Hall rule in California

2013Certainly the evidence was insufficient to meet the Hall test for admission of third-party culpability evidence as Revill did not have “direct or circumstantial evidence linking [Bloomquist] to the actual perpetration of the crime.” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833 .) The problem for Revill is that every other reason he gives for admitting this evidence is either plainly wrong or completely insignificant in view of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.

2013Certainly the evidence was insufficient to meet the Hall test for admission of third-party culpability evidence as Revill did not have “direct or circumstantial evidence linking [Bloomquist] to the actual perpetration of the crime.” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833 .) The problem for Revill is that every other reason he gives for admitting this evidence is either plainly wrong or completely insignificant in view of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.

2024(Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 ; see Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 28 .) The section labeled “Statement of Facts” in Woolard and Hall’s brief does not include a single reference to the record; it is, essentially, useless to us.

2024(Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 ; see Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 28 .) The section labeled “Statement of Facts” in Woolard and Hall’s brief does not include a single reference to the record; it is, essentially, useless to us.

2020He also [pointed] out that the criminalist was unable to testify as to the whereabouts of the blood sample during the three days before the crime lab received it and the six days following the crime lab’s receipt of the blood sample.” (Hall, at p. 294.) The Second District Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s reliance on Jimenez, describing the chain-of-custody testimony in Jimenez as providing “no reasonable certainty that the DNA sample purportedly obtained from the defendant and the crime scene DNA had not been substituted for one or the other.” (Hall, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 296 .

2014Segovia complains that the trial court was obligated to ascertain the facts underlying the excessive force judgment in order to determine its materiality under Brady, and it never sought to do so. 40 “Critically, ‘[a] new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is not granted where the only value of the newly discovered testimony is as impeaching evidence’ or to contradict a witness of the opposing party. [Citations.]” (People v. Hall, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 299 .) In Hall, the court found that the trial court properly denied Hall’s motion for new trial because the purpose of th

2019(People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1182 .) Here, the parties stipulated that the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for Hall's plea, and the court accepted the plea on that basis.

2019(People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1182 .) Here, the parties stipulated that the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for Hall's plea, and the court accepted the plea on that basis.

2019(People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 571 .) Indeed, there is a split of authority on whether such a claim may be brought on appeal even with a certificate.

2019(People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 571 .) Indeed, there is a split of authority on whether such a claim may be brought on appeal even with a certificate.

2018Code, § 800, subd. (a).) For purposes of attorney fee statutes, the terms "prevailing party" and "successful party" are synonymous. ( Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604 , 610, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 , 101 P.3d 174 .) Accordingly, for the same reasons we affirm the order denying Hall's motion under section 1021.5, we also affirm the trial court's determination he did not "prevail" under Government Code section 800.

2018Code, § 800, subd. (a).) For purposes of attorney fee statutes, the terms "prevailing party" and "successful party" are synonymous. ( Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604 , 610, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 , 101 P.3d 174 .) Accordingly, for the same reasons we affirm the order denying Hall's motion under section 1021.5, we also affirm the trial court's determination he did not "prevail" under Government Code section 800.

2014We are instructed under Brinker that the starting point for purposes of class certification commences with Hall’s theory of liability because, “for purposes of certification, the proper inquiry is ‘whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment.’ ” (Benton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 726 .) Here, as in Brinker and its progeny, Hall alleged (and Rite Aid did not dispute) that Rite Aid had a uniform policy of the type envisioned by Brinker: Rite Aid did not allow its Cashier/Clerlcs to sit (and therefore provided no suitable seats for it

2014We are instructed under Brinker that the starting point for purposes of class certification commences with Hall's theory of liability because, "for purposes of certification, the proper inquiry is 'whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment.' " (Benton,, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 726 .) Here, as in Brinker and its progeny, Hall alleged (and Rite Aid did not dispute) that Rite Aid had a uniform policy of the type envisioned by Brinker: Rite Aid did not allow its Cashier/Clerks to sit (and therefore provided no suitable seats for it

2014Our review of Brinker, which is binding on this court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), compels the conclusion the trial court erroneously based its decertification order on its assessment of the merits of Hall’s claim rather than on the theory of liability advanced by Hall.

