instance defense in Connecticut

2015We thoroughly have reviewed the record and are unable to find a single instance where defense counsel made such an argument to the trial court, and the defendant has not cited to any such instance in her appellate briefs. ‘‘[A] party cannot take a path at trial and change tactics on appeal.’’ Moran v. Media News Group, Inc., 100 Conn. App. 485, 501 , 918 A.2d 921 (2007). ‘‘Both our Supreme Court and this court have stated the princi- ple that, when a party abandons a claim or argument before the trial court, that party waives the right to appellate review of such claim because a contrary con-

2015We thoroughly have reviewed the record and are unable to find a single instance where defense counsel made such an argument to the trial court, and the defendant has not cited to any such instance in her appellate briefs. ‘‘[A] party cannot take a path at trial and change tactics on appeal.’’ Moran v. Media News Group, Inc., 100 Conn. App. 485, 501 , 918 A.2d 921 (2007). ‘‘Both our Supreme Court and this court have stated the princi- ple that, when a party abandons a claim or argument before the trial court, that party waives the right to appellate review of such claim because a contrary con-

2011As we recently concluded in [ State v. Fabricatore, supra, 281 Conn. at 481-82 , 915 A.2d 872 ], `[u]nder this factual situation, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to *980 either party . . . or that the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial.'" State v. Brewer, supra, at 360-61 , 927 A.2d 825 .

2011As we recently concluded in [ State v. Fabricatore, supra, 281 Conn. at 481-82 , 915 A.2d 872 ], `[u]nder this factual situation, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to *980 either party . . . or that the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial.'" State v. Brewer, supra, at 360-61 , 927 A.2d 825 .

2011As we recently concluded in [ State v. Fabricatore, supra, 281 Conn. at 481-82 , 915 A.2d 872 ], `[u]nder this factual situation, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to *980 either party . . . or that the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial.'" State v. Brewer, supra, at 360-61 , 927 A.2d 825 .

1985While the failure to take exception to claimed trial errors ordinarily precludes appellate review, we will consider the newly raised claims in this instance under the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1985While the failure to take exception to claimed trial errors ordinarily precludes appellate review, we will consider the newly raised claims in this instance under the doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1974State v. Bell, 153 Conn. 540, 543 , 219 A.2d 218 .

1974State v. Bell, 153 Conn. 540, 543 , 219 A.2d 218 .

1947We can properly presume that, when the act of 1927 was adopted, the General Assembly acted with knowledge of our previous decisions construing the former provision; Stamford v. Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 606 , 141 A. 891 ; and in this instance such a presumption gains great weight because the report of the special commission on tax exemptions, to which we have referred, contains quotations from our decisions in Yale University v. New Haven, supra, and Corbin v. Baldwin, supra, in which the two bases of exemption formulated in Pomfret School v. Pomfret, supra, are stated at length.

1947We can properly presume that, when the act of 1927 was adopted, the General Assembly acted with knowledge of our previous decisions construing the former provision; Stamford v. Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 606 , 141 A. 891 ; and in this instance such a presumption gains great weight because the report of the special commission on tax exemptions, to which we have referred, contains quotations from our decisions in Yale University v. New Haven, supra, and Corbin v. Baldwin, supra, in which the two bases of exemption formulated in Pomfret School v. Pomfret, supra, are stated at length.

1947We can properly presume that, when the act of 1927 was adopted, the General Assembly acted with knowledge of our previous decisions construing the former provision; Stamford v. Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 606 , 141 A. 891 ; and in this instance such a presumption gains great weight because the report of the special commission on tax exemptions, to which we have referred, contains quotations from our decisions in Yale University v. New Haven, supra, and Corbin v. Baldwin, supra, in which the two bases of exemption formulated in Pomfret School v. Pomfret, supra, are stated at length.

1926School District v. Bradley, 54 Conn. 74 , 5 Atl. 861 ; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489 , 71 N. W. 880 ; and, as we point out in the Bartholomew case (p. 616), if in a particular instance the rule requires the exercise of judgment in its application, the respondents are not in a position to take advantage of such a situation upon this motion.

1926School District v. Bradley, 54 Conn. 74 , 5 Atl. 861 ; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489 , 71 N. W. 880 ; and, as we point out in the Bartholomew case (p. 616), if in a particular instance the rule requires the exercise of judgment in its application, the respondents are not in a position to take advantage of such a situation upon this motion.

1926School District v. Bradley, 54 Conn. 74 , 5 Atl. 861 ; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489 , 71 N. W. 880 ; and, as we point out in the Bartholomew case (p. 616), if in a particular instance the rule requires the exercise of judgment in its application, the respondents are not in a position to take advantage of such a situation upon this motion.

1926School District v. Bradley, 54 Conn. 74 , 5 Atl. 861 ; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489 , 71 N. W. 880 ; and, as we point out in the Bartholomew case (p. 616), if in a particular instance the rule requires the exercise of judgment in its application, the respondents are not in a position to take advantage of such a situation upon this motion.