available defense in New York

2013Plaintiffs actions in attempting to prevent the metal plate from falling “raise, at most, an issue of comparative negligence, which is not an available defense under section 240 (1)” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Dean v City of Utica, 75 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2010]).

2013Plaintiffs actions in attempting to prevent the metal plate from falling “raise, at most, an issue of comparative negligence, which is not an available defense under section 240 (1)” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Dean v City of Utica, 75 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2010]).

2017We therefore conclude that plaintiff’s action in participating in the rigging process raises, at most, an issue concerning his comparative negligence, which is not an available defense under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Signs v Crawford, 109 AD3d 1169, 1170 [4th Dept 2013]).

2015Under the circumstances, plaintiffs actions with respect to the manner in which he constructed the “makeshift” scaffold “ ‘raise, at most, an issue of comparative negligence, which is not an available defense under section 240 (1)’ ” (Signs v Crawford, 109 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2013]; see Stolt v General Foods Corp., 81 NY2d 918, 920 [1993]).

2015Under the circumstances, plaintiffs actions with respect to the manner in which he constructed the “makeshift” scaffold “ ‘raise, at most, an issue of comparative negligence, which is not an available defense under section 240 (1)’ ” (Signs v Crawford, 109 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2013]; see Stolt v General Foods Corp., 81 NY2d 918, 920 [1993]).

2015Under the circumstances, plaintiffs actions with respect to the manner in which he constructed the “makeshift” scaffold “ ‘raise, at most, an issue of comparative negligence, which is not an available defense under section 240 (1)’ ” (Signs v Crawford, 109 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2013]; see Stolt v General Foods Corp., 81 NY2d 918, 920 [1993]).

2024Fraudulent inducement is an available defense “to an action by the holder of a negotiable instrument to enforce the instrument . . . even if the fraud was committed by a third party,” so long as the noteholder “is not a holder in due course.” (Thornock v Kinderhill Corp., 749 F Supp 513, 518 [SD NY 1990] [internal citations omitted].) A holder in due course is a “(1) holder (2) of a negotiable instrument (3) who took it for value, (4) in good faith, and (5) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of another.” (DH Cattle Hold

2024Fraudulent inducement is an available defense "to an action by the holder of a negotiable instrument to enforce the instrument . . . even if the fraud was committed by a third party," so long as the noteholder "is not a holder in due course." ( Thornock v Kinderhill Corp ., 749 F Supp 513, 518 [SD NY 1990] [internal citations omitted].) A holder in due course is a "(1) holder (2) of a negotiable instrument (3) who took it for value, (4) in good faith, and (5) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of another." ( DH Cattle H

2024Fraudulent inducement is an available defense “to an action by the holder of a negotiable instrument to enforce the instrument . . . even if the fraud was committed by a third party,” so long as the noteholder “is not a holder in due course.” (Thornock v Kinderhill Corp., 749 F Supp 513, 518 [SD NY 1990] [internal citations omitted].) A holder in due course is a “(1) holder (2) of a negotiable instrument (3) who took it for value, (4) in good faith, and (5) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of another.” (DH Cattle Hold

2024Fraudulent inducement is an available defense "to an action by the holder of a negotiable instrument to enforce the instrument . . . even if the fraud was committed by a third party," so long as the noteholder "is not a holder in due course." ( Thornock v Kinderhill Corp ., 749 F Supp 513, 518 [SD NY 1990] [internal citations omitted].) A holder in due course is a "(1) holder (2) of a negotiable instrument (3) who took it for value, (4) in good faith, and (5) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of another." ( DH Cattle H

2024Group, Inc. v Isacsen , 114 AD2d 1022, 1022-23 [2d Dept 1985] [holding that absent a [*4]contention by plaintiff that it was the noteholder in due course, defendant could assert a fraudulent inducement defense].) Moreover, a "a person does not acquire rights of a holder in due course of an instrument taken . . . [b]y legal process or by purchase in an execution, bankruptcy or creditor's sale." (UCC 3-302 [a].) Il Mulino assigned the note to plaintiff in connection with the asset-purchase agreement that resulted from the bankruptcy proceedings. ( See NYSCEF No. 6 at 1.) This court also conclude

2021Ogden, Inc. v Jordache Dev. , 298 AD2d 976, 976 [4th Dept 2002]; see generally CPLR 3018 [b]; Ross v Ross Metals Corp. , 111 AD3d 695, 696-697 [2d Dept 2013]; State of New York Higher Educ.

