exact instruction in North Carolina

2024See State v. McPhail, 329 N.C. 636, 643 (1991); State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 214 (1996) (“Since defendant asked for the exact instruction that he now contends was prejudicial, any error was invited error.” (cleaned up)).

2024But even if there was error, it was invited error as “[a] criminal defendant will not be heard to complain of a jury instruction given in response to his own request.” State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 124 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McPhail, 329 N.C. 636, 643 (1991)); see also State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 214 (1996) (“Since defendant asked for the exact instruction -20- STATE V.

2024See State v. McPhail, 329 N.C. 636, 643 (1991); State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 214 (1996) (“Since defendant asked for the exact instruction that he now contends was prejudicial, any error was invited error.” (cleaned up)).

2024But even if there was error, it was invited error as “[a] criminal defendant will not be heard to complain of a jury instruction given in response to his own request.” State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 124 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McPhail, 329 N.C. 636, 643 (1991)); see also State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 214 (1996) (“Since defendant asked for the exact instruction -20- STATE V.

2020Therefore, this assignment is without merit and is overruled.” Id. at 214, 474 S.E.2d at 383 (quoting McPhail, 329 N.C. at 644 , 406 S.E.2d at 596-97 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 570 , 508 S.E.2d 253, 275 (1998) (explaining that the defendant “will not be heard to complain on appeal” when the defendant requested a specific jury instruction, “did not object when given the opportunity either at the charge conference or after the charge had been given[,]” and, in fact, “affirmatively approved the instructions during the charge conference”) (citing W

2020Therefore, this assignment is without merit and is overruled.” Id. at 214, 474 S.E.2d at 383 (quoting McPhail, 329 N.C. at 644 , 406 S.E.2d at 596-97 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 570 , 508 S.E.2d 253, 275 (1998) (explaining that the defendant “will not be heard to complain on appeal” when the defendant requested a specific jury instruction, “did not object when given the opportunity either at the charge conference or after the charge had been given[,]” and, in fact, “affirmatively approved the instructions during the charge conference”) (citing W

1994State v. Lee, 335 N.C. at 286-87, 439 S.E.2d at 569 .

1994State v. Lee, 335 N.C. at 286-87, 439 S.E.2d at 569 .

1986Quoting 1 Stansbury’s North Carolina Evidence § 78, at 237 (Brandis rev. ed. 1973), this Court in State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 335 , 226 S.E. 2d 629, 645 (1976), stated: The standard of admissibility based on relevancy and materiality is of necessity so elastic, and the variety of possible fact situations so nearly infinite, that an exact rule cannot be formulated.

1986Quoting 1 Stansbury’s North Carolina Evidence § 78, at 237 (Brandis rev. ed. 1973), this Court in State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 335 , 226 S.E. 2d 629, 645 (1976), stated: The standard of admissibility based on relevancy and materiality is of necessity so elastic, and the variety of possible fact situations so nearly infinite, that an exact rule cannot be formulated.

2024But even if there was error, it was invited error as “[a] criminal defendant will not be heard to complain of a jury instruction given in response to his own request.” State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 124 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McPhail, 329 N.C. 636, 643 (1991)); see also State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 214 (1996) (“Since defendant asked for the exact instruction -20- STATE V.

2022See id. at 347-48, 247 S.E.2d at 781 ; Collins, 49 N.C.

2017State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 304 , 595 S.E.2d 381, 420 (2004) (citing State v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233, 239 , 485 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053 , 118 S. Ct. 704 , 139 L.

2017State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 304 , 595 S.E.2d 381, 420 (2004) (citing State v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233, 239 , 485 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053 , 118 S. Ct. 704 , 139 L.

2016To provide adequate notice, the “probation officer [must] specifically allege[ ] in the violation report that defendant . . . violated the condition that he not commit any criminal offense[,]” and Defendant must be “aware that the State [is] alleging a revocation-eligible violation and he [is] aware of the exact violation upon which the State relied.” State v. Lee, 232 N.C.

2016Additionally, the Court noted Defendant in Lee was “aware that the State was alleging a revocation-eligible violation and he was aware of the exact violation upon which the State relied.” Id. at 260 , 753 S.E.2d at 724 (emphasis added).

