exact instruction in Mississippi

2007This exact instruction was found proper in Turner v. State, 732 So.2d 937, 954-55 (Miss.1999).

2004This exact instruction was found proper in Turner v. State, 732 So.2d 937, 954-55 (Miss.1999).

2007See also Irving v. State, 618 So.2d 58 (Miss.1992).

2004See also Irving v. State, 618 So.2d 58 (Miss.1992).

2004We addressed this exact instruction in Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 791-92 (Miss.2001) and Petti v. State, 666 So.2d 754, 756-57 (Miss.1995).

2004We addressed this exact instruction in Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 791-92 (Miss.2001) and Petti v. State, 666 So.2d 754, 756-57 (Miss.1995).

2004We addressed this exact instruction in Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 791-92 (Miss.2001) and Petti v. State, 666 So.2d 754, 756-57 (Miss.1995).

2004We addressed this exact instruction in Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 791-92 (Miss.2001) and Petti v. State, 666 So.2d 754, 756-57 (Miss.1995).

1997Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1236 (Miss.1996) (approving similar instruction which did not include "dismemberment" clause, and added "that the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death" after the "serious mutilation" clause); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1270 (Miss.1993) (approving very similar instruction, except final sentence combined "serious mutilation" and "dismemberment of the corpse" in the same clause and inserted the clause "where the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death" before the phrase dealing with "mental torture and aggravation before

1997Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1236 (Miss.1996) (approving similar instruction which did not include “dismemberment” clause, and added “that the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death” after the “serious mutilation” clause); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1270 (Miss.1993) (approving very similar instruction, except final sentence combined “serious mutilation” and “dismemberment of the corpse” in the same clause and inserted the clause “where the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death” before the phrase dealing with “mental torture and aggravation before

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss. 1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that "barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim"); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss.1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that “barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim”); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d

1997Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1236 (Miss.1996) (approving similar instruction which did not include "dismemberment" clause, and added "that the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death" after the "serious mutilation" clause); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1270 (Miss.1993) (approving very similar instruction, except final sentence combined "serious mutilation" and "dismemberment of the corpse" in the same clause and inserted the clause "where the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death" before the phrase dealing with "mental torture and aggravation before

1997Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1236 (Miss.1996) (approving similar instruction which did not include “dismemberment” clause, and added “that the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death” after the “serious mutilation” clause); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1270 (Miss.1993) (approving very similar instruction, except final sentence combined “serious mutilation” and “dismemberment of the corpse” in the same clause and inserted the clause “where the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death” before the phrase dealing with “mental torture and aggravation before

1997Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1236 (Miss.1996) (approving similar instruction which did not include "dismemberment" clause, and added "that the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death" after the "serious mutilation" clause); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1270 (Miss.1993) (approving very similar instruction, except final sentence combined "serious mutilation" and "dismemberment of the corpse" in the same clause and inserted the clause "where the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death" before the phrase dealing with "mental torture and aggravation before

1997Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1236 (Miss.1996) (approving similar instruction which did not include “dismemberment” clause, and added “that the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death” after the “serious mutilation” clause); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1270 (Miss.1993) (approving very similar instruction, except final sentence combined “serious mutilation” and “dismemberment of the corpse” in the same clause and inserted the clause “where the Defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death” before the phrase dealing with “mental torture and aggravation before

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss. 1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that "barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim"); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss.1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that “barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim”); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss.1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that “barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim”); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss.1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that “barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim”); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d

2004See Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131 (Miss.1988); McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130 (Miss. 1987); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss.1985).

1997See Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131 (Miss. 1988); McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130 (Miss. 1987); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985).

1999Robinson v. State, 434 So.2d 206, 207 (Miss.1983).

1999Robinson v. State, 434 So.2d 206, 207 (Miss.1983).

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss. 1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that "barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim"); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2

1997See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 357 (Miss.1988), vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) (approving language used in first two sentences and noting that “barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim”); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d

2023Therefore, as a result of the Commission’s insufficient response, the supreme court was not able to determine whether “the action of the [Commission] was in good faith for cause” or whether “there was substantial evidence before the [Commission] to support its order[,] and whether the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory, and capricious.” Id. (¶19) (quoting Necaise, 170 So. 3d at 618 (¶9)).12 ¶25.

