculated to temper the contemporaneous-objection requirement in the interests of permitting an appellate court to correct particularly egregious errors.” Id. at ¶ 18 (first quoting Miller , 113 P.3d at 7 50 ; an d then 49 quoting Wilson v. People , 743 P.2d 415, 420 (Colo.1987)). 2012The plain error standard is “calculated to temper the contemporaneous-objection requirement in the interests of permitting an appellate court to correct particularly egregious errors.” Wilson , 743 P.2d at 420 . | 2 | 3 |
People v. Petschowgreen2 sentences2025See People v. Petschow, 119 P.3d 495, 499 (Colo. App. 2004) (explaining that, without the contemporaneous objection rule, “a defendant could intentionally withhold an objection to a constitutional deficiency, on appeal argue that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus, unfairly manipulate the judicial process”). 18 ¶ 28 Thus, we conclude that any violation of Milsap’s due process rights when the court entered the April order was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 29 Lastly, despite framing his argument as a constitutional due process violation claim, Milsap also reli 2010Requiring such an objection before considering error on appeal ensures that defendants do not end up "gambling for favorable verdicts and then resorting to appeal on errors that might have easily been corrected by objection at trial." People v. Petschow, 119 P.3d 495, 505 (Colo.App.2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rollinsgreen2 sentences2005See People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866 , 874 n. 13 (Colo.1995) ("An accused may not withhold his objection until completion of his trial and after conviction, and later complain of matters which, if he had made a timely objection, would have allowed the trial court to take corrective action."). 2004Contemporaneous Objection Rule In accordance with the contemporaneous objection rule, "[aln accused may not withhold his objections until completion of his trial and after conviction, and later complain of matters which, if he had made a timely objection, would have allowed the trial court to take corrective action." People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866 , 874 n. 18 (Colo.1995). | 1 | 2 |
v. Cooleygreen1 sentence2024See People v. Cooley, 2020 COA 101, ¶ 20 (noting that “[t]he purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to conserve judicial resources by alerting the district court to a particular issue in order to give the court an opportunity to correct any error that could otherwise jeopardize a defendant’s right to a fair trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Hagos v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2015See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63 , ¶ 14, 288 P.3d 116 . 2015See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63 , ¶ 14, 288 P.3d 116 . | 1 | 1 |
Denton v. Sunflower Electric Cooperative, Inc.green1 sentence2012The plain error standard is "calculated to temper the contemporaneous-objection requirement in the interests of permitting an appellate court to correct particularly egregious errors." Wilson, 748 P.2d at 420. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lorenzo Jesus Mejia-Alarcongreen1 sentence2011Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc, 723 P.2d 1322, 1330-31 (Colo.1986); see also United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.1993) (recognizing that requiring renewed objections after a definitive ruling may be a needless provocation to the trial court and a distracting interruption during trial). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence2006See People v. Smith, 121 P.3d 243 (Colo.App.2005)(Webb, J., specially concurring). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). 2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Dare v. Sobulegreen2 sentences1990See Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960 (Colo.1984). 1990See Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960 (Colo.1984). | 1 | 1 |
First Nat. Bank of Canon City v. Campbellgreen2 sentences1982See First National Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344 , 599 P.2d 915 (1979). 1982See First National Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344 , 599 P.2d 915 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wainwright v. Sykes
green
2 sentences2009As the Supreme Court noted in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977): The failure of the federal habeas courts generally to require compliance with a contemporaneous-objection rule tends to detract from the perception of the trial of a criminal case in state court as a decisive and portentous event. 2009As the Supreme Court noted in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977): The failure of the federal habeas courts generally to require compliance with a contemporaneous-objection rule tends to detract from the perception of the trial of a criminal case in state court as a decisive and portentous event. | 3 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Douglas
green
2 sentences2015A. The Error Was Preserved 117 Citing the contemporaneous objection rule, see People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57, ¶ 59 , 296 P.3d 234 , the People argue that, by agreeing that the definition of security was correct, defense counsel approved or accepted the trial court's" defimtlonal instruction, thus . precluding ainy review other than for plain error. 'The People s narrow readlng of the record is unwarranted 1 18 "The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is. to ... alert[ ] the trial court to a particular issue in order to give the court an opportunity to correct any error" and "put the t 2015A. The Error Was Preserved 117 Citing the contemporaneous objection rule, see People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57, ¶ 59 , 296 P.3d 234 , the People argue that, by agreeing that the definition of security was correct, defense counsel approved or accepted the trial court's" defimtlonal instruction, thus . precluding ainy review other than for plain error. 'The People s narrow readlng of the record is unwarranted 1 18 "The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is. to ... alert[ ] the trial court to a particular issue in order to give the court an opportunity to correct any error" and "put the t | 2 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Atkinson
