holder privilege in Texas

2021Co., 905 S.W.2d at 686 (affirming trial court’s ruling that the movant's interest in confidential documents, admitted into evidence and presented to the jury, did not outweigh presumption of openness).

2009Co. , 905 S.W.2d at 686 (affirming trial court's ruling that the movant's interest in confidential documents, admitted into evidence and presented to the jury, did not outweigh presumption of openness).

2009See In re Ford Motor Co. , 211 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tex. 2006) (stating that "[u]nder Texas law, discovery privileges are waived by voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege"); see also Tex. R.

2009See In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tex.2006) (stating that “[u]nder Texas law, discovery privileges are waived by voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege”); see also Tex.R.

2003See id. (holding that a privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is privileged); Jordan v. Court of Appeals for Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist. , 701 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (holding that once privileged matters are voluntarily disclosed, the privilege is waived).

2003See id. (holding that a privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is privileged); Jordan v. Court of Appeals for Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist. , 701 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (holding that once privileged matters are voluntarily disclosed, the privilege is waived).

2003Rose, 907 S.W.2d at 642 (discussing De Mankowski v. Ship Channel Dev.

2003Rose , 907 S.W.2d at 642 (discussing De Mankowski v. Ship Channel Dev.

2003See id. (holding that a privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is privileged); Jordan v. Court of Appeals for Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist. , 701 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (holding that once privileged matters are voluntarily disclosed, the privilege is waived).

2003See id. (holding that a privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is privileged); Jordan v. Court of Appeals for Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist. , 701 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (holding that once privileged matters are voluntarily disclosed, the privilege is waived).

2025It is not asserted casually or preserved vaguely. -8- See Salazar v. Coastal Corp., 928 S.W.2d 162, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (a party must “specifically plead the particular privilege claimed”); Texaco, Inc. v. Dominguez, 812 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ) (same).

2025It is not asserted casually or preserved vaguely. -8- See Salazar v. Coastal Corp., 928 S.W.2d 162, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (a party must “specifically plead the particular privilege claimed”); Texaco, Inc. v. Dominguez, 812 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ) (same).

2022Ctr. – El Paso v. Niehay, 641 S.W.3d 761 , 789 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. filed) (per curiam) (“The attorney–client privilege is waived when the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses the privileged material to a third party.”); see also Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 241 F.R.D. 296, 301 (N.D.

2022See Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 770 ; see also U.S. v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing “the bedrock principle that the attorney–client privilege is the client’s and his alone” and “[i]f the client wishes to waive it, the attorney may not assert it, either for the client’s or for his own benefit”).

2022See Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 770 ; see also U.S. v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing “the bedrock principle that the attorney–client privilege is the client’s and his alone” and “[i]f the client wishes to waive it, the attorney may not assert it, either for the client’s or for his own benefit”).

2021See Alaniz, 105 S.W.3d at 341 (“[T]he absolute privilege is lost if the holder of the privilege repeats the statements outside the protected context within which the statements originally were made.”); Skeen, 130 S.W.3d at 926 (“Although libelous statements made in connection with a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged . . . re-publication of such statements outside of the judicial context waives the privilege.”); Levingston Shipbuilding, 688 S.W.2d at 196–97 (same). 7 6 See also In re JDN Real Estate-McKinney L.P., 211 S.W.3d 907, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, orig. proceeding) (“The c

2021See Alaniz, 105 S.W.3d at 341 (“[T]he absolute privilege is lost if the holder of the privilege repeats the statements outside the protected context within which the statements originally were made.”); Skeen, 130 S.W.3d at 926 (“Although libelous statements made in connection with a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged . . . re-publication of such statements outside of the judicial context waives the privilege.”); Levingston Shipbuilding, 688 S.W.2d at 196–97 (same). 7 6 See also In re JDN Real Estate-McKinney L.P., 211 S.W.3d 907, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, orig. proceeding) (“The c

2021Co., 300 S.W. 118, 122 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ) (same); cf. Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 341, 343 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (relying on De Mankowski, noting “the [judicial-proceedings] privilege is lost if the holder of the privilege repeats the statements outside the protected context within which the statements originally were made”), abrogated on other grounds by Fort Brown Villas III Condo.

2021See Alaniz, 105 S.W.3d at 341 (“[T]he absolute privilege is lost if the holder of the privilege repeats the statements outside the protected context within which the statements originally were made.”); Skeen, 130 S.W.3d at 926 (“Although libelous statements made in connection with a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged . . . re-publication of such statements outside of the judicial context waives the privilege.”); Levingston Shipbuilding, 688 S.W.2d at 196–97 (same). 7 6 See also In re JDN Real Estate-McKinney L.P., 211 S.W.3d 907, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, orig. proceeding) (“The c

2021Co., 300 S.W. 118, 122 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1927, no writ) (same); cf. Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 341, 343 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (relying on De Mankowski, noting “the [judicial-proceedings] privilege is lost if the holder of the privilege repeats the statements outside the protected context within which the statements originally were made”), abrogated on other grounds by Fort Brown Villas III Condo.

2020See Bailey v. State, 507 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Tex. Crim.

2014Alford v. Bryant, 137 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (“[A] statutory privilege may be waived by the holder of a privilege.”).

