governmental entity retains immunity in Texas

2019City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693, 694 (Tex. 2006); City of Angleton v. USFilter Operating Servs., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 677, 678 (Tex. 2006).

2008City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693, 694 (Tex. 2006); City of Angleton v. USFilter Operating Servs., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 677, 678 (Tex. 2006).

2019City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693, 694 (Tex. 2006); City of Angleton v. USFilter Operating Servs., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 677, 678 (Tex. 2006).

2008City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 693, 694 (Tex. 2006); City of Angleton v. USFilter Operating Servs., Inc., 201 S.W.3d 677, 678 (Tex. 2006).

2014See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (“Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision under the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Tex. Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Sens., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 258-59 (Tex.2010) (per curiam) (explaining that when allegations and requested declarations are, substantively, ultra vires claims, the governmental entity retains immunity from suit, and immunity is waived only for the government officers in their offi

2014See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (“Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision under the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Tex. Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256 , 258–59 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining that when allegations and requested declarations are, substantively, ultra vires claims, the governmental entity retains immunity from suit, and immunity is waived only for the government officers in their

2005See Mogayzel v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 66 S.W.3d 459, 465 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).

2005See Mogayzel v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 66 S.W.3d 459, 465 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).

2015The Court explained that that the governmental entity retains its immunity from suit when the claimant does not challenge the validity of a statute but rather challenges a government officer's application of a statute to the claimant. 284 S.W.3d at 372 -73 & n.6.

2015The Court explained that that the governmental entity retains its immunity from suit when the claimant does not challenge the validity of a statute but rather challenges a government officer's application of a statute to the claimant. 284 S.W.3d at 372 -73 & n.6.

2016The governmental entity retains immunity, however, from suits for injunctive relief “seeking imposition of an affirmative duty based on a past alleged actionable wrong.” City of Arlington v. Randall, 301 S.W.3d 896, 907 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied); see also Board of Trs. of the Galveston Wharves v. O'Rourke, 405 S.W.3d 228, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (addressing immunity from suits to control state action); Tex. Empl’t Comm’n v. Martinez, 545 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. Civ.

2013We additionally note that, in a claim for injunctive relief, the governmental entity retains immunity "from a suit seeking imposition of an affirmative duty based on a past alleged actionable wrong.” City of Arlington v. Randall, 301 S.W.3d 896, 907 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied); see also Tex. Emp't Comm'n v. Martinez, 545 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1976, no writ) ("Generally, it is the purpose of injunctive relief to halt wrongful acts threatened or that are in the course of accomplishment, rather than to grant relief against past actionable wrongs or to prevent the commi

2016The governmental entity retains immunity, however, from suits for injunctive relief “seeking imposition of an affirmative duty based on a past alleged actionable wrong.” City of Arlington v. Randall, 301 S.W.3d 896, 907 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied); see also Board of Trs. of the Galveston Wharves v. O'Rourke, 405 S.W.3d 228, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (addressing immunity from suits to control state action); Tex. Empl’t Comm’n v. Martinez, 545 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. Civ.

2013We additionally note that, in a claim for injunctive relief, the governmental entity retains immunity "from a suit seeking imposition of an affirmative duty based on a past alleged actionable wrong.” City of Arlington v. Randall, 301 S.W.3d 896, 907 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied); see also Tex. Emp't Comm'n v. Martinez, 545 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1976, no writ) ("Generally, it is the purpose of injunctive relief to halt wrongful acts threatened or that are in the course of accomplishment, rather than to grant relief against past actionable wrongs or to prevent the commi

2014See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (“Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision under the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Tex. Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Sens., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 258-59 (Tex.2010) (per curiam) (explaining that when allegations and requested declarations are, substantively, ultra vires claims, the governmental entity retains immunity from suit, and immunity is waived only for the government officers in their offi

2014See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (“Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision under the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Tex. Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256 , 258–59 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining that when allegations and requested declarations are, substantively, ultra vires claims, the governmental entity retains immunity from suit, and immunity is waived only for the government officers in their

2023Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, 381 S.W.3d at 476 . 8 B.

2023See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476, 491 (Tex. 2012).

2014See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (“Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision under the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Tex. Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Sens., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 258-59 (Tex.2010) (per curiam) (explaining that when allegations and requested declarations are, substantively, ultra vires claims, the governmental entity retains immunity from suit, and immunity is waived only for the government officers in their offi

2014See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (“Sefzik is not challenging the validity of a statute; instead, he is challenging TxDOT’s actions under it, and he does not direct us to any provision under the UDJA that expressly waives immunity for his claim.”); Tex. Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256 , 258–59 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining that when allegations and requested declarations are, substantively, ultra vires claims, the governmental entity retains immunity from suit, and immunity is waived only for the government officers in their

2009Conservation CommÂ’n. v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 856-57 (rejecting application of the waiver-by-conduct doctrine in breach of contract suits and reaffirming that only the legislature can waive immunity). Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Admittedly, the factual circumstances in Little-Tex differ from those before us. Â And, because of that Leach argues that the holding does not control the outcome here. Â Though the circumstances may differ between the two suits, the Supreme Court in Little-Tex actually focused not upon the facts underlying the cause of action but rather upon the cause of action itself, th

2008Id. at 853 .

2023Group, LLC, 502 S.W.3d 859, 866 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).

2022Cervantes, 521 S.W.3d at 393 -94 (citing City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 537-38 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam)).

2022Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, No. 20-0725, 2022 WL 983764 , at *4 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2022) (citing Tooke v. 5 City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. 2006)).

2019Id.; see also Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. Crockett, 257 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, pet. denied).

2019City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014).

2016The governmental entity retains immunity, however, from suits for injunctive relief “seeking imposition of an affirmative duty based on a past alleged actionable wrong.” City of Arlington v. Randall, 301 S.W.3d 896, 907 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied); see also Board of Trs. of the Galveston Wharves v. O'Rourke, 405 S.W.3d 228, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (addressing immunity from suits to control state action); Tex. Empl’t Comm’n v. Martinez, 545 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. Civ.

2015See id.

2015City of Paris v. Abbott, 360 S.W.3d 567, 576 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. denied) (citing Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd., 320 S.W.3d at 839 ); see Lubbock Cnty.

2013App.—El Paso 1976, no writ) (“Generally, it is the purpose of injunctive relief to halt wrongful acts threatened or that are in the course of accomplishment, rather than to grant relief against past actionable wrongs or to prevent the commission of wrongs not eminently threatened.”). 13 Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that DJA is intended to provide means of determining parties’ rights when controversy has arisen but before wrong has been committed and is “preventative in nature”); Russell v. Metro.

2009Conservation CommÂ’n. v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 856-57 (rejecting application of the waiver-by-conduct doctrine in breach of contract suits and reaffirming that only the legislature can waive immunity). Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Admittedly, the factual circumstances in Little-Tex differ from those before us. Â And, because of that Leach argues that the holding does not control the outcome here. Â Though the circumstances may differ between the two suits, the Supreme Court in Little-Tex actually focused not upon the facts underlying the cause of action but rather upon the cause of action itself, th