exact standard in California

2022The prosecution may offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.’ [Citation.]” ( Nelson, supra, at p. 1250 ; see People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1327-1329 (Mirenda).) In Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1242 , our high court explained that “[t]he state and federal constitutional standards regarding what justifies delay differ” and, although “the exact standard [for due process violations] under [the federal] Constitution is not entirely settled[, i]t is clear . . . that the l

2022The prosecution may offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.’ [Citation.]” ( Nelson, supra, at p. 1250 ; see People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1327-1329 (Mirenda).) In Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1242 , our high court explained that “[t]he state and federal constitutional standards regarding what justifies delay differ” and, although “the exact standard [for due process violations] under [the federal] Constitution is not entirely settled[, i]t is clear . . . that the l

2019Based on the state of the law at the time, in Guiton , we said that legal error is "subject to the rule generally requiring reversal." ( Guiton , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) But we also said that this does not mean that reversal is always required when the error is legal. ( Id . at p. 1129, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Because the error in Guiton was purely factual, and thus subject to the lenient standard of review applicable to factually inadequate theories, we did not need to decide the exact standard of review of cases involving legal error. (

2019Based on the state of the law at the time, in Guiton , we said that legal error is "subject to the rule generally requiring reversal." ( Guiton , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) But we also said that this does not mean that reversal is always required when the error is legal. ( Id . at p. 1129, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) Because the error in Guiton was purely factual, and thus subject to the lenient standard of review applicable to factually inadequate theories, we did not need to decide the exact standard of review of cases involving legal error. (

2022The prosecution may offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.’ [Citation.]” ( Nelson, supra, at p. 1250 ; see People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1327-1329 (Mirenda).) In Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1242 , our high court explained that “[t]he state and federal constitutional standards regarding what justifies delay differ” and, although “the exact standard [for due process violations] under [the federal] Constitution is not entirely settled[, i]t is clear . . . that the l

2022The prosecution may offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.’ [Citation.]” ( Nelson, supra, at p. 1250 ; see People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1327-1329 (Mirenda).) In Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1242 , our high court explained that “[t]he state and federal constitutional standards regarding what justifies delay differ” and, although “the exact standard [for due process violations] under [the federal] Constitution is not entirely settled[, i]t is clear . . . that the l

2016(See, e.g., People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 881 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 27 , 331 P.3d 201 ]; People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 942.) As we have explained, “[a]lthough the United States is a signatory [to the ICCPR], it signed the treaty on the express condition ‘[t]hat the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment ....’” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403-404 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d

2015(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 921 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 306 P.3d 1136 ]; accord, People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 909 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 , 271 P.3d 1040 ]; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 850 , 236 P.3d 1074 ].) Respondent contends the holding in Nelson is no longer binding because the crime in Nelson took place in 1976, prior to the passage of Proposition 8, adding the truth-in-evidence provision to the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art.

1994The jurors' `own intelligence and expertise will save them from' the error of giving them `the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory.' ( Griffin, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 59 [116 L.Ed.2d at pp. 382-383, 112 S.Ct. at p. 474 ].)" ( People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) We made clear in Guiton that we were not "decid[ing] the exact standard of review of cases governed by Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1 [i.e., those involving legally incorrect instructional errors]." ( Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) We further observed in Guiton that Green's rule of reversal, even as applied

1994The jurors' `own intelligence and expertise will save them from' the error of giving them `the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory.' ( Griffin, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 59 [116 L.Ed.2d at pp. 382-383, 112 S.Ct. at p. 474 ].)" ( People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) We made clear in Guiton that we were not "decid[ing] the exact standard of review of cases governed by Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1 [i.e., those involving legally incorrect instructional errors]." ( Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) We further observed in Guiton that Green's rule of reversal, even as applied

2024(See People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [remand 16 unnecessary when record “‘clearly indicate[s]’” trial court “would have reached the same conclusion”]; People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425 ; People v. McVey (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 405, 419 .) Second, wife argues that the trial court’s reduction in the award of sanctions “punished” her, “penalized” her, and “impede[d]” her access to court in violation of due process.

