York Times rule in California

2007Despite this substantial abridgment of the state law right to compensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the Court has concluded that the protection of the New York Times privilege should be available to publishers and broadcasters of defamatory falsehood concerning public officials and public figures." ( Gertz, supra, 418 U. S. at pp. 342-343, 94 S.Ct. 2997 .) The actual malice requirement has been imposed on public officials and public figures in part because such persons "usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more rea

2007Despite this substantial abridgment of the state law right to compensation for wrongful hurt to one’s reputation, the Court has concluded that the protection of the New York Times privilege should be available to publishers and broadcasters of defamatory falsehood concerning public officials and public figures.” ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 342-343.) The actual malice requirement has been imposed on public officials and public figures in part because such persons “usually enjoy significantly greater access to the. channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportuni

1998In reaching that conclusion, the court traced the evolution of the public figure doctrine, noting that it was first recognized in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967) 388 U.S. 130 [ 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 ], and subsequently refined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323 [ 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 ], where “. . . the court provided a two fold rationale for extending the New York Times rule to ‘public figures.’ First, it recognized that public figures are generally less vulnerable to injury from defamation because of their ability to resort to effective ‘self help.’

1998In reaching that conclusion, the court traced the evolution of the public figure doctrine, noting that it was first recognized in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967) 388 U.S. 130 [ 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 ], and subsequently refined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323 [ 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 ], where “. . . the court provided a two fold rationale for extending the New York Times rule to ‘public figures.’ First, it recognized that public figures are generally less vulnerable to injury from defamation because of their ability to resort to effective ‘self help.’

2000In McCoy , the California Supreme Court had reversed the first judgment without directions, for insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of actual malice for libel under the New York Times rule. ( McCoy, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1657, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 , citing New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 .) On remand, when the trial court entered judgment for the defendants and dismissed *414 the action, the plaintiffs appealed, maintaining they were entitled to a new trial. ( McCoy at p. 1659, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 .) In upholding

2000In McCoy , the California Supreme Court had reversed the first judgment without directions, for insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of actual malice for libel under the New York Times rule. ( McCoy, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1657, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 , citing New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 .) On remand, when the trial court entered judgment for the defendants and dismissed *414 the action, the plaintiffs appealed, maintaining they were entitled to a new trial. ( McCoy at p. 1659, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 .) In upholding

1989J.).) 4 The New York Times privilege was taken one step further in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (1971) 403 U.S. 29, 52 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 296, 316-317 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 ], in which a plurality of the court concluded the malice standard should extend to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the statements concerned matters of general or public interest.

1989J.).) 4 The New York Times privilege was taken one step further in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (1971) 403 U.S. 29, 52 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 296, 316-317 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 ], in which a plurality of the court concluded the malice standard should extend to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the statements concerned matters of general or public interest.

2013Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 256-257.) The New York Times standard has been held to “apply to all claims whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement: ‘[that] constitutional protection does not depend on the label given the stated cause of action’ [citation], and no 23 cause of action ‘can claim . . . talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations[.]’ [Citation.]” (Blatty v. New York Times Company (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1033, 1042 ; accord, Reader’s Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d

1987(See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 335-336, 342-343 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 803, 807]; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U.S. at pp. 154-155 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1111 ]; Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 253 ; Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 415, 432 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 304 ], disapproved on other grounds in McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 847, fn. 9 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 518 , 727 P.2d 711 ].) Further, numerous decisions have applied the New York Times standard to published allegations defaming public figures i

1989Ill will and constitutional malice are not the same. “ ‘[I]ll will toward the plaintiff, or bad motives, are not elements of the New York Times standard.’ ” (Letter Carriers v. Austin (1974) 418 U.S. 264, 281 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 745, 760 , 94 S.Ct. 2770 ], quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc. (1971) 403 U.S. 29, 52, fn. 18 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 296, 317 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 ]; see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, supra, 491 U.S. at p._ [ 105 L.Ed.2d at p. 576 , 109 S.Ct. at p. 2685 ].) For appellant’s argument to satisfy the New York Times standard, appellant must link Herhold’s statements to

