available defense in Michigan

2026“We review questions of law arising from the provision of jury instructions de novo.” Id. “[S]elf-defense is an available defense to the charge of being a felon in possession if supported by sufficient evidence.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 707 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010) (Dupree II).

2026“We review questions of law arising from the provision of jury instructions de novo.” Id. “[S]elf-defense is an available defense to the charge of being a felon in possession if supported by sufficient evidence.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 707 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010) (Dupree II).

2024See In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 , 393 n 60; 835 NW2d 545 (2013); Manning v City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699 ; 509 NW2d 874 (1993). -8- Supreme Court has instructed that a number of factors must be considered to determine whether an official is acting with the scope of his or her executive authority, none of those factors include motive or an inquiry into the official’s subjective state of mind.

2024See In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 , 393 n 60; 835 NW2d 545 (2013); Manning v City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699 ; 509 NW2d 874 (1993). -8- Supreme Court has instructed that a number of factors must be considered to determine whether an official is acting with the scope of his or her executive authority, none of those factors include motive or an inquiry into the official’s subjective state of mind.

2017Summarizing its holding in Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, the Court explained, (1) there is no distinction between an easily ascertainable fraud rule and an innocent-third-party rule, (2) the Supreme Court in Titan [Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547 ; 817 NW2d 562 (2012)] clearly held that fraud is an available defense to an insurance contract except to the extent that the Legislature has restricted that defense by statute, (3) the Legislature has not done so with respect to PIP benefits under the no-fault act, and (4) the judicially created innocent-third-party rule has not survived the Supreme Court’s

2017Summarizing its holding in Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, the Court explained, (1) there is no distinction between an easily ascertainable fraud rule and an innocent-third-party rule, (2) the Supreme Court in Titan [Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547 ; 817 NW2d 562 (2012)] clearly held that fraud is an available defense to an insurance contract except to the extent that the Legislature has restricted that defense by statute, (3) the Legislature has not done so with respect to PIP benefits under the no-fault act, and (4) the judicially created innocent-third-party rule has not survived the Supreme Court’s

2026“We review questions of law arising from the provision of jury instructions de novo.” Id. “[S]elf-defense is an available defense to the charge of being a felon in possession if supported by sufficient evidence.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 707 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010) (Dupree II).

2022However, “second-degree murder is a general-intent crime to which -8- voluntary intoxication is not an available defense.” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464 ; 579 NW2d 868 (1998).

2022However, “second-degree murder is a general-intent crime to which -8- voluntary intoxication is not an available defense.” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464 ; 579 NW2d 868 (1998).

2020We ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address “whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that duress is not an available defense to the charge of felony murder under any circumstances.” 5 1 People v Reichard, 323 Mich App 613, 617 ; 919 NW2d 417 (2018). 2 Id. at 618 . 3 Id. at 619 . 4 Id. 5 People v Reichard, 503 Mich 910 , 910 (2018). 3 II.

2020We ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address “whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that duress is not an available defense to the charge of felony murder under any circumstances.” 5 1 People v Reichard, 323 Mich App 613, 617 ; 919 NW2d 417 (2018). 2 Id. at 618 . 3 Id. at 619 . 4 Id. 5 People v Reichard, 503 Mich 910 , 910 (2018). 3 II.

2019Goree, 296 Mich App at 304-305 .

2019Goree, 296 Mich App at 300-301 .

2018See People v. Aaron , 409 Mich. 672 , 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980) ; Wright v. State , 402 So.2d 493 , 498 n. 8 (Fla. Dist.

2012Nevertheless, this Court clarified that “[t]he Legislature’s failure to provide explicitly for the common law affirmative defense of self-defense does not foreclose defendants from relying on it to justify a violation of MCL 750.224f.”29 Specifically, this Court explained that “[h]istorically, in cases in which the statutory provision did not squarely resolve the issue before this Court, we have applied the common law, presuming that the Legislature enacted statutes mindful of those aspects of common law that have become ‘firmly embedded in our jurisprudence . . . .’”30 This Court went on to e