2014Our review of Brinker, which is binding on this court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]), compels the conclusion the trial court erroneously based its decertification order on its assessment of the merits of Hall’s claim rather than on the theory of liability advanced by Hall.

2014Although Hall argues her suggestion falls within the ambit of Brinker’s approach, Brinker reached the merits only because it recognized there was “ ‘nothing to prevent a court from considering the legal sufficiency of claims when mling on certification where both sides jointly request such action.’ [(Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 443 .)]” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1026 .) We have found no request from Rite Aid that, assuming we vacated the decertification order, we reach the merits of Hall’s claim and resolve the merits of Hall’s theory of recovery in a manner that would become bindi

2014Although Hall argues her suggestion falls within the ambit of Brinker's approach, Brinker reached the merits only because it recognized there was " 'nothing to prevent a court from considering the legal sufficiency of claims when ruling on certification where 24 both sides jointly request such action.' [(Quoting Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 443 .)]" (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1026 .) We have found no request from Rite Aid that, assuming we vacated the decertification order, we reach the merits of Hall's claim and resolve the merits of Hall's theory of recovery in a manner that would

2014Although Hall argues her suggestion falls within the ambit of Brinker’s approach, Brinker reached the merits only because it recognized there was “ ‘nothing to prevent a court from considering the legal sufficiency of claims when mling on certification where both sides jointly request such action.’ [(Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 443 .)]” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1026 .) We have found no request from Rite Aid that, assuming we vacated the decertification order, we reach the merits of Hall’s claim and resolve the merits of Hall’s theory of recovery in a manner that would become bindi

2014Although Hall argues her suggestion falls within the ambit of Brinker's approach, Brinker reached the merits only because it recognized there was " 'nothing to prevent a court from considering the legal sufficiency of claims when ruling on certification where 24 both sides jointly request such action.' [(Quoting Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 443 .)]" (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1026 .) We have found no request from Rite Aid that, assuming we vacated the decertification order, we reach the merits of Hall's claim and resolve the merits of Hall's theory of recovery in a manner that would

1984In People v. Sequeira, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 , the court confused the mandate of Hall by holding “The giving of CALJIC No. 2.91 distinguishes the present case from Guzman , and fulfilled the trial court’s instructional obligations relating to identification testimony and reasonable doubt.” Lybrand and Sequeira were both relied upon in People v. Levingston, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 724, 727 , where the court found the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91 satisfies “. . . the Guzman requirement and made additional instructions superfluous,” noting the Hall rule “is explicitly prospective only,

1984In People v. Sequeira, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 , the court confused the mandate of Hall by holding “The giving of CALJIC No. 2.91 distinguishes the present case from Guzman , and fulfilled the trial court’s instructional obligations relating to identification testimony and reasonable doubt.” Lybrand and Sequeira were both relied upon in People v. Levingston, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 724, 727 , where the court found the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91 satisfies “. . . the Guzman requirement and made additional instructions superfluous,” noting the Hall rule “is explicitly prospective only,

1984In People v. Sequeira, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 , the court confused the mandate of Hall by holding “The giving of CALJIC No. 2.91 distinguishes the present case from Guzman , and fulfilled the trial court’s instructional obligations relating to identification testimony and reasonable doubt.” Lybrand and Sequeira were both relied upon in People v. Levingston, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 724, 727 , where the court found the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91 satisfies “. . . the Guzman requirement and made additional instructions superfluous,” noting the Hall rule “is explicitly prospective only,

1984In People v. Sequeira, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 , the court confused the mandate of Hall by holding “The giving of CALJIC No. 2.91 distinguishes the present case from Guzman , and fulfilled the trial court’s instructional obligations relating to identification testimony and reasonable doubt.” Lybrand and Sequeira were both relied upon in People v. Levingston, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 724, 727 , where the court found the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91 satisfies “. . . the Guzman requirement and made additional instructions superfluous,” noting the Hall rule “is explicitly prospective only,