green
2 sentences2012These errors must therefore "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Young, 470 U.S. at 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391 , 80 L.Ed. 555 (1986)); see also Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1053 (Colo.2005) ("A reviewing appellate court must inquire into whether the errors seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the trial."). {19 Plain error casts serious doubt on the judgment of conviction. 2012These errors must therefore "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Young, 470 U.S. at 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391 , 80 L.Ed. 555 (1986)); see also Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1053 (Colo.2005) ("A reviewing appellate court must inquire into whether the errors seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the trial."). {19 Plain error casts serious doubt on the judgment of conviction. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Calderon
green
2 sentences2025To the extent Milsap intended to assert a separate statutory notice violation, see, e.g., People v. Calderon, 2014 COA 144, ¶¶ 24-28 , 356 P.3d 993, 996-97 , we conclude that, for the reasons set forth above, Milsap failed to establish prejudice resulting from the alleged violation. 2025To the extent Milsap intended to assert a separate statutory notice violation, see, e.g., People v. Calderon, 2014 COA 144, ¶¶ 24-28 , 356 P.3d 993, 996-97 , we conclude that, for the reasons set forth above, Milsap failed to establish prejudice resulting from the alleged violation. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Miller
green
1 sentence2024Plain error addresses error that is both “obvious and substantial , ” and the standard is “calculated to temper the contemporaneous-objection requirement in the interests of permitting an appellate court to correct particularly egregious errors.” Id. at ¶ 18 (first quoting Miller , 113 P.3d at 7 50 ; an d then 49 quoting Wilson v. People , 743 P.2d 415, 420 (Colo.1987)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Fernandez v. California
green
2 sentences2019Id. ¶32 More apropos to the issue here, Fernandez also claimed that he satisfied the contemporaneous objection requirement. 2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2015This exception arose because "[a] rigid and undeviating judicial[ ]" application of the forfeiture doctrine "would be out of harmony with ... the rules of fundamental justice." Olano, 507 U.S. at 731 -32 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Young, 470 U.S. at 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 ("The plain-error doctrine ... tempers the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement."). ¶ 77 Appellate courts-including those in Colorado-have recognized exceptions to forfeiture other than plain error. 2015This exception arose because "[a] rigid and undeviating judicial[ ]" application of the forfeiture doctrine "would be out of harmony with ... the rules of fundamental justice." Olano, 507 U.S. at 731 -32 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Young, 470 U.S. at 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 ("The plain-error doctrine ... tempers the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement."). ¶ 77 Appellate courts-including those in Colorado-have recognized exceptions to forfeiture other than plain error. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ex Parte Medellin
green
1 sentence2015Rather, "the contemporaneous objection rule has been a bulwark of the Anglo-American Common Law for centuries." Ex parte Medellin, 280 S.W.3d 854 , 861-62 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Johnson, Michael
green
2 sentences2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). 2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Albert John Thame, Jr.
green
2 sentences2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). 2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Keith Harrison, United States of America v. Eric M. Black, United States of America v. Felando F. Butler
green
2 sentences2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). 2005See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 , 108 S.Ct. 864, 870 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose
green
2 sentences1998Id. . 1998Id. [4] The verdict form used by the jury in recording its verdict against DeHart is attached to this opinion as Appendix A. [5] From its review of the record, the Johnson court determined that the "manifest weight of the evidence" did not support the percentage finding of the jury. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Roberts v. C & M Ready Mix Concrete Co. of Boulder
green
1 sentence1996The trial court recognized this proposition in granting the DeBoses’ “Request for Entry of Judgment,” when it again rejected the defendants’ post-trial duplicative damages argument and held that “the jury was specifically instructed that it could not award duplicate damages, and it must be presumed the jury followed those instructions and determined damages accordingly.” (Citing Roberts v. C & M Ready Mix Concrete Co., 767 P.2d 769 (Colo.App.1988); jury instruction citation omitted.) In view of these explicit jury instructions, we see no need to consider whether an equitable exception to the c | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Brown v. People
green
2 sentences1972Brown v. People, 158 Colo. 561 , 408 P.2d 981 . 1972Brown v. People, 158 Colo. 561 , 408 P.2d 981 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Scheer v. Cromwell
green
2 sentences1969The rationale behind Rule 51, often referred to as the contemporaneous objection rule, was explained by this court in Scheer v. Cromwell, 158 Colo. 427, 429 , 407 P.2d 344 : “The ‘contemporaneous objection’ rule has a salutary purpose in the orderly administration of justice. 1969The rationale behind Rule 51, often referred to as the contemporaneous objection rule, was explained by this court in Scheer v. Cromwell, 158 Colo. 427, 429 , 407 P.2d 344 : “The ‘contemporaneous objection’ rule has a salutary purpose in the orderly administration of justice. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Buckles v. People neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.