Hall standard in Kansas

2012The Shirley court explained what this meant, stating: “Under the pre-Hall standard, the court must focus on technical considerations. [Citations omitted.] If the charging document does not set out the essential elements of the crime, it is fatally defective and the conviction must be reversed for lack of jurisdiction. [Citation omitted.].” Shirley, 277 Kan. at 661-62 .

2012The Shirley court explained that this new standard—referred to as the post-Hall standard or test—requires the defendant to show that the claimed defect either “(1) prejudiced the defendant’s preparation of a defense, (2) impaired the defendant’s ability to plead the conviction in any subsequent prosecution, or (3) limited die defendant’s substantial rights to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. [Hall,] 246 Kan. at 765 .” Shirley, 277 Kan. at 662 .

2016Rather, he quoted language from our decision in State v. Portillo, 294 Kan. 242 , 274 P.3d 640 (2012).

2015We recognized that the 14-day window from verdict for filing of a 22-3502 motion for arrest of judgment, as required by Hall to justify invocation of tire pre-Hall standard for review of a charging document, had already closed by the time the State sought to amend the PSI. 294 Kan. at 256 .

2011A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the charging document for the first time on appeal must show the alleged defect either "(1) prejudiced the defendant's preparation of a defense; (2) impaired the defendant's ability to plead the conviction in any subsequent prosecution; or (3) limited the defendant's substantial rights to a fair trial. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 254 , 200 P.3d 1275 (2009); see State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 765 , 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428 , 78 P.3d 40 (2003); see also State v. McEl

2011A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the charging document for the first time on appeal must show the alleged defect either "(1) prejudiced the defendant's preparation of a defense; (2) impaired the defendant's ability to plead the conviction in any subsequent prosecution; or (3) limited the defendant's substantial rights to a fair trial. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 254 , 200 P.3d 1275 (2009); see State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 765 , 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428 , 78 P.3d 40 (2003); see also State v. McEl

2015Nevertheless, “[u]nder the pre-Hall standard, an information is sufficient if it substantially follows the language of the statute or charges the offense in equivalent words or others of tire same import, so long as tire defendant is fully informed of the particular offense charged and tire court is able to determine under what statute the charge is founded.” State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666 , Syl. ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 761 , cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 532 (2010).

2015Nevertheless, “[u]nder the pre-Hall standard, an information is sufficient if it substantially follows the language of the statute or charges the offense in equivalent words or others of tire same import, so long as tire defendant is fully informed of the particular offense charged and tire court is able to determine under what statute the charge is founded.” State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666 , Syl. ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 761 , cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 532 (2010).

2013When a defendant timely files a motion for arrest of judgment, this court reviews whether tire complaint was jurisdictionally defective under the pr e-Hall standard, which asks whether the complaint “omits one or more of the essential elements of the crime it attempts to charge.” Scott, 286 Kan. at 63 ; see K.S.A. 22-3502 (providing arrest of judgment should be granted if “the complaint, information or indictment does not charge a crime or if the court was without jurisdiction of the crime charged”).

2013Even though the pr e-Hall standard focuses on “ ‘technical considerations, rather than practical considerations,’ ” a complaint is still sufficient if it “substantially follows the language of the statute or charges the offense in equivalent words or others of the same import so long as the defendant is fully informed of the particular offense charged and the court is able to determine under what statute the charge is founded.” Scott, 286 Kan. at 63-64 .

2012As a result, the Hall factors are inapplicable to this case.” Marino, 34 Kan.

2012As a result, the Hall factors are inapplicable to this case.” Marino, 34 Kan.

2008Although we have stated a pre- Hall standard emphasizes "technical considerations, rather than practical considerations," Hooker, 271 Kan. at 61 , 21 P.3d 964 , we have also held "an information should be read in its entirety, construed according to common sense, and interpreted to include facts which are necessarily implied." Micheaux, 242 Kan. at 199 , 747 P.2d 784 .

2008Although we have stated a pre- Hall standard emphasizes "technical considerations, rather than practical considerations," Hooker, 271 Kan. at 61 , 21 P.3d 964 , we have also held "an information should be read in its entirety, construed according to common sense, and interpreted to include facts which are necessarily implied." Micheaux, 242 Kan. at 199 , 747 P.2d 784 .

