Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
32 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2024"We therefore review to determine whether the failure to instruct was error, and if it was, whether the error was prejudicial." Commonwealth v. Graham, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 651 (2004). 2 The defendant requested that the jury be instructed on self-defense during the charge conference and again during jury deliberations when the jury asked whether "it [is] reasonable to factor self-defense in the assessment of guilt within the legal definition of assault." 6 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense of self-defense, see Commonwealth v. Tirado, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 574 ( 2017Commonwealth v. Graham, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 651 (2004). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Johnstongreen2 sentences2016The defendant's New Hampshire driver's record was admitted in evidence without having been disclosed during pretrial discovery, see Mass. R. 29 The defendant requested an instruction that "you must determine whether the indictments, if brought [more than twenty- seven] years [after] the alleged conduct, are supported by independent corroborating evidence." While the judge was not obligated to give the instruction in exactly this form, see Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 702 (2014), the defendant's request accurately reflected the law as stated in G. 2016Cir. 1969) (“The corroboration doctrines in this jurisdiction require not only the existence of evidence sufficient to avoid a directed verdict, but also that the case be sent to the jury with instructions . . . that it is their' responsibility as jurors to determine whether evidence which they credit establishes such corroboration”). 29 The defendant requested an instruction that “you must determine whether the indictments, if brought [more than twenty-seven] years [after] the alleged conduct, are supported by independent corroborating evidence.” While the judge was not obligated to give the | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen2 sentences2015An actor (defendant) may use force against another in order to protect a third person when “(a) a reasonable person in the [defendant’s] position would believe his intervention to be necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b) in the circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to be, the third person would be justified in using such force to protect himself.” Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 208 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 (1976). 1977In preparation for the judge’s charge the defendant requested an instruction, taken virtually verbatim from Commonwealth v. Martin, supra. The request was refused by the judge, and the refusal was excepted to. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Tiradogreen1 sentence2024"We therefore review to determine whether the failure to instruct was error, and if it was, whether the error was prejudicial." Commonwealth v. Graham, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 651 (2004). 2 The defendant requested that the jury be instructed on self-defense during the charge conference and again during jury deliberations when the jury asked whether "it [is] reasonable to factor self-defense in the assessment of guilt within the legal definition of assault." 6 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense of self-defense, see Commonwealth v. Tirado, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 574 ( | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ariasgreen1 sentence2024The issue is preserved, as the defendant requested the instruction both in writing and orally.2 See Commonwealth v. Arias, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 463 (2013) ("when a judge refuses to give a requested instruction, a defendant's rights are saved without the necessity of a further objection"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mattsongreen1 sentence2017Commonwealth v. Mattson, 377 Mass. 638, 642, 644 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Walkergreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walker , 466 Mass. 268 , 283-284 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'CONNORgreen1 sentence2016The instruction tracked the language of instruction 5.11 of the Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury Instruction (2013), and the language of Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667 (1990), an earlier 3 case in which the court makes reference to the defense. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gomesgreen1 sentence2016See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 357 n.10. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pratergreen2 sentences2015See Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 97 (2000). 2015See Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 97 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Younggreen1 sentence2015An actor (defendant) may use force against another in order to protect a third person when “(a) a reasonable person in the [defendant’s] position would believe his intervention to be necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b) in the circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to be, the third person would be justified in using such force to protect himself.” Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 208 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bellgreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 306-307 (2011). “[T]he felony on which a charge of felony-murder is premised may be uncharged, so long as the evidence supports it.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, supra. The defendant requested an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree predicated on the uncharged offense of “drug *39 distribution.” The judge denied the request on the ground that the evidence did not provide a rational basis for conviction of that offense. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Stokesgreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 306-307 (2011). “[T]he felony on which a charge of felony-murder is premised may be uncharged, so long as the evidence supports it.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, supra. The defendant requested an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree predicated on the uncharged offense of “drug *39 distribution.” The judge denied the request on the ground that the evidence did not provide a rational basis for conviction of that offense. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cuffiegreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Cuffie, 414 Mass. 632, 639-640 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cowansgreen1 sentence2008An alternative is that the Commonwealth may prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally caused an injury to a person within a dwelling place.” The defendant requested an instruction similar to that recommended by the Appeals Court in Commonwealth v. Cowans, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 821 (2001), requiring as essential for conviction a finding of specific intent to use or threaten the use of force. 5 The judge declined to give such an instruction, and the defendant now claims that the omission was error. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Acevedogreen1 sentence2004There was no specific objection to the instruction as given. 