Hall motion in Indiana

2016See Hall v. Dallman Contractors, LLC, 994 N.E.2d 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (Hall I). [6] On May 30, 2014, AT&T Services filed its second motion for summary judgment, again claiming that Hall’s claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.

2016See Hall v. Dallman Contractors, LLC, 994 N.E.2d 1220 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (Hall I). [6] On May 30, 2014, AT & T Services filed its second motion for summary judgment, again claiming that Hall’s claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.

2015As Judge Najam pointed out writing for the Court of Appeals’ majority, “Hall’s defense depended entirely on the jury crediting his version of events over M.T.’s[.]” Hall v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1107, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), vacated.

2015As Judge Najam pointed out writing for the Court of Appeals’ majority, “Hall’s defense depended entirely on the jury crediting his version of events over M.T.’s[.]” Hall v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1107, 1115 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), vacated.

2026Id. at 286–87.

2017The distinction between Cavinder and the instant case, however, is that in Cavinder the trial court must have ruled on Hall’s motion to correct error before this court acquired jurisdiction over the appeal; in this case, the trial court did not. [18] Cavinder says that its holding “applies only if, within thirty days after the motion is deemed denied, the party filing the motion timely initiates an appeal, and if the trial court belatedly grants the motion to correct error before [jurisdiction is transferred] to the appellate tribunal.” Cavinder, 726 N.E.2d at 289 (footnotes omitted).

2025(App. Vol. 2 at 48.) The trial court declined to give Hall’s instruction because the pattern jury instructions were sufficient. [18] Hall’s proposed instruction came from Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), where our court considered whether brass knuckles Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 12 of 20 qualified as a deadly weapon for a battery conviction.

2015The majority is quite correct that “the trial court should have granted Hall’s motion to compel discovery[,]” slip op. at 13; and that “the trial court erred in excluding the phone conversation, which would have corrected A.D.’s deceptively incomplete disclosure.” Id. at 21 (quotation omitted).

2015But this does not end our inquiry, as “certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been ‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the fact-finding process at trial.” Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind.2010). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error may be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 12 In other words, “[violations of the right of cross-examination do not require reversal if the State can show beyond a reasona

2015But this does not end our inquiry, as “certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been ‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the fact-finding process at trial.” Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind.2010). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error may be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 12 In other words, “[violations of the right of cross-examination do not require reversal if the State can show beyond a reasona

2015But this does not end our inquiry, as “certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been ‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the fact-finding process at trial.” Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind.2010). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error may be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 12 In other words, “[violations of the right of cross-examination do not require reversal if the State can show beyond a reasona

2015And as the trial court expressed when considering the parties’ pre-trial motions, “[t]he credibility of [sic] complaining witness is paramount.” Tr. at 14; accord McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind. 2001) (“As with most cases involving claims of child molestation, here the credibility of witnesses was a key issue at trial.”).

2015And as the trial court expressed when considering the parties’ pre-trial motions, “[t]he credibility of [sic] complaining witness is paramount.” Tr. at 14; accord McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind.2001) (“As with most cases involving claims of child molestation, here the credibility of witnesses was a key issue at trial.”).

2014See Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147, 152 (Ind. 2000).

2014See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1097 , 2014 WL 4258769 , No. 45A03-1401-CR-8, slip op. at 10 (Ind.Ct.App.

2014See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1097 , 2014 WL 4258769 , No. 45A03-1401-CR-8, slip op. at 10 (Ind.Ct.App.

2012See Banks, 884 N.E.2d at 368 ; Holman, 314 F.3d at 839-40 ; see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697-98 (stating that challenges to specific portions of trial counsel’s representation during a proceeding are “of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors which we have held subject to Strickland’s performance and prejudice components”).

2012See Banks, 884 N.E.2d at 368 ; Holman, 314 F.3d at 839-40 ; see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 697-98 (stating that challenges to specific portions of trial counsel’s representation during a proceeding are “of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors which we have held subject to Strickland’s performance and prejudice components”).

2008Hall now complains that the recording should not have been admitted into evidence because it did not satisfy the requirements of Lamar v. State, 258 Ind. 504, 512-13 , 282 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Ind.1972), wherein our Supreme Court held that the admission of a sound recording should be preceded by a foundation disclosing the following: (1) That it is authentic and correct; (2) That the testimony elicited was freely and voluntarily made, without any kind of duress; (3) That all required warnings were given and all necessary acknowledgments and waivers were knowingly and intelligently given; (4) That

2005Due Process An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Howard v. Incorporated Town of N. Judson, 661 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Ind.1996) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 389 U.S. 306 , 318, 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

2005We have previously observed that “[i]t is often difficult to draw an exact line between offers and negotiations preliminary thereto.” Suyemasa v. Myers, 420 N.E.2d 1334, 1344 (Ind.Ct.App.1981).

1996INB Banking Co. v. Opportunity Options, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Ind. Ct.App.1992), trans. denied.