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14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Interest of A. C.green2 sentences2023Cf. In the Interest of A. C., 285 Ga. 829, 832 (1) ( 686 SE2d 635 ) (2009) (our Supreme Court “has recognized a limited exception to [the] general rule [that the court will not rule on a constitutional challenge to a statute unless raised and ruled on in the trial court] in the instance of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for the first time on appeal.”). 7. 2017The Supreme Court, however, “has recognized a limited exception to such general rule in the instance of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for the first time on appeal.” (Citation omitted.) In the Interest of A. C., 285 Ga. 829, 832 (3) ( 686 SE2d 635 ) (2009). | 4 | 4 |
In Re ACgreen2 sentences2023Cf. In the Interest of A. C., 285 Ga. 829, 832 (1) ( 686 SE2d 635 ) (2009) (our Supreme Court “has recognized a limited exception to [the] general rule [that the court will not rule on a constitutional challenge to a statute unless raised and ruled on in the trial court] in the instance of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for the first time on appeal.”). 7. 2018There is a "limited exception" to this requirement of a ruling by the trial court "in the instance of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for the first time on appeal." Id. | 2 | 7 |
City of Decatur v. DeKalb Countygreen2 sentences2011See In the Interest of A.C., 285 Ga. 829, 832-833 (1), 686 S.E.2d 635 (2009) ("[The Supreme Court of Georgia] has recognized a limited exception to such general rule in the instance of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for the first time on appeal."). [9] We further note that "[t]he Court of Appeals has jurisdiction when the constitutionality of a state law is questioned if the law has been held to be constitutional against the same attack being made, as such case requires merely an application of unquestioned and unambiguo 2011See In the Interest of A.C., 285 Ga. 829, 832-833 (1), 686 S.E.2d 635 (2009) ("[The Supreme Court of Georgia] has recognized a limited exception to such general rule in the instance of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for the first time on appeal."). [9] We further note that "[t]he Court of Appeals has jurisdiction when the constitutionality of a state law is questioned if the law has been held to be constitutional against the same attack being made, as such case requires merely an application of unquestioned and unambiguo | 2 | 2 |
Jagoe v. Jagoegreen2 sentences1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa 1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa | 1 | 1 |
Burch v. Kenmoregreen2 sentences1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa 1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa 1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa | 1 | 1 |
McCullough v. McCulloughgreen2 sentences1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa 1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences1944Green v. State, 109 Ga. 536, 540 ( 35 S. E. 97 ); Hadaway v. Southern Ry. 1944Green v. State, 109 Ga. 536, 540 ( 35 S. E. 97 ); Hadaway v. Southern Ry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fife v. Johnston
green
2 sentences2009In Fife v. Johnston, 225 Ga. 447 ( 169 SE2d 167 ) (1969), a direct appeal was filed from the grant of the defendant’s motion for new trial, and this Court dismissed the appeal after rejecting the appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Code Ann. § 6-701, the predecessor of OCGA § 5-6-34, providing the procedure for interlocutory appeal. 2009In Fife v. Johnston, 225 Ga. 447 ( 169 SE2d 167 ) (1969), a direct appeal was filed from the grant of the defendant’s motion for new trial, and this Court dismissed the appeal after rejecting the appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Code Ann. § 6-701, the predecessor of OCGA § 5-6-34, providing the procedure for interlocutory appeal. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Robinson v. Kroger Co.
green
2 sentences1998In our view of the case sub judice, the question of whether plaintiff exercised ordinary care for her own safety in detecting and avoiding the hazard posed by articles negligently placed or arranged in defendant's aisles falls within the general rule: Such matters "are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, and that summary judgment is granted only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed." Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748 , 493 S.E.2d 403 , supra. The grant of summary judgment in this instance was in error. 1998In our view of the case sub judice, the question of whether plaintiff exercised ordinary care for her own safety in detecting and avoiding the hazard posed by articles negligently placed or arranged in defendant's aisles falls within the general rule: Such matters "are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, and that summary judgment is granted only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed." Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748 , 493 S.E.2d 403 , supra. The grant of summary judgment in this instance was in error. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Associated Health Systems, Inc. v. Jones
green
2 sentences1992Health Systems v. Jones, 185 Ga. App. 798 (1) ( 366 SE2d 147 ) (1988), does not apply here, because the officer exercised no degree of control over Taggart. 1992Health Systems v. Jones, 185 Ga. App. 798 (1) ( 366 SE2d 147 ) (1988), does not apply here, because the officer exercised no degree of control over Taggart. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Corriher v. McElroy
green
1 sentence1970Since “Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretion of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned” (McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 778 ( 69 SE2d 764 )), this court will not “interfere with the discretion vested in the trial judge unless it has been manifestly abused.” Burch v. Kenmore, 206 Ga. 277, 279 ( 56 SE2d 508 ); Corriher v. McElroy, 209 Ga. 885 , supra. Although the denial of visitation rights does not justify the refusal to hold a defendant in contempt for failure to pa | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Oliver v. Hammond
green
1 sentence1900As an instance in which this rule was applied where no express trust existed, see Oliver v. Hammond, supra. Until one or the other of these contingencies happened, the possession of the defendant was the possession of the plaintiff, and no limitation of time would operate to debar the latter from calling the former to account, with the single exception that if the nature of the transactions was such that, after the lapse of a reasonable time, the law would presume a demand and refusal, then the statute would begin to run from the date such demand would be presumed. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.