1989Ill will and constitutional malice are not the same. “ ‘[I]ll will toward the plaintiff, or bad motives, are not elements of the New York Times standard.’ ” (Letter Carriers v. Austin (1974) 418 U.S. 264, 281 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 745, 760 , 94 S.Ct. 2770 ], quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc. (1971) 403 U.S. 29, 52, fn. 18 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 296, 317 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 ]; see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, supra, 491 U.S. at p._ [ 105 L.Ed.2d at p. 576 , 109 S.Ct. at p. 2685 ].) For appellant’s argument to satisfy the New York Times standard, appellant must link Herhold’s statements to

2014“Today, there is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard and not by the professional standards rule, which has never commanded a majority of this Court.” (Id. at p. 666.) 5 Whether a person in a defamation action is a “public figure” is determined by federal law (see Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966) 383 U.S. 75, 84 ; Ghafur v. Bernstein (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1237 ), and it is a question of law for the trial court.

1988By his argument, however, the plaintiff unwittingly raised the question of whether he was a “public official” and should have to show malice under the New York Times standard. ( 383 U.S. at p. 83 [ 15 L.Ed.2d at p. 604 ].) New York Times had not been decided when the plaintiff in Rosenblatt went to trial.

1989A private-figure plaintiff must prove at least negligence to recover any damages and, when the speech involves a matter of public concern, he must also prove New York Times malice, supra, 376 U.S. 254 , to recover presumed or punitive damages. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 347 and 349 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 809-811]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 756 [86 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601].) This malice must be established by “clear and convincing proof.” (Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 342 [ 41 L.Ed.2d at p. 807 ].) For the New York Times standard to be met, “the publish

1989A private-figure plaintiff must prove at least negligence to recover any damages and, when the speech involves a matter of public concern, he must also prove New York Times malice, supra, 376 U.S. 254 , to recover presumed or punitive damages. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 347 and 349 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 809-811]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 756 [86 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601].) This malice must be established by “clear and convincing proof.” (Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 342 [ 41 L.Ed.2d at p. 807 ].) For the New York Times standard to be met, “the publish

1996(See Nadel v. Regents of University of California (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1260 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; Paradise Hills Associates v. Procel, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1543-1544; Miller v. Nestande (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 191, 198-200 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 359 , 62 A.L.R.4th 301 ]; Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 742 F.Supp. 778, 782, fn. 4 ; Moss v. Stockard (D.C.App. 1990) 580 A.2d 1011 , 1022-1023 & fn. 23.) *375 In Nadel v. Regents of University of California (Nadel), Division Five of this court held that the New York Times standard 8 for proving malice in a defamation a

1996(See Nadel v. Regents of University of California (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1260 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ]; Paradise Hills Associates v. Procel, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1543-1544; Miller v. Nestande (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 191, 198-200 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 359 , 62 A.L.R.4th 301 ]; Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 742 F.Supp. 778, 782, fn. 4 ; Moss v. Stockard (D.C.App. 1990) 580 A.2d 1011 , 1022-1023 & fn. 23.) *375 In Nadel v. Regents of University of California (Nadel), Division Five of this court held that the New York Times standard 8 for proving malice in a defamation a

1986In its landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 ], the United States Supreme Court held that a defamatory statement concerning a public official was protected by the First Amendment except when made with "`actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." (376 U.S. at pp. 279-280 [ 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ].) The New York Times doctrine was later expanded to include public figures. ( Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967) 388 U.S. 130 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1

1986In its landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 ], the United States Supreme Court held that a defamatory statement concerning a public official was protected by the First Amendment except when made with "`actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." (376 U.S. at pp. 279-280 [ 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ].) The New York Times doctrine was later expanded to include public figures. ( Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967) 388 U.S. 130 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1

1994(Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979) 443 U.S. 111, 133-134, fn. 16 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 411, 430 , 99 S.Ct. 2675 ].) Numerous state courts have held, as a general proposition, that the New York Times rule does indeed apply to nonmedia defendants, usually on the theory that there is no basis for affording greater protection to the media than to ordinary citizens.

1994(Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979) 443 U.S. 111, 133-134, fn. 16 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 411, 430 , 99 S.Ct. 2675 ].) Numerous state courts have held, as a general proposition, that the New York Times rule does indeed apply to nonmedia defendants, usually on the theory that there is no basis for affording greater protection to the media than to ordinary citizens.

