borrowed servant doctrine in Georgia

2025See Six Flags Over Ga., 247 Ga. at 377 (1) (explaining that courts must focus on the specific “occasion when the injury occurred” in assessing whether the borrowed servant doctrine’s requirements are satisfied).

2025See Six Flags Over Georgia, 247 Ga. at 377 (1) (explaining that courts must focus on the specific “occasion when the injury occurred” in assessing whether the borrowed servant doctrine’s requirements are satisfied).

2014See Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 278 Ga. 796, 798 ( 604 SE2d 763 ) (2004) (noting that when a written contract sets forth each requirement of the borrowed-servant rule, “the contract between the parties is controlling as to their responsibilities thereunder” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see Southway Indus.

2014See Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 278 Ga. 796, 798 ( 604 SE2d 763 ) (2004) (noting that when a written contract sets forth each requirement of the borrowed-servant rule, “the contract between the parties is controlling as to their responsibilities thereunder” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see Southway Indus.

2025See also, e.g., Ross, 258 Ga. at 234 (defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing it was “release[d] from liability under the ‘borrowed servant’ rule” because the employee was acting as a servant of a special master when the injury 5 The lead opinion also noted that the medical student was not an employee of the medical school, and thus that “there was no employment relationship between the parties for the borrowed servant doctrine to apply here.” Statham, 371 Ga. App. at 60 (b). 31 occurred); Brown v. Smith & Kelly, 86 Ga. 274, 277 ( 12 SE 411 ) (1890) (affirming a trial court’s determinati

2025See Ross, 258 Ga. at 234, 235 (1) (explaining that “the borrowed servant rule” allows a general master “to escape liability,” and that “the negligence of [a borrowed servant a defense to a claim of vicarious liability under OCGA § 44-12-62, the Court of Appeals appears to have interpreted Tim’s Crane & Rigging as establishing requirements for a plaintiff to recover from a bailee under the statute.

2025In the respondeat superior context, where “vicarious liability for the acts of servants depends upon the master’s right of control over the acts of the servants,” the borrowed servant doctrine addresses the fact that a servant may have more than one master as a result of being loaned from one employer to another, but that both masters rarely “have control over the actions of the [servant] at the same time.” Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 589-590 (2).

2025In the respondeat superior context, where “vicarious liability for the acts of servants depends upon the master’s right of control over the acts of the servants,” the borrowed servant doctrine addresses the fact that a servant may have more than one master as a result of being loaned from one employer to another, but that both masters rarely “have control over the actions of the [servant] at the same time.” Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 589-590 (2).

2014See Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 247 Ga. at 377 (1) (holding that a borrowing employer had the exclusive right to discharge an employee when it had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from the particular task at hand as well as the right to discharge the employee from working for that employer); see Preston, 227 Ga.App. at 451-52 (1) (“Even if [the general master] retained some authority to remove [employee] from his position [with the special master], the power of the general master to reassign or discharge a borrowed servant is irrelevant to the servant’s employment status with the s

2014See Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 247 Ga. at 377 (1) (holding that a borrowing employer had the exclusive right to discharge an employee when it had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from the particular task at hand as well as the right to discharge the employee from working for that employer); see Preston, 227 Ga.App. at 451-52 (1) (“Even if [the general master] retained some authority to remove [employee] from his position [with the special master], the power of the general master to reassign or discharge a borrowed servant is irrelevant to the servant’s employment status with the s

2024Emory Healthcare, 362 Ga. App. at 821-822; see also Montgomery Trucking Co., 231 Ga. at 213 ; Garden City, 329 Ga. App. at 760 (1). (b) The borrowed servant doctrine does not apply.

2024Cf. Garden City, 329 Ga. App. at 759-760 (1) (contract between lending employer and borrowing employer was controlling in determining servant’s employment status “because it expressly addressed all three prongs of the borrowed-servant rule”).

2021And, “where the contract between the two employers explicitly sets forth each requirement of the borrowed servant doctrine, the contract between the parties is controlling as to their responsibilities thereunder.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Odum, 291 Ga. App. at 748 .

