instance privilege in Texas

2012In the particular instance of an error consisting of the failure to admonish under article 26.13(a)(5), the court further held, the question on appeal is “considering the record as a whole, do we have a fair assurance that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the court admonished him?” Id. at 919 .

2012In the particular instance of an error consisting of the failure to admonish under article 26.13(a)(5), the court further held, the question on appeal is "considering the record as a whole, do we have a fair assurance that the defendant's decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the court admonished him?" Id. at 919 .

1996Id.

1996Id.

1969Ordinarily this question is for the trier of facts and only becomes a matter of law for the court when but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from all the testimony. * * * The following language from Hines v. Arrant [Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W. 767 ] is especially pertinent: ‘If every one injured in a railroad collision who could by looking and listening discover the approach of the train before going upon the track is to be charged with contributory negligence, it would be difficult to find an instance in which that defense would not be fully established.

1969Ordinarily this question is for the trier of facts and only becomes a matter of law for the court when but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from all the testimony. * * * The following language from Hines v. Arrant [Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W. 767 ] is especially pertinent: `If every one injured in a railroad collision who could by looking and listening discover the approach of the train before going upon the track is to be charged with contributory negligence, it would be difficult to find an instance in which that defense would not be fully established.

2019But we agree with the Austin Court of Appeals, which addressed this issue on remand from the court of criminal appeals after that court remanded the case for a rule 44.2 harm analysis in Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d at 509 , that the proper standard in this instance is rule 44.2(b).

2018Even a single instance of error by counsel can rise to the level of deficient performance if the error “was egregious and had a seriously deleterious impact on the balance of the representation.” Id.

2015See Lott, 424 F.3d at 452-53 ; Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 718 -19 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 , 9 S.Ct. 125 , 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888)); see also U.S. Fire Ins.

2015Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993) (“In an instance in which the privilege is being used as a sword rather than a shield, the privilege may be waived.”). 11 See Lott, 424 F.3d at 452–53; Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 718–19 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 , 9 S. Ct. 125 (1888)); see also U.S. Fire Ins.

2015Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993) (“In an instance in which the privilege is being used as a sword rather than a shield, the privilege may be waived.”). 11 See Lott, 424 F.3d at 452–53; Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 718–19 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 , 9 S. Ct. 125 (1888)); see also U.S. Fire Ins.

2015See Lott, 424 F.3d at 452-53 ; Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 718 -19 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 , 9 S.Ct. 125 , 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888)); see also U.S. Fire Ins.

2015Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993) (“In an instance in which the privilege is being used as a sword rather than a shield, the privilege may be waived.”). 11 See Lott, 424 F.3d at 452–53; Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 718–19 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 , 9 S. Ct. 125 (1888)); see also U.S. Fire Ins.

1998While the impact of a particular instance of error may be innocuous when viewed in a vacuum, it is conceivable that repeated error may eventually accumulate to a level depriving the accused of a fair trial, and that was the conclusion reached by the court in Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

1998There the court noted that individual acts of misconduct may be ameliorated by an appropriate instruction; yet, those same improprieties may “esealate[ ] in to cumulative harm.” Id. at 832 .

1997The United States Supreme Court adopted a two (2) prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1997The United States Supreme Court adopted a two (2) prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1996King v. State , 631 S.W.2d 486 , 492 n.15 (Tex. Crim.

1957We base our decision in this instance on the doctrine announced by this court in Houston News Co. v. Shavers, Tex.Civ.App., 64 S.W.2d 384 (writ ref.).

1954On another trial the issue of damages should be submitted without the above-quoted preliminary instruction.” In Schroeder v. Rainboldt, 128 Tex. 269 , 97 S.W.2d 679, 684 , the Court considered issues and instructions on findings as to unavoidable accident of like character to those before the Court in Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, supra. The Court cited that case and said: “It is not always reversible error to instruct a jury in the charge to- answer or not answer a certain issue conditioned upon the answer to another, but in this instance the instruction was in connection with an

1954Co. v. Brannen, 140 Tex. 52 , 166 S.W.2d 112 ; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rhodes, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 448 , we fail to see wherein in this instance the rule is more advantageous to the appellants than to the appellees.

1954Co. v. Brannen, 140 Tex. 52 , 166 S.W.2d 112 ; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rhodes, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 448 , we fail to see wherein in this instance the rule is more advantageous to the appellants than to the appellees.

1954On another trial the issue of damages should be submitted without the above-quoted preliminary instruction.” In Schroeder v. Rainboldt, 128 Tex. 269 , 97 S.W.2d 679, 684 , the Court considered issues and instructions on findings as to unavoidable accident of like character to those before the Court in Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, supra. The Court cited that case and said: “It is not always reversible error to instruct a jury in the charge to- answer or not answer a certain issue conditioned upon the answer to another, but in this instance the instruction was in connection with an

1954Co. v. Brannen, 140 Tex. 52 , 166 S.W.2d 112 ; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rhodes, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 448 , we fail to see wherein in this instance the rule is more advantageous to the appellants than to the appellees.

1947City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281 , 190 S.W. 2d 67 .

1947City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281 , 190 S.W. 2d 67 .