20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dawkins, Inc. v. Huffgreen2 sentences2019See Dawkins, Inc. v. Huff , 836 So.2d 1062 , 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("[W]e must dismiss this appeal. 2019See Dawkins, Inc. v. Huff , 836 So.2d 1062 , 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("[W]e must dismiss this appeal. | 3 | 3 |
Hall v. Floridagreen2 sentences2023This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of the Hall claim in Zack III, explaining that Zack was unable to “present additional evidence of intellectual disability” because his “I.Q. test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error.” Id. at 46 (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 ). 2023This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of the Hall claim in Zack III, explaining that Zack was unable to “present additional evidence of intellectual disability” because his “I.Q. test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error.” Id. at 46 (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 ). | 1 | 2 |
Blanco v. Stategreen2 sentences2017This Court has rejected the argument that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither “narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty” nor “reasonably justifies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Parker v. State, 873 So.2d 270 , 286 n.12 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)); see Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997). 2017This Court has rejected the argument that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither “narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty” nor “reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 , 286 n.12 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)); see Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Zant v. Stephensgreen2 sentences2017This Court has rejected the argument that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither “narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty” nor “reasonably justifies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Parker v. State, 873 So.2d 270 , 286 n.12 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)); see Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997). 2017This Court has rejected the argument that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither “narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty” nor “reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 , 286 n.12 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)); see Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Cherry v. Statered2 sentences2016See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (holding that a person whose test score is above 70, including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his faculties are limited), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 993 (2007), abrogated by Hall v. - 22 - Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 2016See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla.2007) (holding that a person whose test score is above 70, including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his faculties are limited), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 993 , 128 S.Ct. 490 , 169 L.Ed.2d 344 (2007), abrogated by Hall v. Florida, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1986 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Hall IX, 109 So. 3d at 712-14 (Pariente, J., concurring) (noting that “in 2010, there was a true adversarial testing of whether Hall was [intellectually disabled] under Florida’s statutory definition.”). 2016Hall IX, 109 So.3d at 712-14 (Pariente, J., concurring) (noting that “in 2010, there was a true adversarial testing of whether Hall was [intellectually disabled] under Florida’s statutory definition.”). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Pearson v. Moore, 767 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“As part of the executive branch, DOC lacks the power to adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to add or delete sentencing conditions.”); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc), aff'd, 688 So.2d 319 (Fla.1997) (“[T]he Department of Corrections lacks the authority to correct an illegal sentence or render the illegality harmless.”); Wilson v. State, 603 So.2d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (holding that “the award of the credit is a judicial task to be accomplished at sentencing rather than an administra | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. Mooregreen1 sentence2001See Pearson v. Moore, 767 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“As part of the executive branch, DOC lacks the power to adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to add or delete sentencing conditions.”); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc), aff'd, 688 So.2d 319 (Fla.1997) (“[T]he Department of Corrections lacks the authority to correct an illegal sentence or render the illegality harmless.”); Wilson v. State, 603 So.2d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (holding that “the award of the credit is a judicial task to be accomplished at sentencing rather than an administra | 1 | 1 |
Slay v. Singletarygreen1 sentence2001See Pearson v. Moore, 767 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“As part of the executive branch, DOC lacks the power to adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to add or delete sentencing conditions.”); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc), aff'd, 688 So.2d 319 (Fla.1997) (“[T]he Department of Corrections lacks the authority to correct an illegal sentence or render the illegality harmless.”); Wilson v. State, 603 So.2d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (holding that “the award of the credit is a judicial task to be accomplished at sentencing rather than an administra | 1 | 1 |
| Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shippinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. State
green
2 sentences2016In finding that the trial court properly denied Hall’s claim that the court erred in finding him competent to proceed at the resentencing, this Court stated “While there is no doubt that [Hall] has serious mental difficulties, is probably somewhat retarded, and certainly has learning difficulties and a speech impediment, the Court finds that [Hall] was competent at the resentencing hearings.” Id. at 229 . 2012In finding that the trial court properly denied Hall’s claim that the court erred in finding him competent to proceed at the resentencing, we stated “While there is no doubt that [Hall] has serious mental difficulties, is probably somewhat retarded, and certainly has learning difficulties and a speech impediment, the Court finds that [Hall] was competent at the resentencing hearings.” Id. at 229 . | 2 | 2012–2016 |
Stano v. State
green
2 sentences1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla.1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 -(1984). 1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Way v. State
green
2 sentences1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla.1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 -(1984). 1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla.1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 -(1984). 1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla.1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 -(1984). 1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
McKenna v. Nevada
green
2 sentences1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla.1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 -(1984). 1990Way v. State, 496 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1986); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 869 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1329 , 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Whren v. United States
green
1 sentence2024This was error. 2 As this Court explained in State v. Hickman, 363 So. 3d 217 , 218 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), review denied, No. SC2023-0744, 2023 WL 5274212 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2023), a law enforcement officer’s subjective intent in stopping a driver is irrelevant to the determination of whether probable cause existed to support the stop: Thus, when addressing the constitutional validity of a traffic stop, Florida courts employ a “strict objective test which asks only whether any probable cause for the [traffic] stop existed.” Holland [v. State], 696 So. 2d [757] at 759 [Fla. 1997] (citing Whren [v. Un | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Huff v. State
green
2 sentences2023As this Court further explained, - 14 - At the Huff [v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993)] hearing, Zack presented his full range of scores, as well as evidence of adaptive deficits before age 18. 2023As this Court further explained, - 14 - At the Huff [v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993)] hearing, Zack presented his full range of scores, as well as evidence of adaptive deficits before age 18. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
& SC16-1090 Michael Duane Zack, III v. State of Florida and Michael Duane Zack, III v. Julie L. Jones, etc.