2021But while it acknowledged Hall's objection to his jail attire, it refused to adopt a rule that "appearance in prison garb per se results in an unfair trial." 220 Kan. at 715 .

2020See, e.g., McClanahan, 251 Kan. at 534 (defendant charged with single count of felony theft based upon aggregate value of items taken); Fox, 242 Kan. at 459-60 (defendant charged with single count of felony unemployment fraud instead of multiple misdemeanors); State v. Green, 213 Kan. 547, 547-48 , 516 P.2d 926 (1973) (defendant charged with single count of felony grand theft even though two of the three discrete takings were in amounts less than the felony limit); State v. Roberts, 210 Kan. 786, 787 , 504 P.2d 242 (1972) (defendant charged with two counts of grand larceny for theft of two pow

2020See, e.g., McClanahan, 251 Kan. at 534 (defendant charged with single count of felony theft based upon aggregate value of items taken); Fox, 242 Kan. at 459-60 (defendant charged with single count of felony unemployment fraud instead of multiple misdemeanors); State v. Green, 213 Kan. 547, 547-48 , 516 P.2d 926 (1973) (defendant charged with single count of felony grand theft even though two of the three discrete takings were in amounts less than the felony limit); State v. Roberts, 210 Kan. 786, 787 , 504 P.2d 242 (1972) (defendant charged with two counts of grand larceny for theft of two pow

2020See, e.g., McClanahan, 251 Kan. at 534 (defendant charged with single count of felony theft based upon aggregate value of items taken); Fox, 242 Kan. at 459-60 (defendant charged with single count of felony unemployment fraud instead of multiple misdemeanors); State v. Green, 213 Kan. 547, 547-48 , 516 P.2d 926 (1973) (defendant charged with single count of felony grand theft even though two of the three discrete takings were in amounts less than the felony limit); State v. Roberts, 210 Kan. 786, 787 , 504 P.2d 242 (1972) (defendant charged with two counts of grand larceny for theft of two pow

2020See, e.g., McClanahan, 251 Kan. at 534 (defendant charged with single count of felony theft based upon aggregate value of items taken); Fox, 242 Kan. at 459-60 (defendant charged with single count of felony unemployment fraud instead of multiple misdemeanors); State v. Green, 213 Kan. 547, 547-48 , 516 P.2d 926 (1973) (defendant charged with single count of felony grand theft even though two of the three discrete takings were in amounts less than the felony limit); State v. Roberts, 210 Kan. 786, 787 , 504 P.2d 242 (1972) (defendant charged with two counts of grand larceny for theft of two pow

2020See, e.g., McClanahan, 251 Kan. at 534 (defendant charged with single count of felony theft based upon aggregate value of items taken); Fox, 242 Kan. at 459-60 (defendant charged with single count of felony unemployment fraud instead of multiple misdemeanors); State v. Green, 213 Kan. 547, 547-48 , 516 P.2d 926 (1973) (defendant charged with single count of felony grand theft even though two of the three discrete takings were in amounts less than the felony limit); State v. Roberts, 210 Kan. 786, 787 , 504 P.2d 242 (1972) (defendant charged with two counts of grand larceny for theft of two pow

2020See, e.g., McClanahan, 251 Kan. at 534 (defendant charged with single count of felony theft based upon aggregate value of items taken); Fox, 242 Kan. at 459-60 (defendant charged with single count of felony unemployment fraud instead of multiple misdemeanors); State v. Green, 213 Kan. 547, 547-48 , 516 P.2d 926 (1973) (defendant charged with single count of felony grand theft even though two of the three discrete takings were in amounts less than the felony limit); State v. Roberts, 210 Kan. 786, 787 , 504 P.2d 242 (1972) (defendant charged with two counts of grand larceny for theft of two pow

2019And based on that, the panel held that even though the Van Cleave court used the post-Hall test, it reached the correct result and affirmed. 2016 WL 7325012 , at *18 (citing State v. Overman, 301 Kan. 704, 712 , 348 P.3d 516 [2015] [affirming district court as right for wrong reasons]).

