York Times rule in Illinois

1990Ed. 2d at 808 , 94 S. Ct. at 345-46 ), and concluded that “the extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate State interest to a degree that we find unacceptable.” (Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 , 41 L.

1990Ed. 2d at 808 , 94 S. Ct. at 345-46 ), and concluded that “the extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate State interest to a degree that we find unacceptable.” (Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 , 41 L.

1990Ed. 2d at 311 , 91 S. Ct. at 1819 .) However, as noted above, the Gertz court expressly rejected the Rosenbloom “public issue” analysis when it commented: “The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable.

1982The majority opinion does not base its determination that the New York Times standard should apply to this case on a finding that the plaintiff here was a public figure, or that the subject of the statement was a “matter of public or general interest.” (The United States Supreme Court, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. (1971), 403 U.S. 29 , 29 L.

1990App. 3d 889 , 321 N.E.2d 739 , the court commented that Illinois courts had brought such people as doctors within the parameter of the New York Times rule.

1990Snead v. Forbes, Inc. (1971), 2 Ill.App.3d 22 , 275 N.E.2d 746 , the court agreed that under the New York Times rule, constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press extended to "matters of public interest." The court quoted from Farnsworth and concluded based thereon that "the challenged articles describing a prominent business executive in a vitally important industry were fair comment on "matters of public interest" dealing with a "public figure.'" ( Forbes, 2 Ill.App.3d at 27 , 275 N.E.2d 746 .) In Basarich v. Rodeghero (1974), 24 Ill.App.3d 889 , 321 N.E.2d 739 , the court commen

1987This argument has been consistently advanced and just as consistently rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States. ( Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 , 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1994 (1967).) * * * While the recent decision of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974), will have wide-ranging impact on the law of defamation of private plaintiffs and their inability to recover punitive damages under a negligence standard, we do not read the decision as retreating from the Court's previous holdings that punitive damages are *9

1987This argument has been consistently advanced and just as consistently rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States. ( Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 , 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1994 (1967).) * * * While the recent decision of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974), will have wide-ranging impact on the law of defamation of private plaintiffs and their inability to recover punitive damages under a negligence standard, we do not read the decision as retreating from the Court's previous holdings that punitive damages are *9

1986Ed. 1295, 1297-98 , 66 S. Ct. 1029, 1031 .) The New York Times requirement of independent review was reiterated in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984), 466 U.S. 485 , 80 L.

1986Ed. 1295, 1297-98 , 66 S. Ct. 1029, 1031 .) The New York Times requirement of independent review was reiterated in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984), 466 U.S. 485 , 80 L.

2014The McCutcheon court stated the reasoning behind the New York Times standard was "the concept of a freedom of the governed to question the governor, of those who are influenced by the operation of government to criticize those who control the conduct of government." Id. at 424 , 425 N.E.2d at 1133 .

2014The McCutcheon court stated the reasoning behind the New York Times standard was "the concept of a freedom of the governed to question the governor, of those who are influenced by the operation of government to criticize those who control the conduct of government." Id. at 424 , 425 N.E.2d at 1133 .

2014Id. at 511, 530 N.E.2d at 481 . ¶ 25 3.

2014Id. at 511, 530 N.E.2d at 481 . ¶ 25 3.

1990(But compare Chapski with Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 146 , 419 N.E.2d 350 (where Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part, states that the standard enunciated in Troman can’t be reconciled with the standard announced in John).) Heinrich states that pursuant to Gertz, States are not limited by the strict New York Times standard.

1990(But compare Chapski with Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 146 , 419 N.E.2d 350 (where Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part, states that the standard enunciated in Troman can’t be reconciled with the standard announced in John).) Heinrich states that pursuant to Gertz, States are not limited by the strict New York Times standard.

1980With a few exceptions (see Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. (1974), 419 U.S. 245 , 42 L.Ed.2d 419 , 95 S.Ct. 465 ; Time, Inc. v. Hill (1967), 385 U.S. 374 , 17 L.Ed.2d 456 , 87 S.Ct. 534 ; Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron (1971), 401 U.S. 295 , 28 L.Ed.2d 57 , 91 S.Ct. 628 ), the cases before the Supreme Court involving the New York Times rule have been primarily concerned with the liability of a defendant, often a newspaper, for reporting a defamatory statement made by another person, and the court's discussion of malice has taken place in that context.