2014Ordinarily, when an employee commits an act of negligence within the scope of his or her employment, the employer is liable under traditional principles of respondeat superior.6 But one widely recognized exception to the doctrine of respondeat superior is the borrowed-servant rule,7 which provides that if a master lends his servant to another then “the master is not responsible for any negligence of the servant committed within the scope of his employment by the other.”8 And for an employee to be deemed a borrowed servant, the evidence must show that “(1) the special master had complete contro

2025See also, e.g., Ross, 258 Ga. at 234 (defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing it was “release[d] from liability under the ‘borrowed servant’ rule” because the employee was acting as a servant of a special master when the injury 5 The lead opinion also noted that the medical student was not an employee of the medical school, and thus that “there was no employment relationship between the parties for the borrowed servant doctrine to apply here.” Statham, 371 Ga. App. at 60 (b). 31 occurred); Brown v. Smith & Kelly, 86 Ga. 274, 277 ( 12 SE 411 ) (1890) (affirming a trial court’s determinati

2025See also, e.g., Ross, 258 Ga. at 234 (defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing it was “release[d] from liability under the ‘borrowed servant’ rule” because the employee was acting as a servant of a special master when the injury 5 The lead opinion also noted that the medical student was not an employee of the medical school, and thus that “there was no employment relationship between the parties for the borrowed servant doctrine to apply here.” Statham, 371 Ga. App. at 60 (b). 31 occurred); Brown v. Smith & Kelly, 86 Ga. 274, 277 ( 12 SE 411 ) (1890) (affirming a trial court’s determinati

2025See also Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 594 - 596 (2) (explaining that borrowed servants are servants under Georgia law).7 In other words, a plaintiff who seeks to hold a special master vicariously liable for a borrowed servant’s conduct cannot rely on the borrowed servant doctrine but instead must establish the elements of a respondeat superior claim — that, when the injury 7 The parties cite Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga. App. 310 ( 734 SE2d 548 ) (2012), a case in which the Court of Appeals purported to reject an argument that “the borrowed servant doctrine may only be used defensively by a party seeking

2025See also Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 594 - 596 (2) (explaining that borrowed servants are servants under Georgia law).7 In other words, a plaintiff who seeks to hold a special master vicariously liable for a borrowed servant’s conduct cannot rely on the borrowed servant doctrine but instead must establish the elements of a respondeat superior claim — that, when the injury 7 The parties cite Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga. App. 310 ( 734 SE2d 548 ) (2012), a case in which the Court of Appeals purported to reject an argument that “the borrowed servant doctrine may only be used defensively by a party seeking

2025See also Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 594 - 596 (2) (explaining that borrowed servants are servants under Georgia law).7 In other words, a plaintiff who seeks to hold a special master vicariously liable for a borrowed servant’s conduct cannot rely on the borrowed servant doctrine but instead must establish the elements of a respondeat superior claim — that, when the injury 7 The parties cite Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga. App. 310 ( 734 SE2d 548 ) (2012), a case in which the Court of Appeals purported to reject an argument that “the borrowed servant doctrine may only be used defensively by a party seeking

2012Accordingly, the borrowed servant doctrine “is applied in the context of the tort doctrine of respondeat superior.” Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 596 (2); see Staffing Resources v. Nash, 218 Ga. App. 525 (1) ( 462 SE2d 401 ) (1995).

2025See Coe v. Carroll & Carroll, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 777, 779-782 (1) ( 709 SE2d 324 ) (2011) (considering evidence relevant to the borrowed servant doctrine’s requirements in assessing whether a bailee could be held liable under OCGA § 44-12-62).

2025See Coe v. Carroll & Carroll, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 777, 779-782 (1) ( 709 SE2d 324 ) (2011) (considering evidence relevant to the borrowed servant doctrine’s requirements in assessing whether a bailee could be held liable under OCGA § 44-12-62).

2021Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 680 (2) (rejecting application of the borrowed servant doctrine in a case concerning assault and battery, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress due to failure to establish the third prong). 4 Belatedly in the litigation in the trial court, appellees filed, with no legal analysis, a “Supplemental Staffing Agreement” which precedes the Staffing Agreement in time.

2014See Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 679 (1) ("All three prongs of the test must focus on the occasion when the injury occurred rather than the work relationship in general.”); see Stephens, 189 Ga. App. at 7 (1) (citing Six Flags and explaining that our Supreme Court has “refined [the borrowed-servant] test by indicating that all three prongs of the test must focus on ‘the occasion when the injury occurred’ rather than the work relationship in general”); Fulghum Indus., Inc., 106 Ga. App. at 52 (2) (a) (explaining that all three prongs of the borrowed-servant rule relate “only to the specific task for

2014Fulghum Indus., Inc., 106 Ga. App. at 52 (2) (a); see Jarrara v. Doyle, 164 Ga. App. 339, 340 (1) ( 297 SE2d 301 ) (1982). 247 Ga. at 375-77 (1) (holding that the borrowed-servant rule applied because “it is undisputed that Six Flags had the exclusive right to discharge [the loaned employee], that is, that Six Flags could unilaterally discharge [him] from working on the stuck Mind Bender cars and from working at Six Flags.” (emphasis supplied)). 227 Ga. App. at 451 (1) (holding that because it was undisputed that the borrowing employer had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from th

2014See Preston, 227 Ga. App. at 452 (1) (finding that the third prong of the borrowed-servant rule was satisfied when it was undisputed that the borrowing employer had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from the particular work he was performing at the time of the injury and the lending employer had no right to countermand that decision).