2021As a result of the Commission’s insufficient response, we are unable to determine 7 “whether or not the action of the [Commission] was in good faith for cause” or “whether or not there was substantial evidence before the [Commission] to support its order[,] and whether the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory, and capricious.” Bates, 247 So. 3d at 340 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Necaise, 170 So. 3d at 618 ). ¶20.

2021As the dissenting opinion in Roberts notes, in Bowie, after the court ordered it to make specific findings of fact in accordance with the statute, “[t]he Commission responded . . . by providing factual findings that (1) identified the specific civil-service rules the terminated officer had violated and (2) discussed the witness testimony the Commission had relied upon.” Roberts, 2020 WL 6281293 , at *4 (Westbrooks, J., dissenting) (citing Bowie, 816 So. 2d at 1018 ). “[U]nlike the response provided in Bowie, the Commission’s response here failed to identify with any clarity or specificity . .

2020Despite our limited standard of review on appeal, no dispute exists that the Commission must “set forth with sufficient clarity and specificity the reason it is upholding the action taken by the city . . . .” Bowie, 816 So. 2d at 1018 (¶21) (quoting City of Jackson v. Froshour, 530 So. 2d 1348, 1355 (Miss. 1988)).

2021As a result of the Commission’s insufficient response, we are unable to determine 7 “whether or not the action of the [Commission] was in good faith for cause” or “whether or not there was substantial evidence before the [Commission] to support its order[,] and whether the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory, and capricious.” Bates, 247 So. 3d at 340 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Necaise, 170 So. 3d at 618 ). ¶20.

2021But we looked to precedent and found that the possession instruction in Adams—which was the exact instruction used in Franklin’s case—was a valid “model jury instruction” since it “state[d] the law of the case and create[d] no injustice.” Id. at (¶16) (quoting Watkins v. State, 101 So. 3d 628, 635 (¶22) (Miss. 2012)). 1 There is a conflict in fact regarding what Franklin was referring to when he made the above statement.

2020Despite our limited standard of review on appeal, no dispute exists that the Commission must “set forth with sufficient clarity and specificity the reason it is upholding the action taken by the city . . . .” Bowie, 816 So. 2d at 1018 (¶21) (quoting City of Jackson v. Froshour, 530 So. 2d 1348, 1355 (Miss. 1988)).

2016While it may have been a better practice for the trial court in this case to limit the language of the instruction to the purposes for which the State, had offered the-evidence, we will not find error if the instructions actually given “fairly, though not' perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law.” Clark v. State, 40 So.3d 531, 544 (Miss.2010).

2016While it may have been a better practice for the trial court in this case to limit the language of the instruction to the purposes for which the State had offered the evidence, we will not find error if the instructions actually given “fairly, though not perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law.” Clark v. State, 40 So. 3d 531, 544 (Miss. 2010).

2016Indeed, “the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a valid guilty plea operates as a waiver of the right to a speedy trial.” Allen v. State, 164 So.3d 498, 500 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2015) (citing Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390, 391 (Miss.1991)).

2016The circuit court has found this exact claim raised by Chandler in a previous PCR motion to be without merit under this Court’s holding in Avery, 95 So.3d at 768 (¶ 9) (“[A] valid guilty plea waives the right to a speedy trial, whether that right is of constitutional or statutory origin.”).

2016Indeed, “the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a valid guilty plea operates as a waiver of the right to a speedy trial.” Allen v. State, 164 So.3d 498, 500 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2015) (citing Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390, 391 (Miss.1991)).

2014Corrothers also cites Wheeler v. State, 560 So.2d 171, 173-74 (Miss.1990), for the proposition that a cautionary instruction on this type of testimony must contain the words “with suspicion;” however, Wheeler involved uncorroborated testimony by an accomplice/coconspirator to the crime, not testimony by an informant. ¶55.