Hall claim in Washington

2008Hall, 162 Wash.2d at 905 , 177 P.3d 680 . ¶ 16 Hall argued that the State's attempt to retry him for the same criminal act, for which he had already been convicted and sentenced, violated double jeopardy principles.

2008Hall, 162 Wn.2d at 905 . ¶17 Hall argued that the State’s attempt to retry him for the same criminal act, for which he had already been convicted and sentenced, violated double jeopardy principles.

2025In re Marriage of Wright, 179 Wn. App. 257, 264 , 319 P.3d 45 (2013) (declining to consider one party’s claim that the accounts receivable was separate property pursuant to RAP 2.5(a) because that party did not raise the issue at trial).

2025In re Marriage of Wright, 179 Wn. App. 257, 264 , 319 P.3d 45 (2013) (declining to consider one party’s claim that the accounts receivable was separate property pursuant to RAP 2.5(a) because that party did not raise the issue at trial).

2025In re Estate of Borghi, 167 Wn.2d 480, 484 , 219 P.3d 932 6 Lockwood argues that Hall’s claim to the characterization of property is unpreserved because he did not argue that Fidelity account 7415 was separate property and cannot now argue so on appeal. “[T]he trial court’s duty to characterize a particular asset of community or separate property only arises where the issue is presented at trial” and may be waived if not appropriately raised.

2025In re Estate of Borghi, 167 Wn.2d 480, 484 , 219 P.3d 932 6 Lockwood argues that Hall’s claim to the characterization of property is unpreserved because he did not argue that Fidelity account 7415 was separate property and cannot now argue so on appeal. “[T]he trial court’s duty to characterize a particular asset of community or separate property only arises where the issue is presented at trial” and may be waived if not appropriately raised.

2021As a matter of policy and equity, our courts have consistently rejected results that would “encourag[e] insureds to not cooperate.” Tran, 136 Wn.2d at 231 .

2016Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 794-95 , 64 P.3d 22 (2003)). 11 Janaszak v. State, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 173 Wn.

2016Collins. 152 Wn.

2016Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 794-95 , 64 P.3d 22 (2003)). 11 Janaszak v. State, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 173 Wn.

2016Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 794-95 , 64 P.3d 22 (2003)). 11 Janaszak v. State, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 173 Wn.

2016No. 74602-2-1/5 genuine issues of material fact.10 "A material fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation."11 A defendant moving for summary judgment "has the initial burden to show the absence of an issue of material fact, or that the plaintiff lacks competent evidence to support an essential element of [his] case."12 If the defendant meets this initial showing, then the inquiry shifts to the plaintiff to set forth evidence to support his case.13 The evidence set forth must be specific and detailed.14 The responding plaintiff may not rely on conclusory statements, mere allegations

2016No. 74602-2-1/5 genuine issues of material fact.10 "A material fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation."11 A defendant moving for summary judgment "has the initial burden to show the absence of an issue of material fact, or that the plaintiff lacks competent evidence to support an essential element of [his] case."12 If the defendant meets this initial showing, then the inquiry shifts to the plaintiff to set forth evidence to support his case.13 The evidence set forth must be specific and detailed.14 The responding plaintiff may not rely on conclusory statements, mere allegations

2010State v. Vike, 125 Wn.2d 407, 410 , 885 P.2d 824 (1994). ¶17 Treating a defendant’s temporally separated tampering actions as the same crime is inconsistent with (1) the long-standing charging principles that require demarcations by time and initiation, (2) the executive prosecutor’s authority to determine the appropriate charges, and (3) the sentencing court’s authority to determine the appropriate standard range sentence. ¶18 Accordingly, although I question the application of the Hall court’s analysis in cases with substantially different facts than Hall, I concur with the majority that Hal

2010State v. Vike, 125 Wn.2d 407, 410 , 885 P.2d 824 (1994). ¶17 Treating a defendant’s temporally separated tampering actions as the same crime is inconsistent with (1) the long-standing charging principles that require demarcations by time and initiation, (2) the executive prosecutor’s authority to determine the appropriate charges, and (3) the sentencing court’s authority to determine the appropriate standard range sentence. ¶18 Accordingly, although I question the application of the Hall court’s analysis in cases with substantially different facts than Hall, I concur with the majority that Hal

1992He relies on State v. Morgavi, 58 Wn.

1992He relies on State v. Morgavi, 58 Wn.

1985The defendant's proposed instruction, cautioning the jury on eyewitness identification testimony, was taken from an instruction in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.

1973Sposari v. Matt Malaspina & Co., 63 Wn.2d 679 , 388 P.2d 970 (1964); Washington Printing Co. v. Osner, 99 Wash. 537 , 169 P. 988 (1918).

1973Sposari v. Matt Malaspina & Co., 63 Wn.2d 679 , 388 P.2d 970 (1964); Washington Printing Co. v. Osner, 99 Wash. 537 , 169 P. 988 (1918).

1973Sposari v. Matt Malaspina & Co., 63 Wn.2d 679 , 388 P.2d 970 (1964); Washington Printing Co. v. Osner, 99 Wash. 537 , 169 P. 988 (1918).

1973Sposari v. Matt Malaspina & Co., 63 Wn.2d 679 , 388 P.2d 970 (1964); Washington Printing Co. v. Osner, 99 Wash. 537 , 169 P. 988 (1918).