holder privilege in New Jersey

2013In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, supra, 241 N.J.

2013In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, supra, 241 N.J.

2010Id. at 429-30, 433 , 640 A2d 817 .

2010Id. at 429-30, 433 , 640 A. 2d 817 .

2002In recognizing that the Cooper/Holder analysis is inapplicable to a true shared custodial relationship, in Baures our Supreme Court expressly stated its agreement with Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J.Super. 103 , 721 A. 2d 317 (Ch.Div. 1998), where the parties' parenting relationship negated the relevance of the "sincere, good faith reasons" of the parent seeking removal and permission to remove turned on the "best interests" of the children. 167 N.J. at 114-15 , 770 A. 2d 214 .

2002In recognizing that the Cooper/Holder analysis is inapplicable to a true shared custodial relationship, in Baures our Supreme Court expressly stated its agreement with Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J.Super. 103 , 721 A. 2d 317 (Ch.Div. 1998), where the parties' parenting relationship negated the relevance of the "sincere, good faith reasons" of the parent seeking removal and permission to remove turned on the "best interests" of the children. 167 N.J. at 114-15 , 770 A. 2d 214 .

2002In recognizing that the Cooper/Holder analysis is inapplicable to a true shared custodial relationship, in Baures our Supreme Court expressly stated its agreement with Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J.Super. 103 , 721 A. 2d 317 (Ch.Div. 1998), where the parties' parenting relationship negated the relevance of the "sincere, good faith reasons" of the parent seeking removal and permission to remove turned on the "best interests" of the children. 167 N.J. at 114-15 , 770 A. 2d 214 .

2002In recognizing that the Cooper/Holder analysis is inapplicable to a true shared custodial relationship, in Baures our Supreme Court expressly stated its agreement with Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J.Super. 103 , 721 A. 2d 317 (Ch.Div. 1998), where the parties' parenting relationship negated the relevance of the "sincere, good faith reasons" of the parent seeking removal and permission to remove turned on the "best interests" of the children. 167 N.J. at 114-15 , 770 A. 2d 214 .

2010In the context of the entire statement, it is clear that Judge Weissbard intended to say "prevent." [3] The tampering charge was based on Jeannette's attempt to retrieve the deleted digital photographs from defendant's Palm Pilot and the removal and possible cleaning of defendant's shorts and towel. [4] These conditions were derived from In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 276-77 , 394 A. 2d 330 , cert. denied sub nom., New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 , 99 S.Ct. 598 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 670 (1978). [5] We refer to "spouses" here because the holder of the privilege is defendant's wife.

2010In the context of the entire statement, it is clear that Judge Weissbard intended to say "prevent." [3] The tampering charge was based on Jeannette's attempt to retrieve the deleted digital photographs from defendant's Palm Pilot and the removal and possible cleaning of defendant's shorts and towel. [4] These conditions were derived from In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 276-77 , 394 A. 2d 330 , cert. denied sub nom., New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 , 99 S.Ct. 598 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 670 (1978). [5] We refer to "spouses" here because the holder of the privilege is defendant's wife.

2010The inclusion of "one partner in a civil union couple" is the result of an amendment passed by the Legislature, effective February 19, 2007, to implement the Court's holding in Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 , 908 A. 2d 196 (2006). [6] This concern is equally applicable to civil unions. [7] As of 2006, nineteen states have abandoned the spousal testimonial privilege, relying solely on the marital communications privilege to protect marital privacy.

2010The inclusion of "one partner in a civil union couple" is the result of an amendment passed by the Legislature, effective February 19, 2007, to implement the Court's holding in Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 , 908 A. 2d 196 (2006). [6] This concern is equally applicable to civil unions. [7] As of 2006, nineteen states have abandoned the spousal testimonial privilege, relying solely on the marital communications privilege to protect marital privacy.

2010In the context of the entire statement, it is clear that Judge Weissbard intended to say "prevent." [3] The tampering charge was based on Jeannette's attempt to retrieve the deleted digital photographs from defendant's Palm Pilot and the removal and possible cleaning of defendant's shorts and towel. [4] These conditions were derived from In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 276-77 , 394 A. 2d 330 , cert. denied sub nom., New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 , 99 S.Ct. 598 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 670 (1978). [5] We refer to "spouses" here because the holder of the privilege is defendant's wife.

