defendant acknowledges claim in Connecticut

2026The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not preserved at trial and therefore seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).2 In response, the state argues that the claim was affirmatively waived by defense counsel and that the record is inadequate for review.

2026The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not preserved at trial and therefore seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).2 In response, the state argues that the claim was affirmatively waived by defense counsel and that the record is inadequate for review.

2024In making the claim, the defendant relies on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 , 143 S. Ct. 2106 , 216 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2023), which is a case involving true threats of violence.

2024In making the claim, the defendant relies on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 , 143 S. Ct. 2106 , 216 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2023), which is a case involving true threats of violence.

2018B Following our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Edwards , 325 Conn. 97 , 156 A.3d 506 (2017), the defendant filed a supplemental brief claiming that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Sergeant Weaver to testify as an expert without conducting a Porter hearing 12 to determine if he was qualified to testify as an expert and whether the methodology he used to support his opinion that [the] defendant was in the same location as Anderson and Rogers at the time of the crime was reliable." (Footnote added.) The defendant acknowledges that defense counsel did not request a P

2018B Following our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Edwards , 325 Conn. 97 , 156 A.3d 506 (2017), the defendant filed a supplemental brief claiming that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Sergeant Weaver to testify as an expert without conducting a Porter hearing 12 to determine if he was qualified to testify as an expert and whether the methodology he used to support his opinion that [the] defendant was in the same location as Anderson and Rogers at the time of the crime was reliable." (Footnote added.) The defendant acknowledges that defense counsel did not request a P

2015The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not preserved and requests review pursuant to the Golding doctrine. ‘‘Specifically, [State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989)] held that a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial;

2015The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not preserved and requests review pursuant to the Golding doctrine. ‘‘Specifically, [State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989)] held that a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial;

2014The defendant acknowledges that this claim was rejected by our Supreme Court in State v. Knight, 266 Conn. 658 , 664–666, 835 A.2d 47 (2003) (doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to several charges allocated between two triers of fact for concurrent adjudication upon same evidence), which we are bound to follow.14 Accordingly, the defendant’s claim is without merit.

2014The defendant acknowledges that this claim was rejected by our Supreme Court in State v. Knight, 266 Conn. 658 , 664–666, 835 A.2d 47 (2003) (doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to several charges allocated between two triers of fact for concurrent adjudication upon same evidence), which we are bound to follow.14 Accordingly, the defendant’s claim is without merit.

2012The defendant conceded in his brief to this court that he “exhausted his peremptory challenges, but did not ask for more, and no juror was seated who would have been challenged if the defendant ha[d] retained more peremptory challenges.” On the basis of these concessions, the defendant acknowledges that our analysis is constrained by our Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213 , 849 A.2d 648 (2004), and State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299 , 613 A.2d 242 (1992).

2012The defendant conceded in his brief to this court that he “exhausted his peremptory challenges, but did not ask for more, and no juror was seated who would have been challenged if the defendant ha[d] retained more peremptory challenges.” On the basis of these concessions, the defendant acknowledges that our analysis is constrained by our Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213 , 849 A.2d 648 (2004), and State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299 , 613 A.2d 242 (1992).

2012The defendant conceded in his brief to this court that he “exhausted his peremptory challenges, but did not ask for more, and no juror was seated who would have been challenged if the defendant ha[d] retained more peremptory challenges.” On the basis of these concessions, the defendant acknowledges that our analysis is constrained by our Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213 , 849 A.2d 648 (2004), and State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299 , 613 A.2d 242 (1992).

2012The defendant conceded in his brief to this court that he “exhausted his peremptory challenges, but did not ask for more, and no juror was seated who would have been challenged if the defendant ha[d] retained more peremptory challenges.” On the basis of these concessions, the defendant acknowledges that our analysis is constrained by our Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213 , 849 A.2d 648 (2004), and State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299 , 613 A.2d 242 (1992).

2010The defendant acknowledges that his claim must take into account the decisions of our Supreme Court in Bender v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn. 733 , and of this court in Ranfone v. Ranfone, supra, 103 Conn. App. 243 .

2010The defendant acknowledges that his claim must take into account the decisions of our Supreme Court in Bender v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn. 733 , and of this court in Ranfone v. Ranfone, supra, 103 Conn. App. 243 .

2006The defendant acknowledges that his claim was not preserved for our review and now requests both Golding and plain error review. 12 “A claim challenging an instruction that mandates a particular inference adverse to a defendant may sufficiently implicate constitutional rights to satisfy the second condition of Golding, i.e., that the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orta, 66 Conn. App. 783, 792 , 786 A.2d 504 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 907 , 789 A.2d 997 (2002).

2006The defendant acknowledges that his claim was not preserved for our review and now requests both Golding and plain error review. 12 “A claim challenging an instruction that mandates a particular inference adverse to a defendant may sufficiently implicate constitutional rights to satisfy the second condition of Golding, i.e., that the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orta, 66 Conn. App. 783, 792 , 786 A.2d 504 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 907 , 789 A.2d 997 (2002).

2006The defendant acknowledges that his claim was not preserved for our review and now requests both Golding and plain error review. 12 “A claim challenging an instruction that mandates a particular inference adverse to a defendant may sufficiently implicate constitutional rights to satisfy the second condition of Golding, i.e., that the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orta, 66 Conn. App. 783, 792 , 786 A.2d 504 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 907 , 789 A.2d 997 (2002).

2006The defendant acknowledges that his claim was not preserved for our review and now requests both Golding and plain error review. 12 “A claim challenging an instruction that mandates a particular inference adverse to a defendant may sufficiently implicate constitutional rights to satisfy the second condition of Golding, i.e., that the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orta, 66 Conn. App. 783, 792 , 786 A.2d 504 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 907 , 789 A.2d 997 (2002).

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

2005See, e.g., State v. Catar, 256 Conn. 785, 797-802 , 781 A.2d 285 (2001) (addressing separately claims that court improperly admitted evidence of prior misconduct and improperly failed to deliver limiting instruction concerning such evidence); State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 277-79 , 853 A.2d 565 (same), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 , 859 A.2d 931 (2004); State v. Johnson, 65 Conn. App. 470, 475-79 , 783 A.2d 1057 (same), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 930 , 783 A.2d 1031 (2001). 10 For example, in Young , the prosecutor argued, in response to the attempt by the defendant’s counsel to cast doubt on

1997The defendant acknowledges an exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity if there is "imminent harm/identifiable victim." Citing Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988), the defendant maintains that it is a question of law as to whether the duty exists and whether its public or private and that if there was a duty to warn the players about the defective condition of the fence, the duty was discretionary.

1997The defendant acknowledges an exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity if there is "imminent harm/identifiable victim." Citing Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988), the defendant maintains that it is a question of law as to whether the duty exists and whether its public or private and that if there was a duty to warn the players about the defective condition of the fence, the duty was discretionary.

1986The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not raised below but asserts that it is, nevertheless, reviewable under the fundamental rights-fair trial exception established by State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1986The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not raised below but asserts that it is, nevertheless, reviewable under the fundamental rights-fair trial exception established by State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).