2013State v. Choudhry, 365 N.C. 215, 219 , 717 S.E.2d 348, 352 (2011) (stating that “[t]he test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to relief under such circumstances without having to demonstrate prejudice is dependent upon the level of notice given to the trial court and the action taken by that court”) (citing Phillips, 365 N.C. at 118-20 , 711 S.E.2d 122, 135-36 (2011)).

2013State v. Choudhry, 365 N.C. 215, 219 , 717 S.E.2d 348, 352 (2011) (stating that “[t]he test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to relief under such circumstances without having to demonstrate prejudice is dependent upon the level of notice given to the trial court and the action taken by that court”) (citing Phillips, 365 N.C. at 118-20 , 711 S.E.2d 122, 135-36 (2011)).

2013State v. Choudhry, 365 N.C. 215, 219 , 717 S.E.2d 348, 352 (2011) (stating that “[t]he test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to relief under such circumstances without having to demonstrate prejudice is dependent upon the level of notice given to the trial court and the action taken by that court”) (citing Phillips, 365 N.C. at 118-20 , 711 S.E.2d 122, 135-36 (2011)).

2013State v. Choudhry, 365 N.C. 215, 219 , 717 S.E.2d 348, 352 (2011) (stating that “[t]he test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to relief under such circumstances without having to demonstrate prejudice is dependent upon the level of notice given to the trial court and the action taken by that court”) (citing Phillips, 365 N.C. at 118-20 , 711 S.E.2d 122, 135-36 (2011)).

2003See United States v. Good, 32 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A. 1991) (a member of armed forces is entitled to warnings only if he is a suspect at the time of the questioning and the questioning itself is part of an official law-enforcement investigation or disciplinary inquiry); see also United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (proper warnings must be given to members of the armed forces before questioning about an offense where there is no evidence to overcome the presumption that questioning is law enforcement related and not solely for administrative reasons). 3 B I also disagree with

2003See United States v. Good, 32 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A.1991) (a member of armed forces is entitled to warnings only if he is a suspect at the time of the questioning and the questioning itself is part of an official law-enforcement investigation or disciplinary inquiry); see also United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 446 (C.A.A.F.2000) (proper warnings must be given to members of the armed forces before questioning about an offense where there is no evidence to overcome the presumption that questioning is law enforcement related and not solely for administrative reasons). [3] B I also disagree with

2003See United States v. Good, 32 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A. 1991) (a member of armed forces is entitled to warnings only if he is a suspect at the time of the questioning and the questioning itself is part of an official law-enforcement investigation or disciplinary inquiry); see also United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (proper warnings must be given to members of the armed forces before questioning about an offense where there is no evidence to overcome the presumption that questioning is law enforcement related and not solely for administrative reasons). 3 B I also disagree with

2003See United States v. Good, 32 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A.1991) (a member of armed forces is entitled to warnings only if he is a suspect at the time of the questioning and the questioning itself is part of an official law-enforcement investigation or disciplinary inquiry); see also United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 446 (C.A.A.F.2000) (proper warnings must be given to members of the armed forces before questioning about an offense where there is no evidence to overcome the presumption that questioning is law enforcement related and not solely for administrative reasons). [3] B I also disagree with

2001App. 404, 415 , 531 S.E.2d 267, 275 (2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 353 N.C. 364 , 543 S.E.2d 478 (2001) (where judge gave the exact instruction given in this case).

1983App. 533, 536-37 , 265 S.E. 2d 416, 419 , cert. denied, 300 N.C. 560 , 270 S.E. 2d 114 (1980), and similar instructions were approved by this Court in State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 630-31 , 260 S.E. 2d 567, 586 (1979).

1983App. 533, 536-37 , 265 S.E. 2d 416, 419 , cert. denied, 300 N.C. 560 , 270 S.E. 2d 114 (1980), and similar instructions were approved by this Court in State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 630-31 , 260 S.E. 2d 567, 586 (1979).

1980See also State v. Perry, 298 N.C. 502 , 259 S.E. 2d 496 (1979).

1980See also State v. Perry, 298 N.C. 502 , 259 S.E. 2d 496 (1979).