1980With a few exceptions (see Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. (1974), 419 U.S. 245 , 42 L.Ed.2d 419 , 95 S.Ct. 465 ; Time, Inc. v. Hill (1967), 385 U.S. 374 , 17 L.Ed.2d 456 , 87 S.Ct. 534 ; Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron (1971), 401 U.S. 295 , 28 L.Ed.2d 57 , 91 S.Ct. 628 ), the cases before the Supreme Court involving the New York Times rule have been primarily concerned with the liability of a defendant, often a newspaper, for reporting a defamatory statement made by another person, and the court's discussion of malice has taken place in that context.

1987Amant v. Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727 , 20 L.Ed.2d 262 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 , the Supreme Court restated the New York Times test to be that the plaintiff in a defamation action must prove that the defamatory publication was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. ( Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc. (1969), 43 Ill.2d 239 , 252 N.E.2d 538 .) The reckless disregard for the truth that is requisite to a proof of malice is described in terms of the subjective frame of mind of the actor, and recklessness is

1987Ed. 2d 262 , 88 S. Ct. 1323 , the Supreme Court restated the New York Times test to be that the plaintiff in a defamation action must prove that the defamatory publication was made with actual malice — that is, "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.

1975(Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 , 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 , 15 L.Ed.2d 597 , 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 , 26 L.Ed.2d 6 , 90 S.Ct. 1537 (1970); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 465 , 42 L.Ed.2d 419 , 95 S.Ct. 465 (1974).) The New York Times rule was further refined in St.

1975(Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 , 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 , 15 L.Ed.2d 597 , 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 , 26 L.Ed.2d 6 , 90 S.Ct. 1537 (1970); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 465 , 42 L.Ed.2d 419 , 95 S.Ct. 465 (1974).) The New York Times rule was further refined in St.

1975(Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 , 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 , 15 L.Ed.2d 597 , 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 , 26 L.Ed.2d 6 , 90 S.Ct. 1537 (1970); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 465 , 42 L.Ed.2d 419 , 95 S.Ct. 465 (1974).) The New York Times rule was further refined in St.

1975(Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 , 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 , 15 L.Ed.2d 597 , 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 , 26 L.Ed.2d 6 , 90 S.Ct. 1537 (1970); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 465 , 42 L.Ed.2d 419 , 95 S.Ct. 465 (1974).) The New York Times rule was further refined in St.

2019In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments require “a federal rule that prohibits a public official from - 20 - 2019 IL App (2d) 181019 recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice.’ ” Under the New York Times standard, a statement made with actual malice was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 280.

2019App. 3d 122, 127 (1975) (allegations that the defendant maliciously intended to injure the plaintiff and bring him into public disrepute by falsely and maliciously publishing statements concerning the plaintiff that were false, scandalous, malicious, - 21 - 2019 IL App (2d) 181019 and defamatory were sufficient to allege actual malice)); see also Davis, 111 Ill.

1993(Winters v. Greeley (1989), 189 Ill.

1990App. 3d 22 , 275 N.E.2d 746 , the court agreed that under the New York Times rule, constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press extended to “matters of public interest.” The court quoted from Farnsworth and concluded based thereon that “the challenged articles describing a prominent business executive in a vitally important industry were fair comment on ‘matters of public interest’ dealing with a ‘public figure.’ ” (Forbes, 2 Ill.

1990App. 3d 22 , 275 N.E.2d 746 , the court agreed that under the New York Times rule, constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press extended to “matters of public interest.” The court quoted from Farnsworth and concluded based thereon that “the challenged articles describing a prominent business executive in a vitally important industry were fair comment on ‘matters of public interest’ dealing with a ‘public figure.’ ” (Forbes, 2 Ill.