2023Penal Code section 954 “ ‘authorizes multiple convictions for different or distinct offenses, but does not permit multiple convictions for a different statement of the same offense when it is based on the same act or course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 650 (Vidana).) Whether two statutes or statutory provisions describe the same offense within the meaning of Penal Code section 954 “ ‘turns on the Legislature’s intent in enacting [the] provisions, and if the Legislature meant to define only one offense, we may not turn it into two.’ ” (People v. Grabham (2021) 68 Cal.A

2016He relies on section 2900.5, which provides that: (1) “in all felony and misdemeanor convictions,” the defendant is entitled to credit for time served; and (2) such credit can be applied toward “any period of imprisonment” and “any period of . . . parole.” (§ 2900.5, subds. (a) and (c); see also In re Sosa (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1002 [under section 2900.5, presentence custody credits in excess of a prisoner’s term of imprisonment reduce the prisoner’s time on parole]; In re Ballard (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 647, 650 [“section 2900.5 credits may be applied against either or both of the period of inc

2016(See, e.g., People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 881 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 27 , 331 P.3d 201 ]; People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 942.) As we have explained, “[a]lthough the United States is a signatory [to the ICCPR], it signed the treaty on the express condition ‘[t]hat the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment ....’” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403-404 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d

2016(See, e.g., People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 881 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 27 , 331 P.3d 201 ]; People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 942.) As we have explained, “[a]lthough the United States is a signatory [to the ICCPR], it signed the treaty on the express condition ‘[t]hat the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment ....’” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403-404 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d

2016He relies on section 2900.5, which provides that: (1) “in all felony and misdemeanor convictions,” the defendant is entitled to credit for time served; and (2) such credit can be applied toward “any period of imprisonment” and “any period of . . . parole.” (§ 2900.5, subds. (a) and (c); see also In re Sosa (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1002 [under section 2900.5, presentence custody credits in excess of a prisoner’s term of imprisonment reduce the prisoner’s time on parole]; In re Ballard (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 647, 650 [“section 2900.5 credits may be applied against either or both of the period of inc

2016(See, e.g., People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 881 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 27 , 331 P.3d 201 ]; People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 942.) As we have explained, “[a]lthough the United States is a signatory [to the ICCPR], it signed the treaty on the express condition ‘[t]hat the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment ....’” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403-404 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d

2016(See, e.g., People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 881 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 27 , 331 P.3d 201 ]; People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 942.) As we have explained, “[a]lthough the United States is a signatory [to the ICCPR], it signed the treaty on the express condition ‘[t]hat the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment ....’” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403-404 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d

2015(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 921 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 306 P.3d 1136 ]; accord, People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 909 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 , 271 P.3d 1040 ]; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 850 , 236 P.3d 1074 ].) Respondent contends the holding in Nelson is no longer binding because the crime in Nelson took place in 1976, prior to the passage of Proposition 8, adding the truth-in-evidence provision to the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art.

2015(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 921 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 306 P.3d 1136 ]; accord, People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 909 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 , 271 P.3d 1040 ]; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 850 , 236 P.3d 1074 ].) Respondent contends the holding in Nelson is no longer binding because the crime in Nelson took place in 1976, prior to the passage of Proposition 8, adding the truth-in-evidence provision to the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art.

2015(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 921 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 306 P.3d 1136 ]; accord, People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 909 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 , 271 P.3d 1040 ]; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 850 , 236 P.3d 1074 ].) Respondent contends the holding in Nelson is no longer binding because the crime in Nelson took place in 1976, prior to the passage of Proposition 8, adding the truth-in-evidence provision to the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art.

2015(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 921 [ 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 306 P.3d 1136 ]; accord, People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 909 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 , 271 P.3d 1040 ]; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 850 , 236 P.3d 1074 ].) Respondent contends the holding in Nelson is no longer binding because the crime in Nelson took place in 1976, prior to the passage of Proposition 8, adding the truth-in-evidence provision to the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art.

2014(People v. Llamas (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1740 .)” In Guiton, however, the California Supreme Court observed that it was “not then 5 presented with the situation of a jury’s having been instructed with a legally adequate and a legally inadequate theory and that [it] therefore ‘need not decide the exact standard of review’ in such circumstances.” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 70 (concur. opn. of Baxter, J. [noting that issue Guiton was not dispositive on alternate-theory error as Cross “only now presents that issue”].) To the extent defendant asserts that the Chapman harmless-error