2021Ogden, Inc. v Jordache Dev. , 298 AD2d 976, 976 [4th Dept 2002]; see generally CPLR 3018 [b]; Ross v Ross Metals Corp. , 111 AD3d 695, 696-697 [2d Dept 2013]; State of New York Higher Educ.

2020Moreover, potential comparative negligence on Markou's part is not an available defense to a Labor Law § 240 (1) violation ( see Salzer v Benderson Development Co., LLC , 130 AD3d 1226, 1228 [2015]; Portes v New York State Thruway Auth. , 112 AD3d at 1050; Williams v Town of Pittstown , 100 AD3d 1250, 1252 [2012]).

2020Moreover, potential comparative negligence on Markou's part is not an available defense to a Labor Law § 240 (1) violation ( see Salzer v Benderson Development Co., LLC , 130 AD3d 1226, 1228 [2015]; Portes v New York State Thruway Auth. , 112 AD3d at 1050; Williams v Town of Pittstown , 100 AD3d 1250, 1252 [2012]).

2020Contrary to the contention of defendants, because any amount that became due after September 15, 2011 is within the limitations period, laches is not an available defense with respect to those amounts ( see Janian v Barnes , 294 AD2d 787, 789 [3d Dept 2002]; New York State Mtge.

2020Moreover, potential comparative negligence on Markou's part is not an available defense to a Labor Law § 240 (1) violation ( see Salzer v Benderson Development Co., LLC , 130 AD3d 1226, 1228 [2015]; Portes v New York State Thruway Auth. , 112 AD3d at 1050; Williams v Town of Pittstown , 100 AD3d 1250, 1252 [2012]).

2017“Facts appearing in the movant’s papers which the opposing party does not controvert, may be deemed to be admitted” (Kuehne & Nagel v Baiden, 36 NY2d 539, 544 [1975]).

2017"Facts appearing in the movant's papers which the opposing party does not controvert, may be deemed to be admitted" ( Kuehne & Nagel v Baiden , 36 NY2d 539, 544 [1975]).

2016The doctrine of equitable estoppel is an available defense in a paternity proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act § 522 (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]; Matter of Kristen D. v Stephen D., 280 AD2d 717, 719 [2001]).

2016Accordingly, “[e]stoppel may . . . preclude a man who claims to be a child’s biological father from asserting his paternity when he acquiesced in the establishment of a strong parent-child bond between the child and another man” (Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 327 [2006]).

2016Bank, FSB v Albanese, 139 AD3d 831, 832 [2016]).

2016The doctrine of equitable estoppel is an available defense in a paternity proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act § 522 (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]; Matter of Kristen D. v Stephen D., 280 AD2d 717, 719 [2001]).

2015Indeed, "[i]n many cases, there may be strategic reasons for a lawyer's choice" to pursue or discard any particular defense theory ( People v Nesbitt , 20 NY3d 1080, 1081 ).

2015Indeed, “[i]n many cases, there may be strategic reasons for a lawyer’s choice” to pursue or discard any particular defense theory (People v Nesbitt, 20 NY3d 1080, 1081 [2013]).

2015Regardless of the relative strengths of each of the available defense theories, i.e., whether the misidentification defense was at least as strong as the justification defense, it is not our function in reviewing this issue on appeal to second-guess choices made by a defense attorney, or to retroactively weigh the relative merits of each of the legal theories made available by the evidence ( see People v McGee , 20 NY3d 513, 520-521 ).

2015Regardless of the relative strengths of each of the available defense theories, i.e., whether the misidentification defense was at least as strong as the justification defense, it is not our function in reviewing this issue on appeal to second-guess choices made by a defense attorney, or to retroactively weigh the relative merits of each of the legal theories made available by the evidence (see People v McGee, 20 NY3d 513, 520-521 [2013]).