Martin motion in Georgia

2013See Accor North America v. Todd, 318 Ga. App. 317 ( 733 SE2d 846 ) (2012).

2013See Accor North America v. Todd, 318 Ga. App. 317 ( 733 SE2d 846 ) (2012).

2025Thereafter, the probate court certified its ruling for immediate review, and this Court granted Martin’s application for interlocutory appeal. 2 See generally Rader v. Levenson, 290 Ga. App. 227, 229 (1) (b) ( 659 SE2d 655 ) (2008) (“This provision permits heirs of the estate to file suit against a personal representative or administrator of the estate.”).

2025Thereafter, the probate court certified its ruling for immediate review, and this Court granted Martin’s application for interlocutory appeal. 2 See generally Rader v. Levenson, 290 Ga. App. 227, 229 (1) (b) ( 659 SE2d 655 ) (2008) (“This provision permits heirs of the estate to file suit against a personal representative or administrator of the estate.”).

2024See Martin v. State, 290 Ga. 901, 903 (1) (a) (725 SE2d 313) (2012) (“Martin’s request for an attorney did not negatively point directly at the substance of Martin’s claim of self- defense or otherwise substantially prejudice Martin.”).

2024See Martin v. State, 290 Ga. 901, 903 (1) (a) (725 SE2d 313) (2012) (“Martin’s request for an attorney did not negatively point directly at the substance of Martin’s claim of self- defense or otherwise substantially prejudice Martin.”).

2023See also Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga. App. 145, 151 (4) ( 671 SE2d 180 ) (2008) (explaining that “the erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Head v. State, 254 Ga. App. 550, 551 (2) ( 562 SE2d 815 ) (2002). 7 has failed to establish prejudice in order to meet the Strickland standard, and the trial court’s denial of Martin’s motion for new trial on this basis was not erroneous. 3.

2023See also Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga. App. 145, 151 (4) ( 671 SE2d 180 ) (2008) (explaining that “the erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Head v. State, 254 Ga. App. 550, 551 (2) ( 562 SE2d 815 ) (2002). 7 has failed to establish prejudice in order to meet the Strickland standard, and the trial court’s denial of Martin’s motion for new trial on this basis was not erroneous. 3.

2023See also Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga. App. 145, 151 (4) ( 671 SE2d 180 ) (2008) (explaining that “the erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Head v. State, 254 Ga. App. 550, 551 (2) ( 562 SE2d 815 ) (2002). 7 has failed to establish prejudice in order to meet the Strickland standard, and the trial court’s denial of Martin’s motion for new trial on this basis was not erroneous. 3.

2023See also Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga. App. 145, 151 (4) ( 671 SE2d 180 ) (2008) (explaining that “the erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Head v. State, 254 Ga. App. 550, 551 (2) ( 562 SE2d 815 ) (2002). 7 has failed to establish prejudice in order to meet the Strickland standard, and the trial court’s denial of Martin’s motion for new trial on this basis was not erroneous. 3.

2023See State v. Bell, 274 Ga. 719, 719 (1) ( 559 SE2d 477 ) (2002) (when a court considers pleadings, substance controls over nomenclature); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”).

2023See State v. Bell, 274 Ga. 719, 719 (1) ( 559 SE2d 477 ) (2002) (when a court considers pleadings, substance controls over nomenclature); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”).

2023See State v. Bell, 274 Ga. 719, 719 (1) ( 559 SE2d 477 ) (2002) (when a court considers pleadings, substance controls over nomenclature); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”).

2023See State v. Bell, 274 Ga. 719, 719 (1) ( 559 SE2d 477 ) (2002) (when a court considers pleadings, substance controls over nomenclature); Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 98 (1) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011) (“[c]ourts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought”).

2021However, “[t]he unavailability of ordinary review does not end our analysis of [Martin’s] evidentiary claim,” Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. at 263 (2) (b), because “our new Evidence Code permits plain error review of certain unpreserved evidentiary errors affecting substantial rights.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3 (1) ( 829 SE2d 126 ) (2019); see also OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).