13 The Commonwealth now points out that the judge’s instruction on provocation contravened Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 716 (1998). 14 . 15 We agree, but conclude that the error did not prejudice the defendant, because we are not persuaded that the evidence warranted any instruction on provocation. 16 A provocation instruction need not be given unless there is evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that is “sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of a rational jury that a defendant’s ac | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bermudezgreen1 sentence1999The law is clear that mere insulting words and threatening gestures alone with nothing else are not adequate provocation to reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter.” The defendant describes this instruction as “incomplete.” The defendant requested an instruction tracking the language contained in Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 370 Mass. 438, 440-442 (1976), 2 specifically: “The existence of sufficient provocation is not foreclosed absolutely because a defendant learns of a fact from oral statements rather than from personal observation. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sullivangreen1 sentence1997Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 93, 99 (1990) (Sullivan II). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Washingtongreen1 sentence1994See Commonwealth v. Washington, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 383 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Almongreen1 sentence1992In concluding that we see no *288 substantial , risk of a miscarriage of justice in the trial judge’s failure to include an instruction on fresh complaint evidence in his final charge, we are guided by our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Almon, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 721, 724-726 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Soarisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Zukoskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Victum v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Crowleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wilbornegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Waldengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Gouldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Goldenberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Franks v. Delaware
green
1 sentence2024As one such effort, the defendant requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511 (1990). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Amral
green
1 sentence2024As one such effort, the defendant requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511 (1990). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
1 sentence2024In that case, the defendant requested an instruction which would have told the jury that "there was evidence that [the defendant] was a juvenile and therefore had less or a diminished capacity than an adult for making critical judgments." Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Dorvil
green
2 sentences2022Here, the defendant requested an instruction stating that "the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently has ruled [that] . . . [a] parent is entitled to discipline his or her child in Page 404 disciplinary circumstances, provided such force is reasonable and conducted for the purpose of enforcing discipline" and does not "place the subject child at undue risk of substantial injury." This is not an accurate reflection of the rule articulated in Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 472 Mass. 1 (2015). 2022The Supreme Judicial Court there "h[e]ld that a parent or guardian may not be subjected to criminal liability for the use of force against a minor child under the care and supervision of the parent or guardian, provided that (1) the force used against the minor child is reasonable; (2) the force is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor . . . ; and (3) the force used neither causes, nor creates a substantial risk of causing, physical harm (beyond fleeting pain or minor, transient marks), gross degradation, or severe mental distress." Id. at 12 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Okoro
green
2 sentences2019Because the defendant requested an instruction with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 926A, and objected when the request was denied, we review for prejudicial error. 14 See Commonwealth v. Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 67, 26 N.E.3d 1092 (2015). 2019Because the defendant requested an instruction with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 926A, and objected when the request was denied, we review for prejudicial error. 14 See Commonwealth v. Okoro , 471 Mass. 51 , 67, 26 N.E.3d 1092 (2015). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Henderson
green
1 sentence2016The defendant requested an instruction on eyewitness identification that was essentially identical to the instruction that was developed after the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Henderson, 208 N.J. at 298-299 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Mutina
green
1 sentence2016The defendant requested an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility as provided in Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810 , 823 & n.12 (1975) (Mutina instruction). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Burgos
green
2 sentences2015The defendant requested such an instruction, and objected when it was not given.25 The prejudicial error standard therefore applies on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 66-67 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 (2012), but there was no error. 2015The defendant requested such an instruction, and objected when it was not given. 25 The prejudicial error standard therefore applies on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 66-67 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 (2012), but there was no error. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Minnesota
green
2 sentences2015The defendant requested such an instruction, and objected when it was not given.25 The prejudicial error standard therefore applies on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 66-67 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 (2012), but there was no error. 2015The defendant requested such an instruction, and objected when it was not given. 25 The prejudicial error standard therefore applies on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 66-67 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 (2012), but there was no error. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Darch
green
1 sentence2010In Darch , there was expert testimony that the defendant’s underlying mental conditions, for which she was being treated by a psychiatrist, were exacerbated by “too much prescribed medication, . . . [and when cjombined with the two drinks that she had admitted to imbibing . . . caused her to become psychotic and unable to control her behavior in a rational way.” Id. at 714 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Taylor v. Kentucky green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Commonwealth v. Hinckley green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Commonwealth v. Noxon green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.