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14 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2013See Pixley , 453 Mass, at 833, citing Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 295-296 (2008) (“a Martin hearing should be conducted only as an exception to the general rule that the judge’s verification of the validity of the privilege be based on information provided in open court”). 2013See Pixley , 453 Mass, at 833, citing Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 295-296 (2008) (“a Martin hearing should be conducted only as an exception to the general rule that the judge’s verification of the validity of the privilege be based on information provided in open court”). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen2 sentences2015A judge may hold an in camera hearing (called a “Martin hearing,” see Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496 [1996]) on the validity of an assertion of the right against self-incrimination only after holding an open hearing at which the parties are “invite[d] ... to provide the court with information that may shed light on whether the witness’s testimony . . . could possibly tend to incriminate him.” Pixley v. Commonwealth, supra. “Only in those rare circumstances where this information is inadequate to allow the judge to make an informed determination should the judge conduct an in camera Mart 2015A judge may hold an in camera hearing (called a “Martin hearing,” see Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496 [1996]) on the validity of an assertion of the right against self-incrimination only after holding an open hearing at which the parties are “invite[d] ... to provide the court with information that may shed light on whether the witness’s testimony . . . could possibly tend to incriminate him.” Pixley v. Commonwealth, supra. “Only in those rare circumstances where this information is inadequate to allow the judge to make an informed determination should the judge conduct an in camera Mart | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Gardnergreen2 sentences2025See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 299 , 304 (2023). 2025See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 299 , 304 (2023). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Healygreen2 sentences2024See Commonwealth v. Healy, 452 Mass. 510, 514 (2008) ("we assume that the judge gave no weight to the [inadmissible] evidence for the purposes of trial and considered it only for the [other] purposes"). 5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority. 5 2024See Commonwealth v. Healy, 452 Mass. 510, 514 (2008) ("we assume that the judge gave no weight to the [inadmissible] evidence for the purposes of trial and considered it only for the [other] purposes"). 5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority. 5 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2013Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 318 (2008), cert, denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 121 (1976). 2013Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 318 (2008), cert, denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 121 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clementegreen2 sentences2013Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 318 (2008), cert, denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 121 (1976). 2013Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 318 (2008), cert, denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 121 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Emery v. Crowleygreen1 sentence2012Generally, “[a]n express easement can be extinguished only by grant, release, abandonment, estoppel or prescription.” Emery v. Crowley, 371 Mass. 489, 495 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Drumgoldgreen2 sentences2009See Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 423 Mass. 230, 247-248 (1996). 7 A Martin hearing poses the unique situation of compelling potentially incriminating testimony from a reluctant witness for the sole purpose of determining whether the witness has a valid privilege against self-incrimination. 2009See Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 423 Mass. 230, 247-248 (1996). 7 A Martin hearing poses the unique situation of compelling potentially incriminating testimony from a reluctant witness for the sole purpose of determining whether the witness has a valid privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Austin A.green2 sentences2009See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); Commonwealth v. Austin A., 450 Mass. 665, 667-668 (2008). 8 To allow the defendant to argue the content of the Martin hearing before the Appeals Court would, out of fairness, require that the prosecution be given access to the impounded transcript as well. 9 This would defeat, for practical purposes, the reason for conducting the Martin hearing in camera in the first place, which was not simply to delay disclosure until appeal but to prevent disclosure entirely. 2009See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); Commonwealth v. Austin A., 450 Mass. 665, 667-668 (2008). 8 To allow the defendant to argue the content of the Martin hearing before the Appeals Court would, out of fairness, require that the prosecution be given access to the impounded transcript as well. 9 This would defeat, for practical purposes, the reason for conducting the Martin hearing in camera in the first place, which was not simply to delay disclosure until appeal but to prevent disclosure entirely. | 1 | 1 |
Kastigar v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2009See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); Commonwealth v. Austin A., 450 Mass. 665, 667-668 (2008). 8 To allow the defendant to argue the content of the Martin hearing before the Appeals Court would, out of fairness, require that the prosecution be given access to the impounded transcript as well. 9 This would defeat, for practical purposes, the reason for conducting the Martin hearing in camera in the first place, which was not simply to delay disclosure until appeal but to prevent disclosure entirely. 2009See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); Commonwealth v. Austin A., 450 Mass. 665, 667-668 (2008). 8 To allow the defendant to argue the content of the Martin hearing before the Appeals Court would, out of fairness, require that the prosecution be given access to the impounded transcript as well. 9 This would defeat, for practical purposes, the reason for conducting the Martin hearing in camera in the first place, which was not simply to delay disclosure until appeal but to prevent disclosure entirely. | 1 | 1 |
Glassman v. Computervision Corp.green1 sentence2006See Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that a court may deny a motion to amend when it is an “attempt to alter the shape of the case in order to defeat summary judgment”); Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc. 814 F.2d 798, 806 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to amend where the plaintiff filed the motion after the court took the application for summary judgment under advisement). | 1 | 1 |
