borrowed servant doctrine in Texas

2022Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 537 (Tex. 2002) (plurality op.) (applying doctrine in vicarious liability case); Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1977) (similar, noting that the borrowed servant doctrine “cuts across the entire law of principal and agent and employer and employee”).

2019At the outset, the test for employee status under the Act, and the tests for both borrowed servant and respondeat superior each include some formulation for the “right of control.” Garza, 161 S.W.3d at 477 (employee status under the Act 8 determined by traditional indicia, such as actual right of control over details of work causing accident); Limestone Products Distribution., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. 2002) (setting out factors for right of control in determining if company was responsible for driver’s conduct); Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. 1977) (

2003Williams v. APS, Inc. , 969 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Carr v. Carroll Co. , 646 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e .).

2003Williams v. APS, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Carr v. Carroll Co., 646 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). *754 To achieve consistency and predictability in the law, the borrowed servant doctrine should be applied to both subscribers and non-subscribers.

2002See Marshall v. Toys-R-Us Nytex, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

2002See Marshall v. Toys-R-Us Nytex, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

2002Esquivel v. Mapelli Meat Packing Co., 932 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).

2002Esquivel v. Mapelli Meat Packing Co., 932 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).

2005Because Western Steel bore the burden of proof on the borrowed servant defense, we look to the circumstances surrounding Altenburg’s temporary employment with Western Steel by reviewing the factors enumerated in McKay, 366 S.W.2d at 226 .

2005Because Western Steel bore the burden of proof on the borrowed servant defense, we look to the circumstances surrounding Altenburg's temporary employment with Western Steel by reviewing the factors enumerated in McKay, 366 S.W.2d at 226 .

2005The borrowed servant doctrine is discussed in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227 (1958), “Servant Lent to Another Master.” See Lara v. Lile, 828 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).

2005The borrowed servant doctrine is discussed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1958), "Servant Lent to Another Master." See Lara v. Lile, 828 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).

2022“Accordingly, in determining if a general employee of a temporary employment agency is also an employee of a client company for purposes of the Act, we consider traditional indicia, such as the exercise of actual control over the details of the work that gave rise to the injury.” Garza, 161 S.W.3d at 477 ; see St.

2019At the outset, the test for employee status under the Act, and the tests for both borrowed servant and respondeat superior each include some formulation for the “right of control.” Garza, 161 S.W.3d at 477 (employee status under the Act 8 determined by traditional indicia, such as actual right of control over details of work causing accident); Limestone Products Distribution., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. 2002) (setting out factors for right of control in determining if company was responsible for driver’s conduct); Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. 1977) (

2022Compare Linden-Alimak, Inc. v. McDonald, 745 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (characterizing the borrowed servant doctrine as “an inferential rebuttal defense” because it “seeks to disprove the existence of an essential element submitted in another issue”; namely, “control”), Everman Corp. v. Haws & Garrett Gen.

2022Compare Linden-Alimak, Inc. v. McDonald, 745 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (characterizing the borrowed servant doctrine as “an inferential rebuttal defense” because it “seeks to disprove the existence of an essential element submitted in another issue”; namely, “control”), Everman Corp. v. Haws & Garrett Gen.

2011The City argued that Johnson’s suit should be dismissed based on governmental immunity because (1) Johnson was a City employee under the borrowed servant doctrine; (2) the legislature requires the City to provide workers’ compensation benefits to its employees; and (3) Lyons v. Texas A & M University, 545 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), holds that the legislature “has not waived the immunity of governmental entities in tort suits by their employees” and “has retained the immunity and provided an alternative remedy through workmen’s compensation.” Alte

2011The City argued that Johnson’s suit should be dismissed based on governmental immunity because (1) Johnson was a City employee under the borrowed servant doctrine; (2) the legislature requires the City to provide workers’ compensation benefits to its employees; and (3) Lyons v. Texas A&M University, 545 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. Civ.

2010Wingfoot Enter, v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134, 144 (Tex.2003); Thompson v. Travelers Indem.

2010Wingfoot Enter. v. Alvarado , 111 S.W.3d 134, 144 (Tex. 2003); Thompson v. Travelers Indem.

2005Rodriguez v. Martin Landscape Mgmt., Inc., 882 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).

2004Rodriguez v. Martin Landscape Mgmt., Inc. , 882 S.W.2d 602, 604 ( Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ ).

2003See Sparger , 547 S.W. 2d at 584 (stating the principle of borrowed servant “cuts across the entire law of principle and agent and employer and employee”); Ortiz , 26 S.W.3d at 652 (applying the borrowed servant doctrine to non-subscribers). [15] The borrowed servant doctrine can be fairly applied across the board due to the potential mixture of subscribers and non-subscribers present at any worksite.

2003See Sparger, 547 S.W.2d at 584 (stating the principle of borrowed servant “cuts across the entire law of principle and agent and employer and employee”); Ortiz, 26 S.W.3d at 652 (applying the borrowed servant doctrine to non-subscribers). 15 The borrowed servant doctrine can be fairly applied across the board due to the potential mixture of subscribers and non-subscribers present at any worksite.

2003Williams v. APS, Inc. , 969 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Carr v. Carroll Co. , 646 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e .).

