13 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Srebnick v. Lo-Law Transit Management, Inc.green1 sentence2026"A judge may find as a fact that laches exists if there has been unjustified, unreasonable, and prejudicial delay in raising a claim." Srebnick v. Lo-Law Transit Mgt., Inc., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 49 (1990). 15 Assuming arguendo that laches is an available defense to enforcement of the settlement agreement,11 the plaintiff's argument exposes two errors in the judge's finding. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clarkegreen1 sentence2023See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-48 . 5 his marriage to a United States citizen, his home ownership here, and his adult children living in the United States but does not claim that those factors existed at the time of his plea in 1999. 6 Without more, we cannot conclude that proceeding to trial in the face of a likely conviction and predictably more severe penalty would have been rational, and we accordingly discern no abuse of discretion in the motion judge's denial of the defendant's motion. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wong Chunggreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaiegreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hortongreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Azargreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Randolphgreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dyergreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Tumey v. Ohiogreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Sheppard v. Maxwellgreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Siresgreen1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Haggertygreen1 sentence2015Based on this record, I am persuaded that, even assuming the availability of a viable lack of criminal responsibility defense, counsel’s strategic choice to defend the case solely on a self-defense theory was not manifestly unreasonable. 17 This was not a case where defense counsel’s strategic decision left the defendant without any defense at all, Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400 Mass. 437, 441-442 (1987), and there is no suggestion in the record or by appellate counsel in argument that the alternative self-defense theory was not supported by the facts or that it was not presented competently by | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen1 sentence1998Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sellongreen1 sentence1987Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 228 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Evansgreen2 sentences1985See Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 153-154 (1983). 1985See Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 153-154 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brumfieldgreen2 sentences1983The use of such motions to prevent the defendant from introducing “evidence on an available defense not only distorts the traditional application of motions in limine, but likewise raises serious constitutional questions relating to an accused’s right to present a defense.” People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill. 1983The use of such motions to prevent the defendant from introducing "evidence on an available defense not only distorts the traditional application of motions in limine, but likewise raises serious constitutional questions relating to an accused's right to present a defense." People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Gattozzi v. Director of Inspection Servicesgreen1 sentence1982If Cape Resort believed that the absence of structural changes was legally significant, it bore the burden of establishing this fact at trial. 12 It was pointed out in Gattozzi v. Director of Inspection Servs. of Melrose, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 889, 890 (1978), that there is some question *225 whethei loches is an available defense in actions in the nature of mandamus to compel a building inspector to enforce a zoning ordinance. | 1 | 1 |
Chilson v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleborogreen1 sentence1982Compare Chilson v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleboro, 344 Mass. 406, 409 (1962), with McAleer v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 361 Mass. 317, 323 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
McAleer v. Board of Appeals of Barnstablegreen1 sentence1982Compare Chilson v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleboro, 344 Mass. 406, 409 (1962), with McAleer v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 361 Mass. 317, 323 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Roberio
green
1 sentence2015The Supreme Judicial Court held that “where the trial judge has determined that defense counsel was ineffective in not raising a substantial available defense, the issue is limited to whether counsel’s failure to raise a substantial available defense was likely to have influenced the jury’s conclusion.” Ibid. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Vasquez
green
2 sentences2015In Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 835 , we concluded that duress was not an available defense to intentional murder. 10 Nonetheless, the defendant claims that it was error to foreclose the defense to a juvenile offender because of the fundamental differences between adults and juveniles. 2015Seven years prior to the facts that give rise to this case, the defendant witnessed Rasheed Fountain’s murder, allegedly at the hands of the victim in the present case. 8 When the judge went to thank the jury for their service, one juror asked the judge if he might be able to recommend to the juror an attorney for assistance on an immigration matter. 9 The judge was also the trial judge in Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827 (2012). 10 In coming to this conclusion, we noted that duress is not an available defense to intentional murder under the common law of any State and “[ejvery State app | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Davis v. Georgia
green
1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smith v. Dybing
green
1 sentence2015Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 834 & n.5. 11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order new trial where “defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . . . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred”); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) (finding no “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made”); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 12 See, e.g., Davis v. Ge | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Saferian
green
1 sentence2006Commonwealth v. Saferian, supra. The Commonwealth suggests that trial counsel’s failure to request a provocation instruction did not deprive the defendant of a viable defense because, if the jury did not believe that the defendant acted in self-defense, or that he used excessive force in self-defense, they would not believe that he acted based on reasonable provocation. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Doherty
green
1 sentence1999We have stated that “[sjelf-defense is not an available defense to a charge of armed assault in a dwelling house with intent to rob.” Commonwealth v. Doherty, 394 Mass. 341 , 351 n.12 (1985). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Lanigan
green
1 sentence1998The judge reached his conclusion that a new trial was not needed because, in his view, the psychologist was not credible. 4 Once the expert’s qualifications were established and assuming the expert’s testimony met the standard of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994), the issue of credibility was for a jury, not the judge. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Commonwealth v. Deeran
green
1 sentence1996Deeran, 397 Mass. at 141-42 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Commonwealth v. Tavares
green
1 sentence1985Although we criticized the emotional overtones of rhetoric suggesting that if the jury were to acquit a defendant on an unreasonable doubt, the "lawless" should reign "supreme," we held in Tavares, supra at 148 , that the charge did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. [12] Self-defense is not an available defense to a charge of armed assault in a dwelling house with intent to rob. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.