borrowed servant doctrine in Pennsylvania

2021The borrowed employee doctrine, also known as the borrowed servant doctrine, “is an outgrowth of the common law rule that a servant who is loaned by his master to a third party is regarded as the servant of that third party while under that third party’s direction and control.” Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 969-70 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Mature v. Angelo, 97 -9- J-A13044- 20 A.2d 59, 60 (Pa. 1953) (“One who is in the general employ of another may, with respect to certain work, be transferred to the service of a third person in such a way that he becomes, for the time being and in the partic

2020Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 970 (Pa. Super. 2013).6 In Peter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the borrowed servant doctrine to determine whether the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer under the LHWCA. 903 F.2d at 940 .

2020There, the court focused on two primary factors for evaluating the existence of a borrowed servant relationship: “(1) whether the borrowing employer was responsible for the borrowing employee’s working conditions and (2) whether the employment was of such duration that the borrowed employee could be presumed to have acquiesced in the risks of his new employment.” Id. at 942 (citing Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 1977)).

2020There, the court focused on two primary factors for evaluating the existence of a borrowed servant relationship: “(1) whether the borrowing employer was responsible for the borrowing employee’s working conditions and (2) whether the employment was of such duration that the borrowed employee could be presumed to have acquiesced in the risks of his new employment.” Id. at 942 (citing Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 1977)).

2013By contrast, the borrowed servant doctrine “is an outgrowth of the common law rule that a servant who is loaned by his master to a third party is regarded as the servant of that third party while under that third party’s direction and control.” Mathis v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 381 Pa.Super. 466 , 554 A.2d 96, 102 (1989) (emphasis added).

2013By contrast, the borrowed servant doctrine “is an outgrowth of the common law rule that a servant who is loaned by his master to a third party is regarded as the servant of that third party while under that third party’s direction and control.” Mathis v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 381 Pa.Super. 466 , 554 A.2d 96, 102 (1989) (emphasis added).

2022Claimant cites our Supreme Court’s holdings in Mature v. Angelo, 97 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1953), a leading case on the borrowed servant doctrine, asserting that it stands for the proposition that there are “factors” other than control which may be 6 relevant in determining whether an employee is borrowed.

2013As Appellants noted, in Mature v. Angelo, 373 Pa. 593 , 97 A.2d 59 (1953), our Supreme Court held that, under the borrowed servant doctrine: The crucial test in determining whether a servant furnished by one person to another becomes the employe of the person to whom he is loaned is whether he passes under the latter’s right of control with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it.

2021The borrowed employee doctrine, also known as the borrowed servant doctrine, “is an outgrowth of the common law rule that a servant who is loaned by his master to a third party is regarded as the servant of that third party while under that third party’s direction and control.” Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 969-70 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Mature v. Angelo, 97 -9- J-A13044- 20 A.2d 59, 60 (Pa. 1953) (“One who is in the general employ of another may, with respect to certain work, be transferred to the service of a third person in such a way that he becomes, for the time being and in the partic

2013The “borrowing employer” is thus the common-law master of the borrowed employee — and, by definition, the borrowing employer cannot be a “statutory employer.” See McDonald, 153 A. at 425 (“[a] statutory employer is a master who is not a contractual or [a] common-law one, but is made one by the [Workers’ Compensation] Act”) (emphasis added); see also English v. Lehigh Cty.

1992In the case of Lego v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 66 Pa.Commw. 593, 445 A.2d 1324, 1326-1327 (1982), the court held that even in a case where the equipment is leased with an operator, the borrowed servant doctrine will apply when the lessee had the right to control the work to be done and also the manner of performing it.

1984See also English v. Lehigh County Authority, 286 Pa. Superior Ct. 312 , 428 A.2d 1343 (1981).

1984See also English v. Lehigh County Authority, 286 Pa. Superior Ct. 312 , 428 A.2d 1343 (1981).