2010In the context of the entire statement, it is clear that Judge Weissbard intended to say "prevent." [3] The tampering charge was based on Jeannette's attempt to retrieve the deleted digital photographs from defendant's Palm Pilot and the removal and possible cleaning of defendant's shorts and towel. [4] These conditions were derived from In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 276-77 , 394 A. 2d 330 , cert. denied sub nom., New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 , 99 S.Ct. 598 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 670 (1978). [5] We refer to "spouses" here because the holder of the privilege is defendant's wife.

2010In the context of the entire statement, it is clear that Judge Weissbard intended to say "prevent." [3] The tampering charge was based on Jeannette's attempt to retrieve the deleted digital photographs from defendant's Palm Pilot and the removal and possible cleaning of defendant's shorts and towel. [4] These conditions were derived from In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 276-77 , 394 A. 2d 330 , cert. denied sub nom., New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 , 99 S.Ct. 598 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 670 (1978). [5] We refer to "spouses" here because the holder of the privilege is defendant's wife.

2006Waiver of the privilege also occurs if the holder of the privilege discloses "a confidential communication for a purpose outside the scope of the privilege," Sicpa North Am., Inc. v. Donaldson Enters., 179 N.J.Super. 56, 62 , 430 A. 2d 262 (Law Div. 1981); and, once the holder discloses privileged communications, he has waived the privilege with respect to related privileged information pertaining to the same subject *88 matter.

2006Waiver of the privilege also occurs if the holder of the privilege discloses "a confidential communication for a purpose outside the scope of the privilege," Sicpa North Am., Inc. v. Donaldson Enters., 179 N.J.Super. 56, 62 , 430 A. 2d 262 (Law Div. 1981); and, once the holder discloses privileged communications, he has waived the privilege with respect to related privileged information pertaining to the same subject *88 matter.

2006Weingarten v. Weingarten, 234 N.J.Super. 318, 326 , 560 A. 2d 1243 (App. Div.1989); Sicpa, supra, 179 N.J.Super. at 62 , 430 A. 2d 262 ; N.J.R.E. 530.

2006Weingarten v. Weingarten, 234 N.J.Super. 318, 326 , 560 A. 2d 1243 (App. Div.1989); Sicpa, supra, 179 N.J.Super. at 62 , 430 A. 2d 262 ; N.J.R.E. 530.

2001See N.J.R.E. 533(1) ("A party may predicate error on a ruling disallowing a claim of privilege only if he is the holder of the privilege."); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 345-46 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988) (noting that even if his wife's Uniform Defendant Intake Report were privileged, defendant would not be entitled to a new trial based upon the erroneous use of her statement contained therein). [2] Evid.

2001See N.J.R.E. 533(1) ("A party may predicate error on a ruling disallowing a claim of privilege only if he is the holder of the privilege."); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 345-46 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988) (noting that even if his wife's Uniform Defendant Intake Report were privileged, defendant would not be entitled to a new trial based upon the erroneous use of her statement contained therein). [2] Evid.

2001R. 23(2)(a), the precursor to N.J.R.E. 501(2)(a), provided that "[t]he spouse of the accused in a criminal action shall not testify in such action except to prove the fact of marriage unless (a) such spouse and the accused shall both consent." [3] Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1968) (requiring separate trials where defendant's confession cannot be effectively redacted to avoid inculpating a co-defendant). [4] N.J.R.E. 509 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall disclose any communication made in confidence between such person and his or he

2001R. 23(2)(a), the precursor to N.J.R.E. 501(2)(a), provided that "[t]he spouse of the accused in a criminal action shall not testify in such action except to prove the fact of marriage unless (a) such spouse and the accused shall both consent." [3] Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1968) (requiring separate trials where defendant's confession cannot be effectively redacted to avoid inculpating a co-defendant). [4] N.J.R.E. 509 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall disclose any communication made in confidence between such person and his or he

2001In Cerminara , the court set forth the scheme this way: Under the Holder test, ‘a custodial parent may move with the children of the marriage to another state as long as the move does not interfere with the best interests of the children or the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent.’ Id. at 349 , 544 A.2d 852 .

