manifest injustice standard in Kansas

2021Unless Tiger meets the manifest injustice exception, he cannot pursue a claim under this statute. "'The [K.S.A. 60-1507(f)] time limitation herein "may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice."'" .... 7 "[M]anifest injustice in the habeas context means 'obviously unfair' or 'shocking to the conscience.'" Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 610, 614 , 325 P.3d 1114 (2014), superseded by statute as stated in White v. State, 308 Kan. 491 , 421 P.3d 718 (2018).

2021The factors a court may consider when determining whether the manifest injustice exception applies are "(1) a movant's reasons for the failure to timely file the motion . . . or (2) a movant's claim of actual innocence." White v. State, 308 Kan. 491 , 496, 421 P.3d 718 (2018).

2026The Wilkinson panel found that "[w]ithout knowing about the manifest-injustice standard, Wilkinson could not reasonably judge the value of the State's sentencing recommendation, which was made in exchange for his plea." 40 Kan.

2014The panel remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether Wilkinson’s counsel had failed to inform him of the manifest-injustice standard. 40 Kan.

2022State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 512 , 231 P.3d 563 (2010).

2022State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 512 , 231 P.3d 563 (2010).

2026App. 2d 235 , 240, 490 P.3d 78 (2021); see K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

2024Below, the district court centered its analysis on Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000).

2024State v. Roberts, 310 Kan. 5 , Syl. ¶ 5, 444 P.3d 982 (2019).

2023Thus, "[i]t is an abuse of discretion for a district court to issue a 'blanket ruling' that disposes of a discretionary determination automatically without analyzing the factors that would enter into the discretionary decision." State v. Horton, 292 Kan. 437, 440 , 254 P.3d 1264 (2011). 5 The sentencing hearing transcript strongly suggests the district court did not appreciate the discretionary authority conferred under the manifest injustice exception.

2023First, the appellate courts have recognized that a manifest injustice entails an occurrence that is "obviously unfair" or "shocking to the conscience." See State v. Hutto, 313 Kan. 741 , 745, 490 P.3d 43 (2021); White v. State, 308 Kan. 491 , 496, 421 P.3d 718 (2018).

2023Thus, "[i]t is an abuse of discretion for a district court to issue a 'blanket ruling' that disposes of a discretionary determination automatically without analyzing the factors that would enter into the discretionary decision." State v. Horton, 292 Kan. 437, 440 , 254 P.3d 1264 (2011). 5 The sentencing hearing transcript strongly suggests the district court did not appreciate the discretionary authority conferred under the manifest injustice exception.

2022When determining whether a movant has established manifest injustice, courts in this state generally consider the three Edgar factors: "'(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made.'" State v. Morris, 298 Kan. 1091, 1100 , 319 P.3d 539 (2014) (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 [2006]).

2022When determining whether a movant has established manifest injustice, courts in this state generally consider the three Edgar factors: "'(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made.'" State v. Morris, 298 Kan. 1091, 1100 , 319 P.3d 539 (2014) (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 [2006]).

2022When determining whether a movant has established manifest injustice, courts in this state generally consider the three Edgar factors: "'(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made.'" State v. Morris, 298 Kan. 1091, 1100 , 319 P.3d 539 (2014) (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 [2006]).

2022When determining whether a movant has established manifest injustice, courts in this state generally consider the three Edgar factors: "'(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made.'" State v. Morris, 298 Kan. 1091, 1100 , 319 P.3d 539 (2014) (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 [2006]).

2021Under the manifest injustice standard, the outcome must be "'obviously unfair'" or "'shocking to the conscience." Sherwood v. State, 310 Kan. 93 , 99-100, 444 P.3d 966 (2019).

2020Szczygiel claimed his plea was not knowingly or understandingly made because the government did not disclose material impeachment evidence prior to his plea, which denied him "'the ability to make an accurate calculus of the evidence and facts of the case to determine whether the best option . . . was to go to trial or to enter into the plea agreement.'" 294 Kan. at 645 .

2020Schmeal asserts Brackman's representation was lackluster because he violated Schmeal's statutory right to receive copies of discovery, as discussed in State v. Marks, 297 Kan. 131, 148 , 298 P.3d 1102 (2013).

2020Schmeal asserts Brackman's representation was lackluster because he violated Schmeal's statutory right to receive copies of discovery, as discussed in State v. Marks, 297 Kan. 131, 148 , 298 P.3d 1102 (2013).

2020Similar to the manifest injustice exception to the one-year time limit for filing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, whether a defendant moving to withdraw a plea can show excusable neglect for his or her failure to timely file the motion "must be raised in the motion itself or at least presented to the district court or it will not be considered on appeal." Wilkerson v. State, 38 Kan.

2020App. 2d 732, 734 , 171 P.3d 671 (2007); see State v. Williams, 311 Kan. 88 , 92, 456 P.3d 540 (2020) (issues not raised before district court cannot be raised on appeal).

2014Kelly, 291 Kan. at 567 .

2011Wimbley III, 2010 WL 597008, at *6 .

2008Because pro se motions under K.S.A. 60-1507 are liberally construed, Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 605 , 88 P.3d 214 (2004), Wilkinson’s motion should be construed as one to withdraw *744 his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to tell him of the manifest-injustice requirement for concurrent sentences.

2008Because pro se motions under K.S.A. 60-1507 are liberally construed, Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 605 , 88 P.3d 214 (2004), Wilkinson’s motion should be construed as one to withdraw *744 his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to tell him of the manifest-injustice requirement for concurrent sentences.

2008The manifest-injustice standard presents quite a high hurdle: a sentence results in manifest injustice only when it “is obviously unfair and shocks the conscience of the court.” State v. Medina, 256 Kan. 695 , Syl. ¶ 1, 887 P.2d 105 (1994).

2008The manifest-injustice standard presents quite a high hurdle: a sentence results in manifest injustice only when it “is obviously unfair and shocks the conscience of the court.” State v. Medina, 256 Kan. 695 , Syl. ¶ 1, 887 P.2d 105 (1994).

1992The court stated: “Individual sentencing judges will, no doubt, differ in their views as to when manifest injustice has been shown.” 672 P.2d at 155 .