manifest injustice standard in Tennessee

2013While the term “manifest injustice” has not been defined by statutory or case law, “courts have identified on a case-by-case basis 15 circumstances that meet the manifest injustice standard necessary for withdrawal of a plea.” See State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim.

2012While the term “manifest injustice” has not been defined by statutory or case law, “courts have identified on a case-by-case basis circumstances that meet the manifest injustice standard necessary for withdrawal of a plea.” See State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim.

2005Although Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure 444(g)(2) utilizes the “to correct manifest injustice” standard, the rule does not (continued...) -9- by-case basis circumstances that meet the manifest injustice standard necessary for withdrawal of a plea.5 See Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 355 ; Evans, 454 S.E.2d at 473 .

2005Although Rule 32(f) does not define “manifest injustice,” 4 courts have identified on a case-by-case basis circumstances that meet the manifest injustice standard necessary for withdrawal of a plea. 5 See Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 355 ; Evans, 454 S.E.2d at 473 .

2024Though Rule 32(f) does not define “manifest injustice,” Tennessee “courts have identified circumstances that meet the manifest injustice standard necessary for withdrawal of a plea.” State v. Virgil, 256 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tenn. Crim.

2020State v. Virgil, 256 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See, e.g., State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291-92 (Fla. 2003); see also, e.g., Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).

2019See, e.g., State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291-92 (Fla. 2003); see also, e.g., Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).

2016See Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (stating that information is considered material when “„there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different‟”); see also Phelps, 329 S.W.3d at 444 (stating that a guilty plea may be withdrawn under the manifest injustice standard when the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady and “this failure to disclose influenced the entry of the plea”).

2016See Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (stating that information is considered material when “„there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different‟”); see also Phelps, 329 S.W.3d at 444 (stating that a guilty plea may be withdrawn under the manifest injustice standard when the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady and “this failure to disclose influenced the entry of the plea”).

2005See generally 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, § 755 (2004) ("Circumstances that constitute manifest injustice permitting the withdrawal of the plea include pleas entered: (1) involuntarily, (2) without effective assistance of counsel, (3) without an understanding of the nature of the charges, (4) after a court's failure to establish a sufficient factual basis for the plea, (5) pursuant to a plea agreement that was not kept by the prosecution, or (6) as a result of procedural errors by the court."). [6] Henning, 201 S.W.2d at 670 ; see also Capri Adult Cinema v. State, 537 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tenn.1976

2005See United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277 , 281 n. 3 (3d Cir.1965); Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 (4th Cir.1963) ("The facts disclosed in a hearing might not be sufficient for the court to conclude that the guilty plea was involuntary and violative of due process, yet the court may be of the opinion that clear injustice was done.") [11] Although prior Tennessee decisions have discussed the factual basis requirement as if it applies to nolo contendere pleas, the State did not contest its application in these prior cases.

2005See United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277 , 281 n. 3 (3d Cir.1965); Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 (4th Cir.1963) ("The facts disclosed in a hearing might not be sufficient for the court to conclude that the guilty plea was involuntary and violative of due process, yet the court may be of the opinion that clear injustice was done.") [11] Although prior Tennessee decisions have discussed the factual basis requirement as if it applies to nolo contendere pleas, the State did not contest its application in these prior cases.

2005See generally 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, § 755 (2004) ("Circumstances that constitute manifest injustice permitting the withdrawal of the plea include pleas entered: (1) involuntarily, (2) without effective assistance of counsel, (3) without an understanding of the nature of the charges, (4) after a court's failure to establish a sufficient factual basis for the plea, (5) pursuant to a plea agreement that was not kept by the prosecution, or (6) as a result of procedural errors by the court."). [6] Henning, 201 S.W.2d at 670 ; see also Capri Adult Cinema v. State, 537 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tenn.1976

2005Withdrawal to correct manifest injustice is warranted where: (1) the plea "was entered through a misunderstanding as to its effect, or through fear and fraud, or where it was not made voluntarily"; [6] (2) the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and this failure to disclose influenced the entry of the plea; [7] (3) the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered; [8] and (4) the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of the p

2005Withdrawal to correct manifest injustice is warranted where: (1) the plea “was entered through a misunderstanding as to its effect, or through fear and fraud, or where it was not made voluntarily”; 6 (2) the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and this failure to disclose influenced the entry of the plea; 7 (3) the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered; 8 and (4) the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of the plea. 9