2019And based on that, the panel held that even though the Van Cleave court used the post-Hall test, it reached the correct result and affirmed. 2016 WL 7325012 , at *18 (citing State v. Overman, 301 Kan. 704, 712 , 348 P.3d 516 [2015] [affirming district court as right for wrong reasons]).

2015Hurd, 298 Kan. at 565 ; see State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 764-65 , 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428 , 78 P.3d 40 (2003).

2015Hurd, 298 Kan. at 565 ; see State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 764-65 , 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428 , 78 P.3d 40 (2003).

2015Nevertheless, “[u]nder the pre-Hall standard, an information is sufficient if it substantially follows the language of the statute or charges the offense in equivalent words or others of tire same import, so long as tire defendant is fully informed of the particular offense charged and tire court is able to determine under what statute the charge is founded.” State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666 , Syl. ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 761 , cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 532 (2010).

2015Nevertheless, "[u]nder the pre–Hall standard, an information is sufficient if it substantially follows the language of the statute or charges the offense in equivalent words or others of the same import, so long as the defendant is fully informed of the particular offense charged and the court is able to determine under what statute the charge is founded." State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666 , Syl. ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 761 , cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 532 (2010).

2014Under the pre-Hall standard, “ ‘[A] conviction based upon an information which does not sufficiently charge the offense for which the accused is convicted is void.’ ” State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 835 , 850 P.2d 818 (1993) (quoting State v. Bird, 238 Kan. 160, 166 , 708 P.2d 946 [1985]).

2014Under the pre-Hall standard, “ ‘[A] conviction based upon an information which does not sufficiently charge the offense for which the accused is convicted is void.’ ” State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 835 , 850 P.2d 818 (1993) (quoting State v. Bird, 238 Kan. 160, 166 , 708 P.2d 946 [1985]).

2014Under the pre-Hall standard, “ ‘[A] conviction based upon an information which does not sufficiently charge the offense for which the accused is convicted is void.’ ” State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 835 , 850 P.2d 818 (1993) (quoting State v. Bird, 238 Kan. 160, 166 , 708 P.2d 946 [1985]).

2014Under the pre-Hall standard, “ ‘[A] conviction based upon an information which does not sufficiently charge the offense for which the accused is convicted is void.’ ” State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 835 , 850 P.2d 818 (1993) (quoting State v. Bird, 238 Kan. 160, 166 , 708 P.2d 946 [1985]).

2012I would submit that the Hall exception to fhe jurisdictional defect of elements missing from a charging document “deserves a proper burial,” and that “[w]e should administer last rites with this opinion.” State v. Bryant, 272 Kan. 1204, 1210 , 38 P.3d 661 (2002) (Six, J., concurring; referring to res gestae as an independent evidentiary concept).

2012I would submit that the Hall exception to fhe jurisdictional defect of elements missing from a charging document “deserves a proper burial,” and that “[w]e should administer last rites with this opinion.” State v. Bryant, 272 Kan. 1204, 1210 , 38 P.3d 661 (2002) (Six, J., concurring; referring to res gestae as an independent evidentiary concept).

2012Tapia, 42 Kan.

2011Accordingly, we determine that the trial court properly denied Hall’s motion for mistrial based on the admission of this brief comment by Jordan about the Udells’ suspicions. *310 Did the Trial Court Clearly Err In Not Instructing the Jury To Disregard the Evidence P In her brief argument regarding the lack of a kmiting instruction, Hall maintains that the trial court’s failure to give a kmiting instruction “left the jury with the impression that it was proper to consider this- information when assessing Ms. Hall’s credibility under the general PIK witness credibikty instruction.” In support,

2011Accordingly, we determine that the trial court properly denied Hall’s motion for mistrial based on the admission of this brief comment by Jordan about the Udells’ suspicions. *310 Did the Trial Court Clearly Err In Not Instructing the Jury To Disregard the Evidence P In her brief argument regarding the lack of a kmiting instruction, Hall maintains that the trial court’s failure to give a kmiting instruction “left the jury with the impression that it was proper to consider this- information when assessing Ms. Hall’s credibility under the general PIK witness credibikty instruction.” In support,