2021However, “[t]he unavailability of ordinary review does not end our analysis of [Martin’s] evidentiary claim,” Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. at 263 (2) (b), because “our new Evidence Code permits plain error review of certain unpreserved evidentiary errors affecting substantial rights.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3 (1) ( 829 SE2d 126 ) (2019); see also OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).

2021However, “[t]he unavailability of ordinary review does not end our analysis of [Martin’s] evidentiary claim,” Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. at 263 (2) (b), because “our new Evidence Code permits plain error review of certain unpreserved evidentiary errors affecting substantial rights.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3 (1) ( 829 SE2d 126 ) (2019); see also OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).

2019Here, Martin’s claim fails because she has not demonstrated that the exclusion of this evidence affected her substantial rights; in other words, she has not demonstrated that such exclusion “likely affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 240 ( 824 SE2d 317 ) (2019).

2019Here, Martin’s claim fails because she has not demonstrated that the exclusion of this evidence affected her substantial rights; in other words, she has not demonstrated that such exclusion “likely affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 240 ( 824 SE2d 317 ) (2019).

2017See, e.g., Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 692-693 (3) ( 763 SE2d 704 ) (2014); Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (4) ( 690 SE2d 220 ) (2010); Bradley v. State, 152 Ga. App. 902 ( 264 SE2d 332 ) (1980).

2017See, e.g., Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 692-693 (3) ( 763 SE2d 704 ) (2014); Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (4) ( 690 SE2d 220 ) (2010); Bradley v. State, 152 Ga. App. 902 ( 264 SE2d 332 ) (1980).

2017See, e.g., Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 692-693 (3) ( 763 SE2d 704 ) (2014); Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (4) ( 690 SE2d 220 ) (2010); Bradley v. State, 152 Ga. App. 902 ( 264 SE2d 332 ) (1980).

2017See, e.g., Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 692-693 (3) ( 763 SE2d 704 ) (2014); Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (4) ( 690 SE2d 220 ) (2010); Bradley v. State, 152 Ga. App. 902 ( 264 SE2d 332 ) (1980).

2015See Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 719 (7) (d) ( 739 SE2d 332 ) (2013).

2015See Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 719 (7) (d) ( 739 SE2d 332 ) (2013).

2015See Miller v. State, 270 Ga. 741, 742 (1) ( 512 SE2d 272 ) (1999) (holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict).

2015See Miller v. State, 270 Ga. 741, 742 (1) ( 512 SE2d 272 ) (1999) (holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict).

2015Motel Properties, 263 Ga. at 486, n.6 .4 4 Even assuming that the attack on Martin was foreseeable, and that the attack occurred on an approach over which Six Flags had the right to provide security, Martin’s claim under OCGA § 51-3-1 fails as a matter of law for an additional reason.

2015See Martin, 284 Ga. 504 . 8 The possibility that Martin’s original counsel could be disqualified solely for the purpose of the litigation of Martin’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on the alleged promise was *268 also never raised by either his original counsel before their disqualification or by his new counsel.

2014See Walden v. State, 291 Ga. 260, 262 (2) ( 728 SE2d 186 ) (2012) (a defendant failing to raise an ineffective assistance claim in a post-plea hearing is not entitled to a direct appeal and is left to raise such a claim in habeas corpus proceedings). (b) Unlike his ineffective assistance claim, Martin’s claim that the indictment was defective can be decided on the record.

2014See Walden v. State, 291 Ga. 260, 262 (2) ( 728 SE2d 186 ) (2012) (a defendant failing to raise an ineffective assistance claim in a post-plea hearing is not entitled to a direct appeal and is left to raise such a claim in habeas corpus proceedings). (b) Unlike his ineffective assistance claim, Martin’s claim that the indictment was defective can be decided on the record.