green
2 sentences2023This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of the Hall claim in Zack III, explaining that Zack was unable to “present additional evidence of intellectual disability” because his “I.Q. test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error.” Id. at 46 (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 ). 2023This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of the Hall claim in Zack III, explaining that Zack was unable to “present additional evidence of intellectual disability” because his “I.Q. test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error.” Id. at 46 (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Parker v. State
green
2 sentences2017This Court has rejected the argument that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither “narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty” nor “reasonably justifies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Parker v. State, 873 So.2d 270 , 286 n.12 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)); see Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997). 2017This Court has rejected the argument that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it provides for an automatic aggravating circumstance and neither “narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty” nor “reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 , 286 n.12 (Fla. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)); see Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sonny Boy Oats, Jr. v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2017The facts in this case—specifically the findings made after the prior evidentiary hearing as to each prong of intellectual disability—distinguish this case from the clear Hall error this Court found in Oats, 181 So.3d at 471 , and Cardona, 185 So.3d at 527 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2017Rodriguez also filed in this Court a motion requesting permission for supplemental briefing on Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), which was decided January 12, 2016. 2017Rodriguez also filed in this Court a motion requesting permission for supplemental briefing on Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), which was decided January 12, 2016. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ana Maria Cardona v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2017The facts in this case—specifically the findings made after the prior evidentiary hearing as to each prong of intellectual disability—distinguish this case from the clear Hall error this Court found in Oats, 181 So.3d at 471 , and Cardona, 185 So.3d at 527 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Atkins v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2012After Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), was decided, Hall filed a motion to declare section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2004), 1 unconstitutional. 2012After Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), was decided, Hall filed a motion to declare section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2004), 1 unconstitutional. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Gantt
green
1 sentence2005In granting Mr. Hall’s motion, the trial court relied principally on State v. Gantt, 688 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence2002(Citations omitted.) The trial court denied Hall's claim, stating that he "is not entitled to control release as he has been convicted of sexual battery." However, Smith states that the purpose is "to preserve the appellant's entitlement, if any, to control release." Smith, 632 So.2d at 97 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Singletary v. Slay
green
1 sentence2001See Pearson v. Moore, 767 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“As part of the executive branch, DOC lacks the power to adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to add or delete sentencing conditions.”); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc), aff'd, 688 So.2d 319 (Fla.1997) (“[T]he Department of Corrections lacks the authority to correct an illegal sentence or render the illegality harmless.”); Wilson v. State, 603 So.2d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (holding that “the award of the credit is a judicial task to be accomplished at sentencing rather than an administra | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Gordon v. Sanders
neutral
1 sentence2001Mayolo v. State, 692 So.2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence1994In the instant case, the court below should have treated Hall's motion as if filed pursuant to rule 3.850. [1] See Young v. State, 619 So.2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); DeSantis v. State, 400 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
DeSantis v. State
green
1 sentence1994In the instant case, the court below should have treated Hall's motion as if filed pursuant to rule 3.850. [1] See Young v. State, 619 So.2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); DeSantis v. State, 400 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hall v. State
green
1 sentence1989Hall v. State, 420 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1982) ( Hall II). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Witt v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Jarrett v. Jarrett green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Robinson v. Hanrahan green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.