14 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damrongreen2 sentences2003Moreover, a “charge of criminal conduct against an official or a candidate ... is always relevant to his fitness for office for purposes of applying the New York Times rule of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth.” Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., supra at 863, quoting Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, supra. (b) Based on the summary judgment record before him, the motion judge concluded that Lane could not reasonably expect to prove that the defendants acted with actual malice, and therefore that summary judgment was appropriate. 1985Moreover, in Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., supra, we said that “a charge of criminal conduct against an official or a candidate .... is always relevant to his fitness for office for purposes of applying the New York Times rule of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth.” Id. at 863, quoting Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971). | 3 | 4 |
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.red2 sentences1979It was in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), that the Supreme Court considered whether the New York Times privilege should extend to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons, if the statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 1975Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. at 96 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting): “Statements like this have a way of growing and I fear that the words ‘in the first instance’ will soon be forgotten.” “It may be that jury instructions that are couched only in terms of knowing or reckless falsity, and omit reference to ‘actual malice,’ would further a proper application of the New York Times standard to the evidence.” Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U. S. 29, 52, fn. 18 (1971) (Brennan, J.). | 2 | 4 |
Rosenblatt v. Baergreen2 sentences1975Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. at 96 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting): “Statements like this have a way of growing and I fear that the words ‘in the first instance’ will soon be forgotten.” “It may be that jury instructions that are couched only in terms of knowing or reckless falsity, and omit reference to ‘actual malice,’ would further a proper application of the New York Times standard to the evidence.” Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U. S. 29, 52, fn. 18 (1971) (Brennan, J.). 1973“What the New York Times rule ultimately protects is defamatory falsehood.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92 (Stewart, J., concurring). | 2 | 2 |
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Buttsgreen2 sentences2009See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (applying the New York Times rule to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (applying the New York Times rule to limited purpose public figures); accord Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 (2007). 1983See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (extending the New York Times standard to defamatory criticism of public figures). | 1 | 2 |
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (applying the New York Times rule to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (applying the New York Times rule to limited purpose public figures); accord Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 (2007). 1979Perhaps because it was so badly divided in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., the Supreme Court subsequently considered in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the question of the extent of the immunity of the press (whether print or electronic) from liability for defamation to private persons. | 1 | 2 |
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.green2 sentences1983In his decision granting summary judgment against Lyons the judge concluded that Lyons “is a public figure for the range of issues involved in this case.” Although the judge did not make an explicit finding about Atkins’ status, it is a fair inference that in denying the summary judgment motion as to Atkins he determined that Atkins was not a public figure. *55 We have previously stated that in a case tried to a jury, the question whether a plaintiff is a public figure “is a question for the jury to answer after instructions by the judge on the applicable law and on what facts must be found to 1981Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. at 863 . | 1 | 2 |
Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc.green1 sentence2009See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (applying the New York Times rule to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (applying the New York Times rule to limited purpose public figures); accord Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.green1 sentence2003Lane appeals from this ruling. 11 We will affirm an order granting summary judgment to the defendants if they have demonstrated that the plaintiff “has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of the case at trial.” Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 127 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
A. S. Abell Co. v. Barnesgreen1 sentence2003Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 75 (Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff not public official in part because “[sjhe held no elective office . . .”); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 17 (1983) (“Plaintiff [mayor and participant in election for office] clearly ... a ‘public of ficial’ ”); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., supra at 1102 (“person may become a public official within contemplation of the New York Times rule ... [by being] an elected official”); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 577 (1983) (“appellant concedes he is certainly an elected ‘public official’ ”); Grayson v. | 1 | 1 |
Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co.green1 sentence2003Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 1006 (1967) (considering whether New York Times rule applies to cases “other than those involving elected public officials”); Long v. Egnor, 176 W. | 1 | 1 |
