York Times standard in Pennsylvania

1984Concluding that presumed damages constituted “gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury,” id. at 349 , 94 S.Ct. at 3011 , the Court reasoned that the state interest in these instances was insufficient to permit recovery unless, at a minimum, at least, the New York Times standard is met.

1984Concluding that presumed damages constituted “gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury,” id. at 349 , 94 S.Ct. at 3011 , the Court reasoned that the state interest in these instances was insufficient to permit recovery unless, at a minimum, at least, the New York Times standard is met.

1984In 1967, the Court extended the New York Times rule to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).

1984In 1967, the Court extended the New York Times rule to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).

2015Id. at 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. at 726 , See Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212, 226 , 860 A.2d 48, 56 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 956 , 125 S.Ct. 1700 , 161 L.Ed.2d 539 (2005) (acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated public officials are required to prove actual malice as a prerequisite to establishing liability in defamation actions). 6 Following New York Times, the U.S. Supreme Court struggled with whether and how the New York Times standard should apply to private individuals. 7 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (plurality opinion), abr

2015Id. at 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. at 726 , See Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212, 226 , 860 A.2d 48, 56 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 956 , 125 S.Ct. 1700 , 161 L.Ed.2d 539 (2005) (acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated public officials are required to prove actual malice as a prerequisite to establishing liability in defamation actions). 6 Following New York Times, the U.S. Supreme Court struggled with whether and how the New York Times standard should apply to private individuals. 7 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (plurality opinion), abr

1984“The proof of ‘actual malice’ calls a defendant’s state of mind into question, and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition.” Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 184 , 439 A.2d 652, 662 (1981) (citation omitted), quoting Hutchinson v. Proxmire, supra, 443 U.S. at 120 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. at 2680 n. 9, 61 L.Ed.2d at 422 n. 9. “[A] defendant in a defamation action cannot insure a favorable verdict [merely] ‘by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true.’” Id., 497 Pa. at 184-185 , 439 A.2d at 662 , quoting from St.

1984“The proof of ‘actual malice’ calls a defendant’s state of mind into question, and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition.” Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 184 , 439 A.2d 652, 662 (1981) (citation omitted), quoting Hutchinson v. Proxmire, supra, 443 U.S. at 120 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. at 2680 n. 9, 61 L.Ed.2d at 422 n. 9. “[A] defendant in a defamation action cannot insure a favorable verdict [merely] ‘by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true.’” Id., 497 Pa. at 184-185 , 439 A.2d at 662 , quoting from St.

1978Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 394 n. 11, 87 S.Ct. at 545. *133 Several facts supported the Court’s finding that given such falsehood, a jury could properly find malice.

1972Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 87 S. Ct. 534 (1967).

2015Id. at 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. at 726 , See Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212, 226 , 860 A.2d 48, 56 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 956 , 125 S.Ct. 1700 , 161 L.Ed.2d 539 (2005) (acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated public officials are required to prove actual malice as a prerequisite to establishing liability in defamation actions). 6 Following New York Times, the U.S. Supreme Court struggled with whether and how the New York Times standard should apply to private individuals. 7 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (plurality opinion), abr

2015Id. at 475 n. 3, 96 S.Ct. at 975 n. 3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis and citations omitted).

2015Id. at 475 n. 3, 96 S.Ct. at 975 n. 3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis and citations omitted).

2014Id., at 20 n.6.

2002See Byers, 161 Ga.App. at 288 (holding that a dean of a state college was a limited-purpose public figure with respect to a controversy over the elimination of his position where he was publicly vocal about the controversy after the story broke); Van Dyke v. Kutz, 663 P.2d 52 (Utah 1983) (holding that the director of financial aid at a state college was a public official where he had considerable discretion to allocate federal student aid funds and his position invited public scrutiny); Walko v. Kean College of N.J., 235 N.J.

2002See Byers, 161 Ga.App. at 288 (holding that a dean of a state college was a limited-purpose public figure with respect to a controversy over the elimination of his position where he was publicly vocal about the controversy after the story broke); Van Dyke v. Kutz, 663 P.2d 52 (Utah 1983) (holding that the director of financial aid at a state college was a public official where he had considerable discretion to allocate federal student aid funds and his position invited public scrutiny); Walko v. Kean College of N.J., 235 N.J.

1996The trial court and Appellees also rely on Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 , 91 S.Ct. 633 , 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971), as authority for their argument that, “if a publication is a rational interpretation of the source document, then a misconception found in the publication is not sufficient to create a jury issue of malice under the New York Times standard.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/95, at p. 9.

1996The trial court and Appellees also rely on Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 , 91 S.Ct. 633 , 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971), as authority for their argument that, “if a publication is a rational interpretation of the source document, then a misconception found in the publication is not sufficient to create a jury issue of malice under the New York Times standard.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/95, at p. 9.

1988In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 , 85 S.Ct. 209 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), the Supreme Court reversed a Louisiana Supreme Court decision which refused to apply the New York Times rule in a prosecution for criminal defamation.

1988In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 , 85 S.Ct. 209 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), the Supreme Court reversed a Louisiana Supreme Court decision which refused to apply the New York Times rule in a prosecution for criminal defamation.

1988Accord Connaughton v. Harte Hanks Communications, 842 F.2d 825 (6th Cir.1988) (discussion of conflict in applying independent judicial review); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir.1987) (same).

1988In reasserting the position taken in Roy , the court stated “that a charge of criminal conduct against an official or a candidate, no matter how remote in time or place, is always ‘relevant to his fitness for office’ for purposes of applying the New York Times rule of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth.” Ocala Star-Banner Co., 401 U.S. at 300 , 91 S.Ct. at 632 .

1988In reasserting the position taken in Roy , the court stated “that a charge of criminal conduct against an official or a candidate, no matter how remote in time or place, is always ‘relevant to his fitness for office’ for purposes of applying the New York Times rule of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth.” Ocala Star-Banner Co., 401 U.S. at 300 , 91 S.Ct. at 632 .

1988In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 , 91 S.Ct. 621 , 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971), the Supreme Court was asked to revisit the question of what constitutes “official conduct” in determining when the New York Times rule is to be applied.

1988In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 , 91 S.Ct. 621 , 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971), the Supreme Court was asked to revisit the question of what constitutes “official conduct” in determining when the New York Times rule is to be applied.

1984Id. 376 U.S. at 271-72 , 84 S.Ct. at 721-22 . 4 The major question commanding the attention of the Court in subsequent decisions was the extent to which *318 the New York Times rule should apply.

1984“If the evidence ... measures up to the New York Times standard, the case is one for the jury____ [T]he function of the trial court [on motion for summary judgment] is not to weigh proof and make independent findings, but rather to determine whether or not the plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact from which a jury, using the appropriate burden of proof — ‘clear and convincing’ evi dence — could find publication of a defamatory falsehood with actual malice.” Community Medical Services of *110 Clearfield Inc. v. Local 2665, AFSCME, supra, 292 Pa.Super. at 246 , 437 A.2d at

1984“If the evidence ... measures up to the New York Times standard, the case is one for the jury____ [T]he function of the trial court [on motion for summary judgment] is not to weigh proof and make independent findings, but rather to determine whether or not the plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact from which a jury, using the appropriate burden of proof — ‘clear and convincing’ evi dence — could find publication of a defamatory falsehood with actual malice.” Community Medical Services of *110 Clearfield Inc. v. Local 2665, AFSCME, supra, 292 Pa.Super. at 246 , 437 A.2d at

1984Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).” Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 163-164 , 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-2706 , 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979).

1984Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).” Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 163-164 , 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-2706 , 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979).