Blue Sky L. Rep. P 72,496, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,186 Thorburn Kennedy, Trustee v. Josephthal & Company, Inc., Edward M. Swartz and Fredric Swartzgreen1 sentence2006See Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that a court may deny a motion to amend when it is an “attempt to alter the shape of the case in order to defeat summary judgment”); Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc. 814 F.2d 798, 806 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to amend where the plaintiff filed the motion after the court took the application for summary judgment under advisement). | 1 | 1 |
Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co.green1 sentence2006Stated another way, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has “(1) knowledge or sufficient notice that she was harmed and (2) knowledge or sufficient notice of what the cause of harm was.” Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 63 Mass.App.Ct. 337, 343 (2005) (quoting Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 408 Mass. 204, 208 (1990)). 3 In this case, BMC has pled the statute of limitations as a defense to Martin’s claim. | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc.green1 sentence2006Stated another way, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has “(1) knowledge or sufficient notice that she was harmed and (2) knowledge or sufficient notice of what the cause of harm was.” Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 63 Mass.App.Ct. 337, 343 (2005) (quoting Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 408 Mass. 204, 208 (1990)). 3 In this case, BMC has pled the statute of limitations as a defense to Martin’s claim. | 1 | 1 |
Hunnewell v. Hunnewellgreen1 sentence2002Hunnewell v. Hunnewell, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 363-364 (1983). 3. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Francis Melvingreen2 sentences1980He also concluded that the Martin analysis had been made unnecessary by the holding in United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979): “[T]he reasonable implication of the affidavit is that the ‘unknown male’ was a bystander witness, not an informant. 1980He also concluded that the Martin analysis had been made unnecessary by the holding in United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979): “[T]he reasonable implication of the affidavit is that the ‘unknown male’ was a bystander witness, not an informant. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boohergreen2 sentences1977See People v. Booher, 18 Cal. App. 3d 331 (1971). 1977See People v. Booher, 18 Cal. App. 3d 331 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le
green
2 sentences2017During the first day of DaSilva’s testimony, she stated, as she had at the Martin hearing, that her testimony before the grand jury had been coerced, and asserted multiple times that she did not remember events to which she had testified at the grand jury. 4 The judge conducted a voir dire examination to ascertain whether, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55 (1984), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), and its progeny, DaSilva’s grand jury testimony was admissible substantively. 2017During the first day of DaSilva’s testimony, she stated, as she had at the Martin hearing, that her testimony before the grand jury had been coerced, and asserted multiple times that she did not remember events to which she had testified at the grand jury. 4 The judge conducted a voir dire examination to ascertain whether, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55 (1984), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), and its progeny, DaSilva’s grand jury testimony was admissible substantively. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Daye
red
2 sentences2017During the first day of DaSilva’s testimony, she stated, as she had at the Martin hearing, that her testimony before the grand jury had been coerced, and asserted multiple times that she did not remember events to which she had testified at the grand jury. 4 The judge conducted a voir dire examination to ascertain whether, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55 (1984), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), and its progeny, DaSilva’s grand jury testimony was admissible substantively. 2017During the first day of DaSilva’s testimony, she stated, as she had at the Martin hearing, that her testimony before the grand jury had been coerced, and asserted multiple times that she did not remember events to which she had testified at the grand jury. 4 The judge conducted a voir dire examination to ascertain whether, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55 (1984), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), and its progeny, DaSilva’s grand jury testimony was admissible substantively. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Young
green
2 sentences2013In the second clause of the Martin formulation, “the circumstances must be viewed from the perspective of the intervening defendant, not of the third party.” Commonwealth v. Young, supra at 209 . 2013In the second clause of the Martin formulation, “the circumstances must be viewed from the perspective of the intervening defendant, not of the third party.” Commonwealth v. Young, supra at 209 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Ellen Brogna
green
2 sentences2009Id., quoting In re Brogna, 589 F.2d 24 , 28 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978). 2009Id., quoting In re Brogna, 589 F.2d 24 , 28 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
New York v. Quarles
green
1 sentence2005The Commonwealth did not contend that the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement applied in this case, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Commonwealth v. Alan A., a juvenile, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 271 (1999), and the facts would probably not have supported such a claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commonwealth v. Alan A.
green
1 sentence2005The Commonwealth did not contend that the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement applied in this case, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Commonwealth v. Alan A., a juvenile, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 271 (1999), and the facts would probably not have supported such a claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Melvin v. United States
green
2 sentences1980He also concluded that the Martin analysis had been made unnecessary by the holding in United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979): “[T]he reasonable implication of the affidavit is that the ‘unknown male’ was a bystander witness, not an informant. 1980He also concluded that the Martin analysis had been made unnecessary by the holding in United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979): “[T]he reasonable implication of the affidavit is that the ‘unknown male’ was a bystander witness, not an informant. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.