contemporaneous objection rule in California

2009(See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1220 [the contemporaneous objection rule applies to cases in which the modification hearing was conducted after this court’s decision in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ]].) In any event, defendant’s claim is without merit.

2008(See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1220 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 998 P.2d 969 ] [the contemporaneous objection rule applies to cases in which the modification hearing was conducted after this court’s decision in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ], became final].) In any event, defendant’s contention is without merit.

2009(See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1220 [the contemporaneous objection rule applies to cases in which the modification hearing was conducted after this court’s decision in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ]].) In any event, defendant’s claim is without merit.

2009(See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1220 [the contemporaneous objection rule applies to cases in which the modification hearing was conducted after this court’s decision in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ]].) In any event, defendant’s claim is without merit.

2015(People v. Daniels (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 304, 320, fn. 10 .) The objection requirement 31 is necessary because a contrary rule “would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would ‘permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 .) “Specificity is required both to enable the court to make an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the party proffering the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence.” (People

2014(People v. Daniels (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 304, 320, fn. 10 .) The objection requirement is necessary because a contrary rule “would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would ‘permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 .) “Specificity is required both to enable the court to make an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the party proffering the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence.” (People v.

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

1983In other instances in which the contemporaneous objection rule applies, however, the courts have permitted defendants to raise for the first time on appeal the "waived" issue in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 49-50 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 ] [failure to claim privilege]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 767 , 775 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] [failure to move to set aside information]; People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374 , 385 fn. 4 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 183 ] [failure to object to hearsay] (disapproved on other grounds in Peopl

2018(See, e.g., People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, 968 (Pinon).) c.

1998Nor did he complain that the additional year was vindictive retaliation. 5 In U.S. v. Vontsteen (5th Cir. 1992) 950 F.2d 1086 , the court held that the failure to object to a sentence on the ground of vindictiveness waived any claim based on an alleged violation of the Pearce rule. “ ‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” (Id. at p. 1089, quoting Yakus v. United States (1944) 321 U.S.

1998Nor did he complain that the additional year was vindictive retaliation. 5 In U.S. v. Vontsteen (5th Cir. 1992) 950 F.2d 1086 , the court held that the failure to object to a sentence on the ground of vindictiveness waived any claim based on an alleged violation of the Pearce rule. “ ‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” (Id. at p. 1089, quoting Yakus v. United States (1944) 321 U.S.

1992NOTES [1] Further unspecified statutory references are to this code. [2] In People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282 , the leading California case on shackling, we relied heavily on Kennedy v. Cardwell, supra, 487 F.2d 101 , and specifically commended its "enlightening" analysis. ( 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, fn. 13 .) [3] Although defendant did not specifically object to the evidence regarding the cocaine, we believe that defendant's general objections on the grounds argued on appeal to all of this evidence, which were overruled, were sufficient to satisfy the contemporaneous objection rule.

1992NOTES [1] Further unspecified statutory references are to this code. [2] In People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282 , the leading California case on shackling, we relied heavily on Kennedy v. Cardwell, supra, 487 F.2d 101 , and specifically commended its "enlightening" analysis. ( 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, fn. 13 .) [3] Although defendant did not specifically object to the evidence regarding the cocaine, we believe that defendant's general objections on the grounds argued on appeal to all of this evidence, which were overruled, were sufficient to satisfy the contemporaneous objection rule.

1990(Compare, e.g., People v. Risenhoover (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 233, 234-236 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 526 ] [second new trial motion based upon subsequent evolution of case law].) Wisely urges in his reply brief that the questions and answers and the juror experiments “fall within the ambit of newly discovered evidence . . . [and are] not subject to the contemporaneous objection rule.” This *949 argument is disingenuous.

1990(Compare, e.g., People v. Risenhoover (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 233, 234-236 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 526 ] [second new trial motion based upon subsequent evolution of case law].) Wisely urges in his reply brief that the questions and answers and the juror experiments “fall within the ambit of newly discovered evidence . . . [and are] not subject to the contemporaneous objection rule.” This *949 argument is disingenuous.

1988(In re James H., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 918 , citing People v. West (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 24 ], People v. DeJesus, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 419 , and In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136, 139, fn. 2 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ].) In People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 ], the Fifth District created an exception to the requirement of an objection when it held, “fairness dictates that before accepting silence or acquiescence in sentencing by a different judge as a waiver, the court must satisfy itself from the record that defendant knew he had

1988(In re James H., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 918 , citing People v. West (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 24 ], People v. DeJesus, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 419 , and In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136, 139, fn. 2 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ].) In People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 ], the Fifth District created an exception to the requirement of an objection when it held, “fairness dictates that before accepting silence or acquiescence in sentencing by a different judge as a waiver, the court must satisfy itself from the record that defendant knew he had

1988(In re James H., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 918 , citing People v. West (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 24 ], People v. DeJesus, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 419 , and In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136, 139, fn. 2 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ].) In People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 ], the Fifth District created an exception to the requirement of an objection when it held, “fairness dictates that before accepting silence or acquiescence in sentencing by a different judge as a waiver, the court must satisfy itself from the record that defendant knew he had

1988(In re James H., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 918 , citing People v. West (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 24 ], People v. DeJesus, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 419 , and In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136, 139, fn. 2 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ].) In People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 ], the Fifth District created an exception to the requirement of an objection when it held, “fairness dictates that before accepting silence or acquiescence in sentencing by a different judge as a waiver, the court must satisfy itself from the record that defendant knew he had

1988Prosecutorial misconduct is cause for reversal only when it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred had the district attorney refrained from the comment attacked by the defendant.” (People v. Beivelman (1968) 70 Cal.2d 60, 75 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 447 P.2d 913 ].) The prosecutor’s comment contained no more than a hint that the defense was fabricated with the assistance of counsel.

1988Prosecutorial misconduct is cause for reversal only when it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred had the district attorney refrained from the comment attacked by the defendant.” (People v. Beivelman (1968) 70 Cal.2d 60, 75 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 447 P.2d 913 ].) The prosecutor’s comment contained no more than a hint that the defense was fabricated with the assistance of counsel.

1985Arbuckle did not hold that it is always an implied term of a plea bargain that the judge who accepts the admission or plea will impose the sentence; instead, Arbuckle stated that such was “a general principle.” (People v. Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 756 ; see In re Mark L., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 180 .) The Arbuckle court also noted that the trial judge had repeatedly used the personal pronoun when referring to sentencing in the proceeding in which the plea bargain was accepted.