2000In McCoy , the California Supreme Court had reversed the first judgment without directions, for insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of actual malice for libel under the New York Times rule. ( McCoy, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1657, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 , citing New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 .) On remand, when the trial court entered judgment for the defendants and dismissed *414 the action, the plaintiffs appealed, maintaining they were entitled to a new trial. ( McCoy at p. 1659, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 .) In upholding

2000In McCoy , the California Supreme Court had reversed the first judgment without directions, for insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of actual malice for libel under the New York Times rule. ( McCoy, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1657, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 , citing New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 .) On remand, when the trial court entered judgment for the defendants and dismissed *414 the action, the plaintiffs appealed, maintaining they were entitled to a new trial. ( McCoy at p. 1659, 278 Cal.Rptr. 596 .) In upholding

1989A private-figure plaintiff must prove at least negligence to recover any damages and, when the speech involves a matter of public concern, he must also prove New York Times malice, supra, 376 U.S. 254 , to recover presumed or punitive damages. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 347 and 349 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 809-811]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 756 [86 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601].) This malice must be established by “clear and convincing proof.” (Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 342 [ 41 L.Ed.2d at p. 807 ].) For the New York Times standard to be met, “the publish

1989A private-figure plaintiff must prove at least negligence to recover any damages and, when the speech involves a matter of public concern, he must also prove New York Times malice, supra, 376 U.S. 254 , to recover presumed or punitive damages. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 347 and 349 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 809-811]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 756 [86 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601].) This malice must be established by “clear and convincing proof.” (Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 342 [ 41 L.Ed.2d at p. 807 ].) For the New York Times standard to be met, “the publish

1994Brennan, Jr., who observed in 1985 that “. . . at least six Members of this Court . . . agree today that, in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.” (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders (1985) 472 U.S. 749, 783-784 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 593, 618-619 , 105 S.Ct. 2939 ] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) No court, however, has decided the specific question whether the New York Times standard applies to a defendant that is not only not a member of *1261 the n

1994Brennan, Jr., who observed in 1985 that “. . . at least six Members of this Court . . . agree today that, in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.” (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders (1985) 472 U.S. 749, 783-784 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 593, 618-619 , 105 S.Ct. 2939 ] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) No court, however, has decided the specific question whether the New York Times standard applies to a defendant that is not only not a member of *1261 the n

1988Those courts have nevertheless consistently applied Justice Brennan’s analysis in Rosenblatt, supra, 38 U.S. at pages 85-86 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 605-606], to “persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of [public] issues,” “to those among the hierarchy of governmental employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or con *607 trol over the conduct of governmental affairs,” and “[w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the pers

1988Those courts have nevertheless consistently applied Justice Brennan’s analysis in Rosenblatt, supra, 38 U.S. at pages 85-86 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 605-606], to “persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of [public] issues,” “to those among the hierarchy of governmental employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or con *607 trol over the conduct of governmental affairs,” and “[w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the pers

1986Section 48a, subdivision 4(d), defines “actual malice” for purposes of punitive or exemplary damages, as “that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is published or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice.” In order to reach the issue of “actual malice” under section 48a for purposes of awarding punitive damages, the jury must first have found liability based on New York Times “actual

1986Section 48a, subdivision 4(d), defines “actual malice” for purposes of punitive or exemplary damages, as “that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is published or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice.” In order to reach the issue of “actual malice” under section 48a for purposes of awarding punitive damages, the jury must first have found liability based on New York Times “actual

1984“Realistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the court in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material.” (Herbert v. Lando (1979) 441 U.S. 153, 171-172 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 115, 131 , 99 S.Ct. 1635 ].) In its very recent decision on this same issue, the United States Supreme Court clearly recognized the need for a certain degree of literary license when properly a

1984“Realistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the court in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material.” (Herbert v. Lando (1979) 441 U.S. 153, 171-172 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 115, 131 , 99 S.Ct. 1635 ].) In its very recent decision on this same issue, the United States Supreme Court clearly recognized the need for a certain degree of literary license when properly a

1982Amant v. Thompson (1968) 390 U.S. 727, 731 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 267 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 ].) “Actual malice” under the New York Times standard focuses on the defendant’s attitude toward the truth or falsity of his published material rather than on the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff.

1982Amant v. Thompson (1968) 390 U.S. 727, 731 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 267 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 ].) “Actual malice” under the New York Times standard focuses on the defendant’s attitude toward the truth or falsity of his published material rather than on the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff.