1984In People v. Sequeira, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 , the court confused the mandate of Hall by holding “The giving of CALJIC No. 2.91 distinguishes the present case from Guzman , and fulfilled the trial court’s instructional obligations relating to identification testimony and reasonable doubt.” Lybrand and Sequeira were both relied upon in People v. Levingston, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 724, 727 , where the court found the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91 satisfies “. . . the Guzman requirement and made additional instructions superfluous,” noting the Hall rule “is explicitly prospective only,

1984In People v. Sequeira, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 , the court confused the mandate of Hall by holding “The giving of CALJIC No. 2.91 distinguishes the present case from Guzman , and fulfilled the trial court’s instructional obligations relating to identification testimony and reasonable doubt.” Lybrand and Sequeira were both relied upon in People v. Levingston, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 724, 727 , where the court found the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91 satisfies “. . . the Guzman requirement and made additional instructions superfluous,” noting the Hall rule “is explicitly prospective only,

1984It was not until People v. West, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 606 that a court found the giving of CALJIC standard instructions to the exclusion of patterned instructions to be error.

1984It was not until People v. West, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 606 that a court found the giving of CALJIC standard instructions to the exclusion of patterned instructions to be error.

2026Considering the seriousness of the current offense and Hall’s extensive prior criminal history, including a 2013 conviction for pimping a minor under the age of 16, the trial court declined Hall’s motion to strike the strike prior under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), and Penal Code1 section 1385.

2025(People v. Mendez, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 34 .) 6 DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. /s/ EARL, P. J.

2025This court recently observed in People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991 , 998, petition for review pending, petition filed May 30, 2025, S291146, that, “[i]f the trial court is not required to act in response to a defendant’s request, then [the] defendant has no right to a decision as to whether the trial court will make its own motion to recall and resentence.” The Court of Appeal in People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985 , 996 similarly concluded section 1172.1, subdivision (c) “undermine[s] any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when they file an unauthorized [sect

2025This court recently observed in People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991 , 998, petition for review pending, petition filed May 30, 2025, S291146, that, “[i]f the trial court is not required to act in response to a defendant’s request, then [the] defendant has no right to a decision as to whether the trial court will make its own motion to recall and resentence.” The Court of Appeal in People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985 , 996 similarly concluded section 1172.1, subdivision (c) “undermine[s] any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when they file an unauthorized [sect

2024The court referred the 2 matter to probation for a presentence investigation report and for an evaluation regarding whether Hall was a suitable candidate for Veterans Treatment Court. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 .

2024The court referred the 2 matter to probation for a presentence investigation report and for an evaluation regarding whether Hall was a suitable candidate for Veterans Treatment Court. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 .

2022“An appeal that is simply without merit is not by definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650 .) DISPOSITION The order modifying temporary spousal support is affirmed.

2022“A reviewing court must accept and is bound by the record before it [citations], cannot properly consider matters not in the record [citations], and will disregard statements of alleged facts in the 12 briefs on appeal which are not contained in the record.” (Weller v. Chavarria (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 234, 246 ; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(C) [appellate brief must support references with specific citations to the record], 8.204(a)(2)(C) [opening brief must “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record].) We also decline to grant Hall’s motion

2022(See Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231 [noting that a defendant may move to reopen voir dire of the jury].) Nor does Hall claim to have submitted any juror affidavits to the trial court to demonstrate the jurors had been exposed to extrajudicial information during the trial’s suspension.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Engstrom (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 174 , 182-184 [noting that a defendant may prove juror misconduct with affidavits describing “ ‘statements, conduct, conditions, or events as are “open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus subject to corroboration” ’ ”].) Instead, Hall’s argument seems to be that the six-month continuance alone gives rise to an unreasonable risk that the jurors could not remain fair and neutral.