2014Servs., Inc. v. Boyd, 283 Ga. App. 850, 853 ( 642 SE2d 889 ) (2007) (same).

2014Servs., Inc. v. Boyd, 283 Ga. App. 850, 853 ( 642 SE2d 889 ) (2007) (same).

2025See id. (holding that, because “the contract between [a general master] and [a special master] explicitly set[ ] forth each requirement of the borrowed servant doctrine” and allocated the “risk” between the general 25 master and the special master as to the “responsibility for the negligence of [a] servant,” “[w]hether or not [the special master] ever assumed any control or supervision of [an agent, the special master] acquired the right to do so,” and thus the general master was not liable for “any negligence of [the agent]” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Blair v. Smith, 201 Ga. 747, 74

2025See id. (holding that, because “the contract between [a general master] and [a special master] explicitly set[ ] forth each requirement of the borrowed servant doctrine” and allocated the “risk” between the general master and the special master as to the “responsibility for the 25 negligence of [a] servant,” “[w]hether or not [the special master] ever assumed any control or supervision of [an agent, the special master] acquired the right to do so,” and thus the general master was not liable for “any negligence of [the agent]” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Blair v. Smith, 201 Ga. 747, 74

2014Fulghum Indus., Inc., 106 Ga. App. at 52 (2) (a); see Jarrara v. Doyle, 164 Ga. App. 339, 340 (1) ( 297 SE2d 301 ) (1982). 247 Ga. at 375-77 (1) (holding that the borrowed-servant rule applied because “it is undisputed that Six Flags had the exclusive right to discharge [the loaned employee], that is, that Six Flags could unilaterally discharge [him] from working on the stuck Mind Bender cars and from working at Six Flags.” (emphasis supplied)). 227 Ga. App. at 451 (1) (holding that because it was undisputed that the borrowing employer had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from th

2014Fulghum Indus., Inc., 106 Ga. App. at 52 (2) (a); see Jarrara v. Doyle, 164 Ga. App. 339, 340 (1) ( 297 SE2d 301 ) (1982). 247 Ga. at 375-77 (1) (holding that the borrowed-servant rule applied because “it is undisputed that Six Flags had the exclusive right to discharge [the loaned employee], that is, that Six Flags could unilaterally discharge [him] from working on the stuck Mind Bender cars and from working at Six Flags.” (emphasis supplied)). 227 Ga. App. at 451 (1) (holding that because it was undisputed that the borrowing employer had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from th

2014See Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 679 (1) ("All three prongs of the test must focus on the occasion when the injury occurred rather than the work relationship in general.”); see Stephens, 189 Ga. App. at 7 (1) (citing Six Flags and explaining that our Supreme Court has “refined [the borrowed-servant] test by indicating that all three prongs of the test must focus on ‘the occasion when the injury occurred’ rather than the work relationship in general”); Fulghum Indus., Inc., 106 Ga. App. at 52 (2) (a) (explaining that all three prongs of the borrowed-servant rule relate “only to the specific task for

2014See Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 247 Ga. at 377 (1) (holding that a borrowing employer had the exclusive right to discharge an employee when it had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from the particular task at hand as well as the right to discharge the employee from working for that employer); see Preston, 227 Ga.App. at 451-52 (1) (“Even if [the general master] retained some authority to remove [employee] from his position [with the special master], the power of the general master to reassign or discharge a borrowed servant is irrelevant to the servant’s employment status with the s

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Smith Stevedoring Co. v. State of Ga., 317 Ga. App. 362, 368-69 (3) (a) ( 730 SE2d 168 ) (2012) (finding the governing contract did not explicitly set forth any of the requirements of the borrowed-servant doctrine, and thus, whether the borrowed-servant test was satisfied was a question of fact for the jury); see Alta Refrigeration, Inc., 301 Ga. App. at 745-46 (1) (finding that none of the requirements of the borrowed-servant rule were satisfied and evidence showed that only the general master could remove the employee from his assigned task); Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 680 (2) (finding that the

2014Smith Stevedoring Co. v. State of Ga., 317 Ga. App. 362, 368-69 (3) (a) ( 730 SE2d 168 ) (2012) (finding the governing contract did not explicitly set forth any of the requirements of the borrowed-servant doctrine, and thus, whether the borrowed-servant test was satisfied was a question of fact for the jury); see Alta Refrigeration, Inc., 301 Ga. App. at 745-46 (1) (finding that none of the requirements of the borrowed-servant rule were satisfied and evidence showed that only the general master could remove the employee from his assigned task); Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 680 (2) (finding that the