1990(But compare Chapski with Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill.2d 146 , 50 Ill.Dec. 242 , 419 N.E.2d 350 , where Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part, states that the standard enunciated in Troman can't be reconciled with the standard announced in John . ) Heinrich states that pursuant to Gertz, States are not limited by the strict New York Times standard. ( Heinrich, 104 Ill.2d at 148 , 83 Ill.Dec. 546 , 470 N.E.2d 966 .) In addition, Justice Clark makes a general reference to Troman in his dissent in a supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing in the Supreme Court decisio

1990(But compare Chapski with Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill.2d 146 , 50 Ill.Dec. 242 , 419 N.E.2d 350 , where Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part, states that the standard enunciated in Troman can't be reconciled with the standard announced in John . ) Heinrich states that pursuant to Gertz, States are not limited by the strict New York Times standard. ( Heinrich, 104 Ill.2d at 148 , 83 Ill.Dec. 546 , 470 N.E.2d 966 .) In addition, Justice Clark makes a general reference to Troman in his dissent in a supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing in the Supreme Court decisio

1990(But compare Chapski with Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill.2d 146 , 50 Ill.Dec. 242 , 419 N.E.2d 350 , where Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part, states that the standard enunciated in Troman can't be reconciled with the standard announced in John . ) Heinrich states that pursuant to Gertz, States are not limited by the strict New York Times standard. ( Heinrich, 104 Ill.2d at 148 , 83 Ill.Dec. 546 , 470 N.E.2d 966 .) In addition, Justice Clark makes a general reference to Troman in his dissent in a supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing in the Supreme Court decisio

1990(But compare Chapski with Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill.2d 146 , 50 Ill.Dec. 242 , 419 N.E.2d 350 , where Justice Clark, concurring in part and dissenting in part, states that the standard enunciated in Troman can't be reconciled with the standard announced in John . ) Heinrich states that pursuant to Gertz, States are not limited by the strict New York Times standard. ( Heinrich, 104 Ill.2d at 148 , 83 Ill.Dec. 546 , 470 N.E.2d 966 .) In addition, Justice Clark makes a general reference to Troman in his dissent in a supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing in the Supreme Court decisio

1988As his argument applies to the status of a police officer, however, we agree with the observation in McLain v. Arnold (1980), 275 S.C. 287 , 270 S.E.2d 124 , where the court stated, “[Sjimply speaking, the status of a public official may be deemed sufficient to warrant application of the New York Times privilege, not because of the government employee’s place on the totem pole, but because of the public interest in a government employee’s activity in a particular context.” 275 S.C. at _, 270 S.E.2d at 125 .

1988As his argument applies to the status of a police officer, however, we agree with the observation in McLain v. Arnold (1980), 275 S.C. 287 , 270 S.E.2d 124 , where the court stated, “[Sjimply speaking, the status of a public official may be deemed sufficient to warrant application of the New York Times privilege, not because of the government employee’s place on the totem pole, but because of the public interest in a government employee’s activity in a particular context.” 275 S.C. at _, 270 S.E.2d at 125 .

1987Amant v. Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727 , 20 L.Ed.2d 262 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 ; Wanless v. Rothballer (1986), 115 Ill.2d 158 , 503 N.E.2d 516 ; Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill.2d 146 , 419 N.E.2d 350 ; cf. Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc. (1969), 43 Ill.2d 239, 247 , 252 N.E.2d 538, 541 .) We are aware, too, that "[j]udges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently *964 decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of actual malice." Bose C

1987Amant v. Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727 , 20 L.Ed.2d 262 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 ; Wanless v. Rothballer (1986), 115 Ill.2d 158 , 503 N.E.2d 516 ; Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill.2d 146 , 419 N.E.2d 350 ; cf. Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc. (1969), 43 Ill.2d 239, 247 , 252 N.E.2d 538, 541 .) We are aware, too, that "[j]udges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently *964 decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of actual malice." Bose C

1987Cir. 1975); see also Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).)" • 6-8 It is well established in Illinois that punitive damages may be awarded when torts are committed with fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or when a defendant acts wilfully or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others. ( Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 ; Warren v. Le May (1986), 142 Ill.

1987Ed. 2d 1094, 1111 , 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1991 , quoting Whitney v. California (1927), 274 U.S. 357, 377 , 71 L.

1987Ed. 2d 1094, 1111 , 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1991 , quoting Whitney v. California (1927), 274 U.S. 357, 377 , 71 L.