Braig v. Field Communicationsgreen1 sentence2003Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 75 (Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff not public official in part because “[sjhe held no elective office . . .”); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 17 (1983) (“Plaintiff [mayor and participant in election for office] clearly ... a ‘public of ficial’ ”); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., supra at 1102 (“person may become a public official within contemplation of the New York Times rule ... [by being] an elected official”); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 577 (1983) (“appellant concedes he is certainly an elected ‘public official’ ”); Grayson v. | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp.green1 sentence2003Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 75 (Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff not public official in part because “[sjhe held no elective office . . .”); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 17 (1983) (“Plaintiff [mayor and participant in election for office] clearly ... a ‘public of ficial’ ”); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., supra at 1102 (“person may become a public official within contemplation of the New York Times rule ... [by being] an elected official”); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 577 (1983) (“appellant concedes he is certainly an elected ‘public official’ ”); Grayson v. | 1 | 1 |
Silsdorf v. Levinegreen1 sentence2003Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 75 (Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff not public official in part because “[sjhe held no elective office . . .”); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 17 (1983) (“Plaintiff [mayor and participant in election for office] clearly ... a ‘public of ficial’ ”); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., supra at 1102 (“person may become a public official within contemplation of the New York Times rule ... [by being] an elected official”); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 577 (1983) (“appellant concedes he is certainly an elected ‘public official’ ”); Grayson v. | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Egnorgreen1 sentence2003Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 1006 (1967) (considering whether New York Times rule applies to cases “other than those involving elected public officials”); Long v. Egnor, 176 W. | 1 | 1 |
Korb v. Albany Carpet Cleaning Co.green1 sentence1982Cf. Korb v. Albany Carpet Cleaning Co., 301 Mass. 317, 318 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenuegreen1 sentence1982Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal, as it “cannot be conferred by consent, conduct or waiver.” Litton Business Syss., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 619, 622 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Mihalik v. Dupreygreen2 sentences1981Any falsity, then, would have had to emerge from the context of the several assertions in the aggregate. *594 We recently held, in a similar circumstance, that a series of individually true statements about a public official did not establish the falsity required by Massachusetts decisions following the New York Times rule “merely because in the aggregate they have an insinuating overtone.” Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 606 (1981). 1981For a review of Massachusetts decisions applying the New York Times rule, see Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 604-606 (1981), which we discuss later in this opinion. | 1 | 1 |
Time, Inc. v. Firestonegreen1 sentence1981See, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) and Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Assoc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc.green1 sentence1981See, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) and Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Assoc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Priestley v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. of Lynngreen1 sentence1973See Priestley v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. of Lynn, 360 Mass. 118 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Buttsgreen2 sentences2009See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (applying the New York Times rule to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (applying the New York Times rule to limited purpose public figures); accord Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 (2007). 1983See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (extending the New York Times standard to defamatory criticism of public figures). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy
green
2 sentences2003See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 299 (1971) (candidate for county tax assessor); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (candidate for United States Senate). 1981Such an inference is not compelled from the words themselves. 5 Even if specific allegations of criminal conduct had been manifest, *596 as in Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (false publication that a candidate had been charged with perjury in Federal court), and Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (characterization of a candidate as “a former small-time bootlegger”), the New York Times test of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity) would be applicable. | 3 | 1975–2003 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence1988In reviewing a jury’s verdict in a libel case, the Constitution requires that we “ ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. ’ ” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 , reh’g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 284-286 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988In reviewing a jury’s verdict in a libel case, the Constitution requires that we “ ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. ’ ” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 , reh’g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 284-286 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988In reviewing a jury’s verdict in a libel case, the Constitution requires that we “ ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. ’ ” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 , reh’g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 284-286 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Company
green
1 sentence1984Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976), where the Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that the decision of a radio station not to use an electronic delay system in connection with a talk show did not constitute “reckless disregard” under the New York Times rule. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114
green
1 sentence1982Rather, Congress, in passing the Federal labor laws, “deprived the States of the power to act,” id. at 59 , in a defamation case arising from a labor dispute absent the correct application of the New York Times standard. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.