2003Williams v. APS, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Carr v. Carroll Co., 646 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). *754 To achieve consistency and predictability in the law, the borrowed servant doctrine should be applied to both subscribers and non-subscribers.

2003See Smith , 670 S.W.2d at 751 .

2003See McKay , 366 S.W.2d at 225 ; Smith , 670 S.W.2d at 751 .

2001Id. at 864 (citing Carr , 646 S.W.2d at 563 ).

2001Id. at 864 (citing Carr, 646 S.W.2d at 563 ).

2022Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 537 (Tex. 2002) (plurality op.) (applying doctrine in vicarious liability case); Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1977) (similar, noting that the borrowed servant doctrine “cuts across the entire law of principal and agent and employer and employee”).

2022Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 537 ; Hilgenberg v. Elam, 198 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1946) (quoting should not have been separately, or disjunctively submitted”), and Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Malpractice, Premises & Products PJC 52.2 (2018) (noting that doctrine is “an inferential rebuttal” defense to the general employer’s liability), with Coco v. Port of Corpus Christi Auth., 132 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.) (“The borrowed servant doctrine is an affirmative defense to tort liability based on respondeat superior

2022Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 537 ; Hilgenberg v. Elam, 198 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1946) (quoting should not have been separately, or disjunctively submitted”), and Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Malpractice, Premises & Products PJC 52.2 (2018) (noting that doctrine is “an inferential rebuttal” defense to the general employer’s liability), with Coco v. Port of Corpus Christi Auth., 132 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.) (“The borrowed servant doctrine is an affirmative defense to tort liability based on respondeat superior

1965Hilgenberg v. Elam, 145 Tex. 437 , 198 S.W.2d 94 ; Dempster Mill Mfg.

1992Id. at 332 .

1992Id. at 332 .

2022Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 537 ; Hilgenberg v. Elam, 198 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1946) (quoting should not have been separately, or disjunctively submitted”), and Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Malpractice, Premises & Products PJC 52.2 (2018) (noting that doctrine is “an inferential rebuttal” defense to the general employer’s liability), with Coco v. Port of Corpus Christi Auth., 132 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.) (“The borrowed servant doctrine is an affirmative defense to tort liability based on respondeat superior

2022Contractors, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1979, no writ) (concluding that “[w]hether he was a borrowed servant in this context is merely inferential rebuttal and 25 Linden-Alimak, Inc., 745 S.W.2d at 84 ; cf. Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Malpractice, Premises & Products PJC 52.2 (2018) (noting that doctrine applies when a general employer “seeks to rebut the employment relationship with evidence that the employee was the borrowed employee of another”).

2022Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 537 ; Hilgenberg v. Elam, 198 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1946) (quoting should not have been separately, or disjunctively submitted”), and Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Malpractice, Premises & Products PJC 52.2 (2018) (noting that doctrine is “an inferential rebuttal” defense to the general employer’s liability), with Coco v. Port of Corpus Christi Auth., 132 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.) (“The borrowed servant doctrine is an affirmative defense to tort liability based on respondeat superior

2019See Wesby v. Act Pipe & Supply, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the client company was entitled to the exclusive remedy defense under 10 the borrowed servant doctrine); Flores v. N. Am.

2019See Wesby v. Act Pipe & Supply, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the client company was entitled to the exclusive remedy defense under 10 the borrowed servant doctrine); Flores v. N. Am.

2019Elastomer Products, L.L.C., 316 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (in claim by staffing agency employee, court notes that “[w]hen there is a question as to whether one is an ‘employer’ under the TWCA, Texas courts turn to the borrowed servant doctrine.”); Lockett v. HB Zachry Co., 285 S.W.3d 63, 75 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (noting, in the workers' compensation context, that “[b]orrowed employee status hinges on whether the other employer or its agents have the right to direct and control the employee with respect to the details of the parti

2019Elastomer Products, L.L.C., 316 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (in claim by staffing agency employee, court notes that “[w]hen there is a question as to whether one is an ‘employer’ under the TWCA, Texas courts turn to the borrowed servant doctrine.”); Lockett v. HB Zachry Co., 285 S.W.3d 63, 75 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (noting, in the workers' compensation context, that “[b]orrowed employee status hinges on whether the other employer or its agents have the right to direct and control the employee with respect to the details of the parti

2019At the outset, the test for employee status under the Act, and the tests for both borrowed servant and respondeat superior each include some formulation for the “right of control.” Garza, 161 S.W.3d at 477 (employee status under the Act 8 determined by traditional indicia, such as actual right of control over details of work causing accident); Limestone Products Distribution., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. 2002) (setting out factors for right of control in determining if company was responsible for driver’s conduct); Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. 1977) (

2019Wolff, 94 S.W.3d at 539 ; Powell v. Knipp, 479 S.W.3d 394, 401 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2015, pet. denied)(holding that plaintiff must show that the borrowing employer controlled the doctor to the exclusion of the state university employer).

2015Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 542 ; Elizondo v. Tavarez, 596 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Tex.Civ.App.—Cor *22 pus Christi 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.) (“Linder the borrowed servant doctrine in a suit for malpractice against a doctor, the controlling question is whether the doctor had the right to control the ‘servant’ in the details of the specific act or omission raising the issue of liability.”).

2014See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009); Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006).

2014See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009); Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006).