available challenge in District of Columbia

2025Such a motion may be procedurally barred, however, “[w]here a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal.” Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C. 1985).

2021Code § 23-110 (e) (2012 Repl.) (“The court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”); Washington v. United States, 834 A.2d 899 , 902 (D.C. 2003) (“Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.”) (citing Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C. 1985)); id. at 906 (“[A] claim not raised in a previous collateral attack is pr

2016“Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985)).

2013See Wu v. United States, 798 A.2d 1083, 1089 (D.C.2002) (“Section 23-110 is not a substitute for a direct appeal.”); Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (“Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.”); Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987).

2001With regard to Thomas's second § 23-110 motion, we have said that when a defendant "`has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.'" Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1993) (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (citation omitted)). [3] Indeed, the "abuse of writ" doctrine precludes consideration of "claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding," McCleskey v

2001I disagree that Matos answers the question presented by this appeal because Matos concerned a situation where appellant "failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal," yet "launched several similar collateral attacks on his conviction." Id.

2003In such circumstances the rule is more strict. “[I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court’s consideration of appellant’s claim.” Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987). 6 “Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless h

2003In such circumstances the rule is more strict. “[I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court’s consideration of appellant’s claim.” Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987). 6 “Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless h

2001With regard to Thomas's second § 23-110 motion, we have said that when a defendant "`has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.'" Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1993) (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (citation omitted)). [3] Indeed, the "abuse of writ" doctrine precludes consideration of "claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding," McCleskey v

2001With regard to Thomas's second § 23-110 motion, we have said that when a defendant "`has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.'" Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1993) (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (citation omitted)). [3] Indeed, the "abuse of writ" doctrine precludes consideration of "claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding," McCleskey v

2021Code § 23-110 (e) (2012 Repl.) (“The court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”); Washington v. United States, 834 A.2d 899 , 902 (D.C. 2003) (“Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.”) (citing Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C. 1985)); id. at 906 (“[A] claim not raised in a previous collateral attack is pr

2011Ms. Watson contends that Mr. Robertson "must establish 'cause' and 'prejudice' for failing to raise the issue earlier” and maintains that "[h]e cannot meet this demanding standard.” The general rule is that "[wjhere a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.” Washington v. United States, 834 A.2d 899, 902 (D.C.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2003In such circumstances the rule is more strict. “[I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court’s consideration of appellant’s claim.” Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987). 6 “Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless h

2003In such circumstances the rule is more strict. "[I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel's ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court's consideration of appellant's claim." Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987). [6] "Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless

2003In such circumstances the rule is more strict. “[I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court’s consideration of appellant’s claim.” Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987). 6 “Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless h

2003In such circumstances the rule is more strict. "[I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel's ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court's consideration of appellant's claim." Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987). [6] "Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless

2000Westbrook] voluntarily exposed himself to the danger.” See Scoggins v. Jude, 419 A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C.1980) (“Assumption of risk is an available defense when a plaintiff voluntarily has incurred a known risk.”) (citations omitted).

1987“Assumption of risk is an available defense when a plaintiff voluntarily has incurred a known risk.” Scoggins v. Jude, 419 A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C.1980) (citing Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 496E, comment a. (1965); other citations omitted).

1987Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68 , 102 S.Ct. at 1594 ; see Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.1982) (applying Frady “cause and prejudice” standard to issue raised in § 2255 motion); cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 , 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (same standard held applicable to motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)).

1985Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68 , 102 S.Ct. at 1594 ; see Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.1982) (applying Frady “cause and prejudice” standard to issue raised in § 2255 motion); cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 , 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (same standard held applicable to motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)).

2019Thus, where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure." Wu v. United States , 798 A.2d 1083 , 1089 (D.C. 2002) (alteration, internal citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013See Wu v. United States, 798 A.2d 1083, 1089 (D.C.2002) (“Section 23-110 is not a substitute for a direct appeal.”); Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (“Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.”); Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987).

2014Consequently, because the officers arrested appellant based on a validly authorized arrest warrant, the trial court reasoned that the only available challenge was to the validity of the affidavit itself, based on “intentional or reckless misrepresentations or omissions of material fact” under Franks v. Delaware[, 438 U.S. 154, 171 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) ].

2014Consequently, because the officers arrested appellant based on a validly authorized arrest warrant, the trial court reasoned that the only available challenge was to the validity of the affidavit itself, based on “intentional or reckless misrepresentations or omissions of material fact” under Franks v. Delaware[, 438 U.S. 154, 171 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) ].

2024Cf. Fatumabahirtu v. United States, 148 A.3d 260, 261 (D.C. 2016) (deficient performance where trial counsel failed to investigate an available defense); (Christie) Jones v. United States, 262 A.3d 1114 , 1124-25 (D.C. 2021) (deficient performance where trial counsel failed to call expert witness to testify to unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence); Frederick v. United States, 741 A.2d 427, 437-39 (D.C. 1999) (deficient performance where trial counsel failed to call an eyewitness known to have exculpatory testimony).

2024Cf. Fatumabahirtu v. United States, 148 A.3d 260, 261 (D.C. 2016) (deficient performance where trial counsel failed to investigate an available defense); (Christie) Jones v. United States, 262 A.3d 1114 , 1124-25 (D.C. 2021) (deficient performance where trial counsel failed to call expert witness to testify to unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence); Frederick v. United States, 741 A.2d 427, 437-39 (D.C. 1999) (deficient performance where trial counsel failed to call an eyewitness known to have exculpatory testimony).

2018In particular, “[w]here a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal [or during the 8 Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 261 (D.C. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 515 (quoting Long, 910 A.2d at 308 ).

2015Co., 127 A.2d 842, 848 (D.C. 1956).

2015Co., 127 A.2d 842, 848 (D.C.1956).

2012See Scipio, 928 So.2d at 1151 ("Not only was the only available defense evidence removed, in the process the defense was made to look utterly foolish. ...”).

2011However, we also have said that "[wjhen an appellant presents an issue which he did not raise in the trial court, we review, if at all, for plain error, whether the alleged error is non-constitutional or constitutional in nature.” Lowery v. United States, 3 A.3d 1169, 1172 (D.C.2010) (footnote and citations omitted).

2001Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.1993); see also Lane, supra, 737 A.2d at 552 .

2001Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.1993); see also Lane, supra, 737 A.2d at 552 .

2001Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.1993); see also Lane, supra, 737 A.2d at 552 .

2001Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.1993); see also Lane, supra, 737 A.2d at 552 .

1980See Martin, supra at 71 ; Harris v. Plummer, D.C.App., 190 A.2d 98, 100 (1963); Kanelos, supra, at 137 , 406 F.2d at 955 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496E, Comment a (1965).

1980See Martin, supra at 71 ; Harris v. Plummer, D.C.App., 190 A.2d 98, 100 (1963); Kanelos, supra, at 137 , 406 F.2d at 955 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496E, Comment a (1965).