2001In Cerminara , the court set forth the scheme this way: Under the Holder test, ‘a custodial parent may move with the children of the marriage to another state as long as the move does not interfere with the best interests of the children or the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent.’ Id. at 349 , 544 A.2d 852 .

2001The privilege is not self-executing, and may be waived by a testifying spouse's voluntary disclosure of a privileged matter, N.J.R.E. 530; State v. Walker, 80 N.J. 187, 192 , 403 A. 2d 1 (1979), or by "the absence of timely assertion by counsel, whether or not the accused has approved the nonassertion or is even aware of the issue," Ospina, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 654 , 571 A. 2d 1373 .

2001The privilege is not self-executing, and may be waived by a testifying spouse's voluntary disclosure of a privileged matter, N.J.R.E. 530; State v. Walker, 80 N.J. 187, 192 , 403 A. 2d 1 (1979), or by "the absence of timely assertion by counsel, whether or not the accused has approved the nonassertion or is even aware of the issue," Ospina, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 654 , 571 A. 2d 1373 .

2001The privilege is not self-executing, and may be waived by a testifying spouse's voluntary disclosure of a privileged matter, N.J.R.E. 530; State v. Walker, 80 N.J. 187, 192 , 403 A. 2d 1 (1979), or by "the absence of timely assertion by counsel, whether or not the accused has approved the nonassertion or is even aware of the issue," Ospina, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 654 , 571 A. 2d 1373 .

2001The privilege is not self-executing, and may be waived by a testifying spouse's voluntary disclosure of a privileged matter, N.J.R.E. 530; State v. Walker, 80 N.J. 187, 192 , 403 A. 2d 1 (1979), or by "the absence of timely assertion by counsel, whether or not the accused has approved the nonassertion or is even aware of the issue," Ospina, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 654 , 571 A. 2d 1373 .

1998The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court "failed to address an issue which is crucial to the disposition of this case: whether defendant could relocate as a method of ensuring the vitality of the shared-custody arrangement." Id. at 307 , 635 A. 2d 539 .

1998The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court "failed to address an issue which is crucial to the disposition of this case: whether defendant could relocate as a method of ensuring the vitality of the shared-custody arrangement." Id. at 307 , 635 A. 2d 539 .

1998Id. at 42 , 563 A. 2d 1158 .

1998Id. at 42 , 563 A. 2d 1158 .

1997Cf Horswell v. Horswell, 297 N.J.Super. 94, 104 , 687 A. 2d 797 (App.Div.1997) (holding that the passage of time was a relevant factor when determining custody issues).

1997Cf Horswell v. Horswell, 297 N.J.Super. 94, 104 , 687 A. 2d 797 (App.Div.1997) (holding that the passage of time was a relevant factor when determining custody issues).

1995In H & H Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue of Pa., supra, the Third Circuit concluded that, although the issuance of a sales tax deficiency assessment was a step toward the creation of a lien, it was excepted from the automatic stay under Code § 362(b)(9) as a notice of tax deficiency.

1994Although we recognize “the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return,” Trammel, supra, 445 U.S. at 51 , 100 S.Ct. at 913 , 63 L.Ed.2d at 195 , we are not persuaded that the comfort of the penitent was the compelling motive for Evidence Rule 29.

1994Although we recognize “the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return,” Trammel, supra, 445 U.S. at 51 , 100 S.Ct. at 913 , 63 L.Ed.2d at 195 , we are not persuaded that the comfort of the penitent was the compelling motive for Evidence Rule 29.

1993Super. at 386 , 279 A. 2d 889 (narrowly construing "a clergyman, minister or other person a practitioner authorized to perform similar functions" not to encompass a teaching nun to whom one of her students had confessed a crime and in dicta recognizing that the holder of the privilege was the clergyperson and thus that it could be waived by that person).

1989Rainer's Dairies, supra, 19 N.J. at 558, 117 A. 2d 889 .

1988See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973) (unconstitutional discrimination to require servicewomen to demonstrate that their husbands are dependent on them for support without requiring servicemen to make same showing regarding their wives); D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, supra, 144 N.J.Super. at 208 & n. 1 (declining to reach constitutional questions implicit in statute, “namely whether restraining the mother from leaving the state with the children who are in her custody offends either the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment or the fundamen