2012Nevertheless, this Court clarified that “[t]he Legislature’s failure to provide explicitly for the common law affirmative defense of self-defense does not foreclose defendants from relying on it to justify a violation of MCL 750.224f.”29 Specifically, this Court explained that “[h]istorically, in cases in which the statutory provision did not squarely resolve the issue before this Court, we have applied the common law, presuming that the Legislature enacted statutes mindful of those aspects of common law that have become ‘firmly embedded in our jurisprudence . . . .’”30 This Court went on to e

2012Nevertheless, this Court clarified that “[t]he Legislature’s failure to provide explicitly for the common law affirmative defense of self-defense does not foreclose defendants from relying on it to justify a violation of MCL 750.224f.”29 Specifically, this Court explained that “[h]istorically, in cases in which the statutory provision did not squarely resolve the issue before this Court, we have applied the common law, presuming that the Legislature enacted statutes mindful of those aspects of common law that have become ‘firmly embedded in our jurisprudence . . . .’”30 This Court went on to e

2012Nevertheless, this Court clarified that “[t]he Legislature’s failure to provide explicitly for the common law affirmative defense of self-defense does not foreclose defendants from relying on it to justify a violation of MCL 750.224f.”29 Specifically, this Court explained that “[h]istorically, in cases in which the statutory provision did not squarely resolve the issue before this Court, we have applied the common law, presuming that the Legislature enacted statutes mindful of those aspects of common law that have become ‘firmly embedded in our jurisprudence . . . .’”30 This Court went on to e

1998Since, irrespective of whether malice is defined in terms of subjective or objective intent, voluntary intoxication is not an available defense, Langworthy, supra at 651 , no issue was created under the state of these proofs that would require the trial court to resolve the subjeetive/objective question.

1998Since, irrespective of whether malice is defined in terms of subjective or objective intent, voluntary intoxication is not an available defense, Langworthy, supra at 651 , 331 N.W.2d 171 , no issue was created under the state of these proofs that would require the trial court to resolve the subjective/objective question.

1998The jury was correctly instructed that it must find malice beyond a reasonable doubt. [27] See also People v. Datema, 448 Mich. 585, 607 , 533 N.W.2d 272 (1995); People v. Langworthy, supra at 650-651 , 331 N.W.2d 171 . [28] See Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.), ch. 2, § 1, p. 60 (the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing death or great bodily harm is a malicious intent). [29] See also Aaron, supra at 729 , 299 N.W.2d 304 (a jury can properly infer malice from evidence that a defendant intentionally set in motion a force whose natural ten

1998The jury was correctly instructed that it must find malice beyond a reasonable doubt. [27] See also People v. Datema, 448 Mich. 585, 607 , 533 N.W.2d 272 (1995); People v. Langworthy, supra at 650-651 , 331 N.W.2d 171 . [28] See Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.), ch. 2, § 1, p. 60 (the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing death or great bodily harm is a malicious intent). [29] See also Aaron, supra at 729 , 299 N.W.2d 304 (a jury can properly infer malice from evidence that a defendant intentionally set in motion a force whose natural ten

1981Under the standards of People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250 ; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), and People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969), we believe that counsel’s failure to pursue the available defense was excusable.

1981Under the standards of People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250 ; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), and People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969), we believe that counsel’s failure to pursue the available defense was excusable.

1981Under the standards of People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250 ; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), and People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969), we believe that counsel’s failure to pursue the available defense was excusable.

1981Under the standards of People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250 ; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), and People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969), we believe that counsel’s failure to pursue the available defense was excusable.

1980Because intoxication is only a defense to a specific intent crime, People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367 ; 212 NW2d 196 (1973), People v Stanton, 97 Mich App 453 ; 296 NW2d 70 (1980), the question at the heart of this issue is whether the offense of carrying a concealed weapon is a specific intent crime.

1980Because intoxication is only a defense to a specific intent crime, People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367 ; 212 NW2d 196 (1973), People v Stanton, 97 Mich App 453 ; 296 NW2d 70 (1980), the question at the heart of this issue is whether the offense of carrying a concealed weapon is a specific intent crime.

1980Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avon Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615 ; 281 NW2d 291 (1979). 1 In *172 accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tulkku , the jury should have been instructed to consider whether defendant met its obligation to provide an adequate safety device and that failure to perform that duty, if such failure was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, precludes any consideration of contributory negligence as a defense.