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014See Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 247 Ga. at 377 (1) (holding that a borrowing employer had the exclusive right to discharge an employee when it had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from the particular task at hand as well as the right to discharge the employee from working for that employer); see Preston, 227 Ga.App. at 451-52 (1) (“Even if [the general master] retained some authority to remove [employee] from his position [with the special master], the power of the general master to reassign or discharge a borrowed servant is irrelevant to the servant’s employment status with the s

2014See Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 247 Ga. at 377 (1) (holding that a borrowing employer had the exclusive right to discharge an employee when it had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from the particular task at hand as well as the right to discharge the employee from working for that employer); see Preston, 227 Ga.App. at 451-52 (1) (“Even if [the general master] retained some authority to remove [employee] from his position [with the special master], the power of the general master to reassign or discharge a borrowed servant is irrelevant to the servant’s employment status with the s

2014Smith Stevedoring Co. v. State of Ga., 317 Ga. App. 362, 368-69 (3) (a) ( 730 SE2d 168 ) (2012) (finding the governing contract did not explicitly set forth any of the requirements of the borrowed-servant doctrine, and thus, whether the borrowed-servant test was satisfied was a question of fact for the jury); see Alta Refrigeration, Inc., 301 Ga. App. at 745-46 (1) (finding that none of the requirements of the borrowed-servant rule were satisfied and evidence showed that only the general master could remove the employee from his assigned task); Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 680 (2) (finding that the

2014Smith Stevedoring Co. v. State of Ga., 317 Ga. App. 362, 368-69 (3) (a) ( 730 SE2d 168 ) (2012) (finding the governing contract did not explicitly set forth any of the requirements of the borrowed-servant doctrine, and thus, whether the borrowed-servant test was satisfied was a question of fact for the jury); see Alta Refrigeration, Inc., 301 Ga. App. at 745-46 (1) (finding that none of the requirements of the borrowed-servant rule were satisfied and evidence showed that only the general master could remove the employee from his assigned task); Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 680 (2) (finding that the

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Co. v. Hand, 216 Ga. App. 370, 370-71 (1) ( 454 SE2d 217 ) (1995) (finding that the borrowed-servant rule was not satisfied when borrowed employee was working for the special master “as part of his job” with the general master and there was insufficient evidence to show that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge him or that the general master had no control or direction over the employee on the occasion at issue); Shannon v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 239 (1) ( 372 SE2d 818 ) (1988) (finding, without further explanation, that the borrowed-servant rule did

2014Fulghum Indus., Inc., 106 Ga. App. at 52 (2) (a); see Jarrara v. Doyle, 164 Ga. App. 339, 340 (1) ( 297 SE2d 301 ) (1982). 247 Ga. at 375-77 (1) (holding that the borrowed-servant rule applied because “it is undisputed that Six Flags had the exclusive right to discharge [the loaned employee], that is, that Six Flags could unilaterally discharge [him] from working on the stuck Mind Bender cars and from working at Six Flags.” (emphasis supplied)). 227 Ga. App. at 451 (1) (holding that because it was undisputed that the borrowing employer had the unilateral right to discharge the employee from th

2014See Howard, 239 Ga. App. at 679 (1) ("All three prongs of the test must focus on the occasion when the injury occurred rather than the work relationship in general.”); see Stephens, 189 Ga. App. at 7 (1) (citing Six Flags and explaining that our Supreme Court has “refined [the borrowed-servant] test by indicating that all three prongs of the test must focus on ‘the occasion when the injury occurred’ rather than the work relationship in general”); Fulghum Indus., Inc., 106 Ga. App. at 52 (2) (a) (explaining that all three prongs of the borrowed-servant rule relate “only to the specific task for

1978Co. v. Forrester, 230 Ga. 182 ( 196 SE2d 133 ) (1973), that impinges on the borrowed servant doctrine: Where there is a general employer who loans an employee to a special employer or subcontractor and where the evidence requires a finding that the employee is at the same time the servant of both, payment of workmen's compensation may be had from either, and the payment by either precludes an action against the other as a third-party tortfeasor.

1978Co. v. Forrester, 230 Ga. 182 ( 196 SE2d 133 ) (1973), that impinges on the borrowed servant doctrine: Where there is a general employer who loans an employee to a special employer or subcontractor and where the evidence requires a finding that the employee is at the same time the servant of both, payment of workmen's compensation may be had from either, and the payment by either precludes an action against the other as a third-party tortfeasor.