1986The case presented the Supreme Court with an apparent conflict between the New York Times rule of independent appellate review and rule 52(a). ( Bose, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 498-499 [ 80 L.Ed.2d at p. 515 ].) The Bose court observed that in New York Times, in the parallel context of review of state jury verdicts, it had rejected a similar contention by the plaintiff there that the Seventh Amendment 4 precluded independent review of a state jury verdict.

1984The statement in this case represents the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies. [Citing Time, Inc. v. Pape (1970) 401 U.S. 279, 290-292 ( 28 L.Ed.2d 45, 53-54 , 91 S.Ct. 633 ).]” (Bose Corp. v. Consumer’s Union, supra, 466 U.S. 485 , — [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502, 525 ].) 13 The allegedly defamatory statements in the instant case provide similarly apposite examples of the importance of literary license to a competent and free press.

2016(Good Government, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 683 .) The court explained that, if that were the standard, “a defendant who makes a statement which is ambiguous in the sense that it can reasonably be viewed as either fact or opinion, but who neither intends the statement to bear a factual meaning nor believes that it will be understood by the reader in that fashion, will be guilty of libel if a jury later determines that the article was understood in its factual, defamatory sense. [¶] Such a holding would render a defendant liable for a defamatory statement negligently made and would create precisel

1991Since, however, a jury verdict in a defamation case can only be supported when the actual malice is shown by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of evidence as in most other cases, [citation], the evidence and all the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from it must meet the higher standard.” (Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 252 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 690 P.2d 610 ], See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986) 477 U.S. 242, 256-257 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216-217 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 ]; Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court

1991Since, however, a jury verdict in a defamation case can only be supported when the actual malice is shown by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of evidence as in most other cases, [citation], the evidence and all the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from it must meet the higher standard.” (Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 252 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 690 P.2d 610 ], See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986) 477 U.S. 242, 256-257 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216-217 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 ]; Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court

1991Since, however, a jury verdict in a defamation case can only be supported when the actual malice is shown by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of evidence as in most other cases, [citation], the evidence and all the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from it must meet the higher standard.” (Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 252 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 690 P.2d 610 ], See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986) 477 U.S. 242, 256-257 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216-217 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 ]; Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court

1988Those courts have nevertheless consistently applied Justice Brennan’s analysis in Rosenblatt, supra, 38 U.S. at pages 85-86 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 605-606], to “persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of [public] issues,” “to those among the hierarchy of governmental employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or con *607 trol over the conduct of governmental affairs,” and “[w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the pers

1988Those courts have nevertheless consistently applied Justice Brennan’s analysis in Rosenblatt, supra, 38 U.S. at pages 85-86 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 605-606], to “persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of [public] issues,” “to those among the hierarchy of governmental employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or con *607 trol over the conduct of governmental affairs,” and “[w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the pers

1980We conclude that an appropriate balancing of freedom of expression against sanctity of reputation in the instant case requires the conclusion reached by the trial court, namely, that Weingarten was a “public official” within the meaning of New York Times and Rosenblatt , both supra. *140 We note that the authorities in other jurisdictions agree that city attorneys or attorneys performing similar duties are “public officials” for the purpose of the New York Times rule (Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., Inc. (Fla.App. 1977) 348 So.2d 51 (former city attorney); Frink v. McEldowney (1971) 29 N.Y.2d 720 [

1980We conclude that an appropriate balancing of freedom of expression against sanctity of reputation in the instant case requires the conclusion reached by the trial court, namely, that Weingarten was a “public official” within the meaning of New York Times and Rosenblatt , both supra. *140 We note that the authorities in other jurisdictions agree that city attorneys or attorneys performing similar duties are “public officials” for the purpose of the New York Times rule (Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., Inc. (Fla.App. 1977) 348 So.2d 51 (former city attorney); Frink v. McEldowney (1971) 29 N.Y.2d 720 [

2014(See Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 ; Annette F., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 [defamation 13 “Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will. [Citation.]” (Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 496, 510-511 (Masson).) Instead, “actual malice” is a “shorthand to describe the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation.” (Id. at p. 511.) 31 plaintiff bears ‘the burden of making a “sufficient prima facie show

2014(See Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 ; Annette F., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 [defamation 13 “Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will. [Citation.]” (Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 496, 510-511 (Masson).) Instead, “actual malice” is a “shorthand to describe the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation.” (Id. at p. 511.) 31 plaintiff bears ‘the burden of making a “sufficient prima facie show