1980Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avon Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615 ; 281 NW2d 291 (1979). 1 In *172 accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tulkku , the jury should have been instructed to consider whether defendant met its obligation to provide an adequate safety device and that failure to perform that duty, if such failure was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, precludes any consideration of contributory negligence as a defense.

1980Because intoxication is only a defense to a specific intent crime, People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367 ; 212 NW2d 196 (1973), People v Stanton, 97 Mich App 453 ; 296 NW2d 70 (1980), the question at the heart of this issue is whether the offense of carrying a concealed weapon is a specific intent crime.

1980Because intoxication is only a defense to a specific intent crime, People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367 ; 212 NW2d 196 (1973), People v Stanton, 97 Mich App 453 ; 296 NW2d 70 (1980), the question at the heart of this issue is whether the offense of carrying a concealed weapon is a specific intent crime.

1979Reversed. 1 But see Berger v City of Berkley, 87 Mich App 361 ; 275 NW2d 2 (1978) (Bronson, J., concurring), which would hold that the defense of governmental immunity should only be applied to those activities of a governmental unit which could be considered planning or policy making functions and not to cases such as the present when the activity involved is merely an operational activity of the governmental unit. 2 This quotation was taken from the principal opinion authored by Justice Fitzgerald and concurred in by Chief Justice Kavanagh and Justice Levin.

1979Reversed. 1 But see Berger v City of Berkley, 87 Mich App 361 ; 275 NW2d 2 (1978) (Bronson, J., concurring), which would hold that the defense of governmental immunity should only be applied to those activities of a governmental unit which could be considered planning or policy making functions and not to cases such as the present when the activity involved is merely an operational activity of the governmental unit. 2 This quotation was taken from the principal opinion authored by Justice Fitzgerald and concurred in by Chief Justice Kavanagh and Justice Levin.

1963As in Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich 235 , plaintiff’s right to recover depended upon the jury’s finding that the impurity was present when the product left the defendant’s control.

1914In Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Buckles, 89 Ill. 237 , it is said: “A surety or guarantor cannot interpose the fraudulent or false representations of his principal as a defense to the payment of a note or bond, without connecting the payee with such representations.” In Lucas v. Owens, 113 Ind. 521 ( 16 N. E. 196 ), the defendant, surety on a promissory note, claimed in her defense that she was induced to sign the note as surety “by means of certain false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which are particularly set out, and which she alleges were relied on by her.” The court said: “A surety wh

1914In Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Buckles, 89 Ill. 237 , it is said: “A surety or guarantor cannot interpose the fraudulent or false representations of his principal as a defense to the payment of a note or bond, without connecting the payee with such representations.” In Lucas v. Owens, 113 Ind. 521 ( 16 N. E. 196 ), the defendant, surety on a promissory note, claimed in her defense that she was induced to sign the note as surety “by means of certain false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which are particularly set out, and which she alleges were relied on by her.” The court said: “A surety wh

1914In Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Buckles, 89 Ill. 237 , it is said: “A surety or guarantor cannot interpose the fraudulent or false representations of his principal as a defense to the payment of a note or bond, without connecting the payee with such representations.” In Lucas v. Owens, 113 Ind. 521 ( 16 N. E. 196 ), the defendant, surety on a promissory note, claimed in her defense that she was induced to sign the note as surety “by means of certain false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which are particularly set out, and which she alleges were relied on by her.” The court said: “A surety wh

1914In Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Buckles, 89 Ill. 237 , it is said: “A surety or guarantor cannot interpose the fraudulent or false representations of his principal as a defense to the payment of a note or bond, without connecting the payee with such representations.” In Lucas v. Owens, 113 Ind. 521 ( 16 N. E. 196 ), the defendant, surety on a promissory note, claimed in her defense that she was induced to sign the note as surety “by means of certain false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which are particularly set out, and which she alleges were relied on by her.” The court said: “A surety wh

1914In Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Buckles, 89 Ill. 237 , it is said: “A surety or guarantor cannot interpose the fraudulent or false representations of his principal as a defense to the payment of a note or bond, without connecting the payee with such representations.” In Lucas v. Owens, 113 Ind. 521 ( 16 N. E. 196 ), the defendant, surety on a promissory note, claimed in her defense that she was induced to sign the note as surety “by means of certain false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which are particularly set out, and which she alleges were relied on by her.” The court said: “A surety wh