Martin rule in Washington

1999Martin, 35 Wn.2d at 228 .

1999Martin, 35 Wn.2d at 228 .

2021Most critically, Martin’s challenge is - 11 - No. 80917-2-I/12 identical to that of Lynch’s: “that the [trial] court’s instruction inhibited the jurors from being willing to nullify the charges against him.” 903 F.3d at 1080 .

2021Importantly, Lynch continues, “but this was also not a violation of any legal right.” Id.

2016Martin fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel. 88 White, 80 Wn.

2016Thus, Martin does not show particularized prejudice, and this final factor weighs in favor of the State. 23 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 840 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 ). 24 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 25 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 26 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 845 . -10- No. 75230-8-1 / 11 Because all four Barker factors weigh in favor of the State, the delay did not constitute a speedy trial violation.27 Interstate Agreement on Detainers Martin also claims that the delay violated the IAD, requiring dismissal.

2016Thus, Martin does not show particularized prejudice, and this final factor weighs in favor of the State. 23 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 840 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 ). 24 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 25 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 26 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 845 . -10- No. 75230-8-1 / 11 Because all four Barker factors weigh in favor of the State, the delay did not constitute a speedy trial violation.27 Interstate Agreement on Detainers Martin also claims that the delay violated the IAD, requiring dismissal.

2016Thus, Martin does not show particularized prejudice, and this final factor weighs in favor of the State. 23 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 840 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 ). 24 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 25 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 26 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 845 . -10- No. 75230-8-1 / 11 Because all four Barker factors weigh in favor of the State, the delay did not constitute a speedy trial violation.27 Interstate Agreement on Detainers Martin also claims that the delay violated the IAD, requiring dismissal.

2016Thus, Martin does not show particularized prejudice, and this final factor weighs in favor of the State. 23 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 840 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 ). 24 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 25 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 26 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 845 . -10- No. 75230-8-1 / 11 Because all four Barker factors weigh in favor of the State, the delay did not constitute a speedy trial violation.27 Interstate Agreement on Detainers Martin also claims that the delay violated the IAD, requiring dismissal.

2016Thus, Martin does not show particularized prejudice, and this final factor weighs in favor of the State. 23 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 840 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 ). 24 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 25 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 . 26 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 845 . -10- No. 75230-8-1 / 11 Because all four Barker factors weigh in favor of the State, the delay did not constitute a speedy trial violation.27 Interstate Agreement on Detainers Martin also claims that the delay violated the IAD, requiring dismissal.

2015Consequently, Martin's claim that the spousal maintenance provision was unfair at the time of execution is thus time-barred. 143 Wn.

2013Perez, 33 Wn.

2013App. at 710 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. Dep’t of Licensing, 138 Wn.2d 783 , 797 n.8, 982 P.2d 601 (1999)).

2013The Gregory court stated that "the Martin analysis clearly supports the Camara court's conclusion." 6 6 Gregory, 158 Wn.2d at 803 .

2013The Gregory court stated that "the Martin analysis clearly supports the Camara court's conclusion." 6 6 Gregory, 158 Wn.2d at 803 .

2013App. at 710 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. Dep’t of Licensing, 138 Wn.2d 783 , 797 n.8, 982 P.2d 601 (1999)).

2013Merseal v. Dept of Licensing, 99 Wn.App. 414,420 , 994 P. d 262 (2000): 2 A. Due Process Martin argues that his due process right was violated when the hearing officer continued the hearing as required by WAC 308 -103 -070( 0)when the arresting officer failed to appear,at 1 Martin's hearing iif December:.

2013In Smith v. United States,_U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 714 , 184 L.

2013In Smith v. United States,_U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 714 , 184 L.

1995To the contrary, Martin makes the trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea explicitly contingent on the trial court’s independent evaluation of voluntariness: "Assuming the trial court was satisfied the guilty plea was made competently, knowingly and voluntarily, it should have accepted Martin’s plea of guilty to the Brown murder charge.” (Italics ours.) Martin, 94 Wn.2d at 9 .

1995To the contrary, Martin makes the trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea explicitly contingent on the trial court's independent evaluation of voluntariness: " Assuming the trial court was satisfied the guilty plea was made competently, knowingly and voluntarily, it should have accepted Martin's plea of guilty to the Brown murder charge." (Italics ours.) Martin, 94 Wn.2d at 9 .

1988Section VII of the first Coe decision addressed the admissibility of testimony by witnesses who had been hypnotized. [5] Therein, this court cited its holding in State v. Martin, 101 Wn.2d 713, 722 , 684 P.2d 651 (1984) (also *861 filed the same day as the first Coe opinion), that "`a person, once hypnotized, should be barred from testifying concerning information recalled while under hypnosis.'" [6] The first Coe decision also cited the Martin exception to this prohibition: witnesses may testify as to facts recalled before hypnosis if certain procedural safeguards are met. [7] One such safegu

1988Section VII of the first Coe decision addressed the admissibility of testimony by witnesses who had been hypnotized. [5] Therein, this court cited its holding in State v. Martin, 101 Wn.2d 713, 722 , 684 P.2d 651 (1984) (also *861 filed the same day as the first Coe opinion), that "`a person, once hypnotized, should be barred from testifying concerning information recalled while under hypnosis.'" [6] The first Coe decision also cited the Martin exception to this prohibition: witnesses may testify as to facts recalled before hypnosis if certain procedural safeguards are met. [7] One such safegu

1980In State v. Burri, 87 Wn.2d 175, 182 , 550 P.2d 507 (1976), our court adverts to the specific language of Chapman and correctly states: Moreover, an error of constitutional proportions will not be held harmless unless the appellate court is "able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Yet in State v. Fricks, supra at 396 , the court appears to have reverted to the pre- Chapman and pre- Martin rule, stating: The State contends, however, that any constitutional error was harmless.

1980In State v. Burri, 87 Wn.2d 175, 182 , 550 P.2d 507 (1976), our court adverts to the specific language of Chapman and correctly states: Moreover, an error of constitutional proportions will not be held harmless unless the appellate court is "able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Yet in State v. Fricks, supra at 396 , the court appears to have reverted to the pre- Chapman and pre- Martin rule, stating: The State contends, however, that any constitutional error was harmless.