2012See Benham v. State, 259 Ga. 249, 249-250 (2) ( 379 SE2d 506 ) (1989) (“To reverse a conviction the evidence of the defendant’s election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of defendant’s defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2012See Benham v. State, 259 Ga. 249, 249-250 (2) ( 379 SE2d 506 ) (1989) (“To reverse a conviction the evidence of the defendant’s election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of defendant’s defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2011“Georgia law allows a finding of spoliation if the loss of the evidence occurs at a time when there is ‘contemplated or pending litigation.’ ” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kitchens v. Brusman, 303 Ga. App. 703, 707 (1) (a) ( 694 SE2d 667 ) (2010). “[Contemplation of potential liability is not notice of potential litigation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

2011“Georgia law allows a finding of spoliation if the loss of the evidence occurs at a time when there is ‘contemplated or pending litigation.’ ” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kitchens v. Brusman, 303 Ga. App. 703, 707 (1) (a) ( 694 SE2d 667 ) (2010). “[Contemplation of potential liability is not notice of potential litigation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

2010Considering the jury charge as a whole, the jury would not have been “misled or confused about the charge of terroristic threats in the indictment.” Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 175 (6) ( 687 SE2d 185 ) (2009) (trial court did not commit reversible error by giving similar terroristic threats charge although indictment charged threat of murder); see also Machado, supra, 300 Ga. App. at 462-463 (5); Stephens v. State, 255 Ga. App. 680, 684 (6) ( 569 SE2d 250 ) (2002). 2 4.

2010Considering the jury charge as a whole, the jury would not have been “misled or confused about the charge of terroristic threats in the indictment.” Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 175 (6) ( 687 SE2d 185 ) (2009) (trial court did not commit reversible error by giving similar terroristic threats charge although indictment charged threat of murder); see also Machado, supra, 300 Ga. App. at 462-463 (5); Stephens v. State, 255 Ga. App. 680, 684 (6) ( 569 SE2d 250 ) (2002). 2 4.

2010Considering the jury charge as a whole, the jury would not have been “misled or confused about the charge of terroristic threats in the indictment.” Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 175 (6) ( 687 SE2d 185 ) (2009) (trial court did not commit reversible error by giving similar terroristic threats charge although indictment charged threat of murder); see also Machado, supra, 300 Ga. App. at 462-463 (5); Stephens v. State, 255 Ga. App. 680, 684 (6) ( 569 SE2d 250 ) (2002). 2 4.

2010Considering the jury charge as a whole, the jury would not have been “misled or confused about the charge of terroristic threats in the indictment.” Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 175 (6) ( 687 SE2d 185 ) (2009) (trial court did not commit reversible error by giving similar terroristic threats charge although indictment charged threat of murder); see also Machado, supra, 300 Ga. App. at 462-463 (5); Stephens v. State, 255 Ga. App. 680, 684 (6) ( 569 SE2d 250 ) (2002). 2 4.

2010Considering the jury charge as a whole, the jury would not have been “misled or confused about the charge of terroristic threats in the indictment.” Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 175 (6) ( 687 SE2d 185 ) (2009) (trial court did not commit reversible error by giving similar terroristic threats charge although indictment charged threat of murder); see also Machado, supra, 300 Ga. App. at 462-463 (5); Stephens v. State, 255 Ga. App. 680, 684 (6) ( 569 SE2d 250 ) (2002). 2 4.

2010Considering the jury charge as a whole, the jury would not have been “misled or confused about the charge of terroristic threats in the indictment.” Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 175 (6) ( 687 SE2d 185 ) (2009) (trial court did not commit reversible error by giving similar terroristic threats charge although indictment charged threat of murder); see also Machado, supra, 300 Ga. App. at 462-463 (5); Stephens v. State, 255 Ga. App. 680, 684 (6) ( 569 SE2d 250 ) (2002). 2 4.

2008Whether Ms. Wright’s prior testimony “is admissible as a matter of Georgia evidence law, and whether it is admissible as a matter of federal constitutional law, are two distinct questions.” Prater v. State, 148 Ga. App. 831, 834 (5) ( 253 SE2d 223 ) (1979) (citing California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 155 (90 SC 1930, 26 LE2d 489) (1970) for the proposition that, while hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are designed to protect similar values and may “overlap,” they are not congruent).

2008Whether Ms. Wright’s prior testimony “is admissible as a matter of Georgia evidence law, and whether it is admissible as a matter of federal constitutional law, are two distinct questions.” Prater v. State, 148 Ga. App. 831, 834 (5) ( 253 SE2d 223 ) (1979) (citing California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 155 (90 SC 1930, 26 LE2d 489) (1970) for the proposition that, while hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are designed to protect similar values and may “overlap,” they are not congruent).