contemporaneous objection rule in Alaska

1971There, the Court said: Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims [citations omitted], we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case. 379 U.S. at 451-452 , 85 S.Ct. at 569 , 13 L.

1971There, the Court said: Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims [citations omitted], we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case. 379 U.S. at 451-452 , 85 S.Ct. at 569 , 13 L.

2018Cf. Lathrop , 781 N.W.2d at 294 (explaining that Iowa's illegal sentence exception to the contemporaneous objection rule does not apply to "sentences that are within the court's statutory and constitutional authority but were procedurally flawed or imposed in an illegal manner"); State v. Stiles , 347 Mont. 95 , 197 P.3d 966 , 968 (2008) ("A sentence that falls within the statutory parameters constitutes a legal sentence.").

2018See Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage , 685 P.2d 103 , 105 (Alaska App. 1984) (setting forth three examples of illegal sentences: "(1) a sentence that was contrary to the applicable statute ...; (2) a written judgment not conforming to the oral pronouncement of sentence; [and] (3) 'a sentence that is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served' " (quoting 3 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 582, at 381-82 (2d ed. 1982) ) ).

1985See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (defendant forfeits right to challenge voluntariness of his confession by failing to move to suppress the confession pre-trial as required by court rule).

1985See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (defendant forfeits right to challenge voluntariness of his confession by failing to move to suppress the confession pre-trial as required by court rule).

1982See Engle v. Isaac, - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 802 (1982).

1982See Engle v. Isaac, - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 802 (1982).

1981See Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1980).

1981See Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1980).

1981The trial court admitted as much by saying that if the defense had “asked for a mistrial at that time I would’ve probably granted it.” Therefore, one purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule, “to require errors to be brought to the attention of the trial court in time for their correction so as to avoid the inconvenience and expense of a new trial,” Dimmick v. State, 449 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1969), was unattainable in this case.

1981The trial court admitted as much by saying that if the defense had "asked for a mistrial at that time I would've probably granted it." Therefore, one purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule, "to require errors to be brought to the attention of the trial court in time for their correction so as to avoid the inconvenience and expense of a new trial," Dimmick v. State, 449 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1969), was unattainable in this case.

1971We think that Henry limits Fay v. Noia at least to this extent — that it stands for the proposition that counsel’s decision, although made “without prior consultation with an accused,” to bypass the contemporaneous-objection rule as part of trial strategy, will nevertheless “preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims” * * * Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir. 1965). 13 .