2012“Thus, it would clearly appear that Congress contemplated the term [surrender] to mean the return and relinquishing of possession or control to the holder of a claim.” In re Robertson, 72 B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr.D.Colo.1985).

2012“Thus, it would clearly appear that Congress contemplated the term [surrender] to mean the return and relinquishing of possession or control to the holder of a claim.” In re Robertson, 72 B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr.D.Colo.1985).

2012“The term ‘surrender’ was contemplated by Congress to be a return of the property and a relinquishing of possession or control to the holder of the claim.” In re Stone, 166 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1993); see In re Theobald, 218 B.R. 133, 135 (10th Cir. BAP 1998) (“surrender” under 11 U.S.C. 521 “does not require a debtor to transfer title by executing and delivering a deed in order to effectuate surrender”).

2012In re Toth, 61 B.R. 160, 169 (N.D.Ill.1986) (emphasis in original); see also 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(A), (B), & (C); In re Rimmer, 143 B.R. 871, 876 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1992) (debtor is permitted by section 1325(a)(5)(C) to satisfy a secured claim by surrender of the collateral).

2012“The term ‘surrender’ was contemplated by Congress to be a return of the property and a relinquishing of possession or control to the holder of the claim.” In re Stone, 166 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1993); see In re Theobald, 218 B.R. 133, 135 (10th Cir. BAP 1998) (“surrender” under 11 U.S.C. 521 “does not require a debtor to transfer title by executing and delivering a deed in order to effectuate surrender”).

2012“A debtor can not surrender collateral in a confirmed plan absent consent of the secured creditor or approval of the comi.” In re Stone, 166 B.R. at 623 (emphasis added).

2012In re Toth, 61 B.R. 160, 169 (N.D.Ill.1986) (emphasis in original); see also 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(A), (B), & (C); In re Rimmer, 143 B.R. 871, 876 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1992) (debtor is permitted by section 1325(a)(5)(C) to satisfy a secured claim by surrender of the collateral).

2010Int’l Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina Co., 744 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1988); see PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs.

2010Int'l Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina Co., 744 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1988); see PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs.

2010Litig.), 382 F.Supp.2d 549, 559 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that “there must be a sufficiently direct communication from the defendant to the plaintiff to support a claim that the fraud induced inaction”); Gutman, 748 F.Supp. at 266 (holding that a holder claim may proceed where “plaintiffs allege that misrepresentations were directed at them to their injury”).

2010Litig.), 382 F.Supp.2d 549 , 559-60 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (predicting that New York would recognize a holder claim where plaintiff pleads specific direct communication with defendant to show actual reliance); Goldin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 994 So.2d 517, 520 (Fla. *929 Ct.App.2008) (noting the “great weight of authority concluding that with holder claims, the direct communication requirement is a logically necessary sub-element of justifiable reliance under New York law”); Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. 636 , 691 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (requiring direct communication and observing that “ '[t]he Su

2010Litig.), 382 F.Supp.2d 549, 559 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that “there must be a sufficiently direct communication from the defendant to the plaintiff to support a claim that the fraud induced inaction”); Gutman, 748 F.Supp. at 266 (holding that a holder claim may proceed where “plaintiffs allege that misrepresentations were directed at them to their injury”).

2010Litig.), 382 F.Supp.2d 549 , 559-60 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (predicting that New York would recognize a holder claim where plaintiff pleads specific direct communication with defendant to show actual reliance); Goldin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 994 So.2d 517, 520 (Fla. *929 Ct.App.2008) (noting the “great weight of authority concluding that with holder claims, the direct communication requirement is a logically necessary sub-element of justifiable reliance under New York law”); Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. 636 , 691 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (requiring direct communication and observing that “ '[t]he Su

2010Litig.), 382 F.Supp.2d 549 , 559-60 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (predicting that New York would recognize a holder claim where plaintiff pleads specific direct communication with defendant to show actual reliance); Goldin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 994 So.2d 517, 520 (Fla. *929 Ct.App.2008) (noting the “great weight of authority concluding that with holder claims, the direct communication requirement is a logically necessary sub-element of justifiable reliance under New York law”); Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. 636 , 691 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (requiring direct communication and observing that “ '[t]he Su

2010Litig.), 382 F.Supp.2d 549 , 559-60 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (predicting that New York would recognize a holder claim where plaintiff pleads specific direct communication with defendant to show actual reliance); Goldin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 994 So.2d 517, 520 (Fla. *929 Ct.App.2008) (noting the “great weight of authority concluding that with holder claims, the direct communication requirement is a logically necessary sub-element of justifiable reliance under New York law”); Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. 636 , 691 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (requiring direct communication and observing that “ '[t]he Su

2010Litig.), 382 F.Supp.2d 549 , 559-60 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (predicting that New York would recognize a holder claim where plaintiff pleads specific direct communication with defendant to show actual reliance); Goldin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 994 So.2d 517, 520 (Fla. *929 Ct.App.2008) (noting the “great weight of authority concluding that with holder claims, the direct communication requirement is a logically necessary sub-element of justifiable reliance under New York law”); Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. 636 , 691 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (requiring direct communication and observing that “ '[t]he Su