17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1924–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Fishergreen2 sentences2014Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478 , 738 A.2d 406 (1999); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001); see also United States v. Fisher, 692 F.Supp. 488 (E.D.Pa.1988) (any voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege that is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship thereby waives the privilege). 1999See United States v. Fisher, 692 F.Supp. 488, 494 (E.D.Pa.1988) (any voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege that is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship thereby waives the privilege). | 3 | 3 |
Maleski v. Corporate Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2018Co. , 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 72 , 646 A.2d 1 , 4 (1994) ("The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to benefit the client, and accordingly, the client is the holder of the privilege."). 2018Co. , 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 72 , 646 A.2d 1 , 4 (1994) ("The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to benefit the client, and accordingly, the client is the holder of the privilege."). | 2 | 3 |
Joe v. Prison Health Services, Inc.green2 sentences2025Judge Mary Hannah Leavitt dissented on grounds not relevant to the instant appeal.12 Issue Did Commonwealth Court err by holding that Toland was the holder of the privilege created by the Board’s regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 61.2 and was therefore entitled to waive the privilege as its beneficiary? 11 “Pennsylvania law does not favor evidentiary privileges.” Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa. Commw. 2001) (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1997)). 2014Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478 , 738 A.2d 406 (1999); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001); see also United States v. Fisher, 692 F.Supp. 488 (E.D.Pa.1988) (any voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege that is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship thereby waives the privilege). | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. McKennagreen2 sentences2019Additionally, "the right to assert the privilege is that of the client." Commonwealth v. McKenna , 206 Pa.Super. 317 , 213 A.2d 223 , 226 (1965) (citing Appeal of McNulty , 135 Pa. 210 , 19 A. 936 (1890) ). 2019Additionally, "the right to assert the privilege is that of the client." Commonwealth v. McKenna , 206 Pa.Super. 317 , 213 A.2d 223 , 226 (1965) (citing Appeal of McNulty , 135 Pa. 210 , 19 A. 936 (1890) ). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Kauffmangreen2 sentences2018Furthermore, "[t]he failure to assert a privilege constitutes a waiver thereof." Commonwealth v. Kauffman , 413 Pa.Super. 527 , 605 A.2d 1243 , 1248 (1992). 2018Furthermore, "[t]he failure to assert a privilege constitutes a waiver thereof." Commonwealth v. Kauffman , 413 Pa.Super. 527 , 605 A.2d 1243 , 1248 (1992). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Nixongreen1 sentence2025See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (“Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances.”) (footnote omitted); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”). 12 Judge Leavitt would have denied Toland’s motion to dismiss the Parole Board’s objections on relevancy, overbreadth, and mootness grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Herbert v. Landogreen1 sentence2025See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (“Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances.”) (footnote omitted); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”). 12 Judge Leavitt would have denied Toland’s motion to dismiss the Parole Board’s objections on relevancy, overbreadth, and mootness grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sanduskygreen1 sentence2014Similarly, our Supreme Court holds that “the work-product doctrine is not absolute but, rather, is a qualified privilege that may be waived.” Kennedy, 876 A.2d at 945 ; see Sandusky, 70 A.3d at 900 n. 15. | 1 | 1 |
Wardleigh v. 2ND JUD. DIST. CT. OF STATEgreen1 sentence1996Del. 1992), and cases cited therein (this waiver doctrine should be limited to cases in which the privileged holder injects the privileged material itself into the case); Wardleigh v. Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, 891 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Nev. 1995) (at issue waiver occurs only where the holder of the privilege pleads a claim or a defense in such a way that eventually he or she will be forced to draw upon the privileged communication at trial in order to prevail). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Custom Designs & Manufacturing Co. v. Sherwin-Williams Co.
green
2 sentences2019Custom Designs, 39 A.3d at 376–77. [E]stablished Pennsylvania law also makes clear that it is the client who owns this privilege: “The purpose of the attorney- client privilege is to benefit the client, and accordingly, the client is the holder of the privilege.” Maleski[, 646 A.2d at 4]. 2019Custom Designs , 39 A.3d at 376-77 . [E]stablished Pennsylvania law also makes clear that it is the client who owns this privilege: "The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to benefit the client, and accordingly, the client is the holder of the privilege." Maleski [, 646 A.2d at 4 ]. | 3 | 2015–2019 |
Estate of Dowie
green
2 sentences2019Additionally, "the right to assert the privilege is that of the client." Commonwealth v. McKenna , 206 Pa.Super. 317 , 213 A.2d 223 , 226 (1965) (citing Appeal of McNulty , 135 Pa. 210 , 19 A. 936 (1890) ). 2019Additionally, "the right to assert the privilege is that of the client." Commonwealth v. McKenna , 206 Pa.Super. 317 , 213 A.2d 223 , 226 (1965) (citing Appeal of McNulty , 135 Pa. 210 , 19 A. 936 (1890) ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Stewart
green
1 sentence2025Judge Mary Hannah Leavitt dissented on grounds not relevant to the instant appeal.12 Issue Did Commonwealth Court err by holding that Toland was the holder of the privilege created by the Board’s regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 61.2 and was therefore entitled to waive the privilege as its beneficiary? 11 “Pennsylvania law does not favor evidentiary privileges.” Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa. Commw. 2001) (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1997)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Wong
green
1 sentence2016Wong, supra at 521 , 40 P.3d 914 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Chmiel
green
2 sentences2014Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478 , 738 A.2d 406 (1999); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001); see also United States v. Fisher, 692 F.Supp. 488 (E.D.Pa.1988) (any voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege that is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship thereby waives the privilege). 2014Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478 , 738 A.2d 406 (1999); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001); see also United States v. Fisher, 692 F.Supp. 488 (E.D.Pa.1988) (any voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege that is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship thereby waives the privilege). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Kennedy
green
1 sentence2014Similarly, our Supreme Court holds that “the work-product doctrine is not absolute but, rather, is a qualified privilege that may be waived.” Kennedy, 876 A.2d at 945 ; see Sandusky, 70 A.3d at 900 n. 15. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In re Estate of Wood
green
1 sentence2013In light of our discussion infra, we need not address this issue further; however, we note that, in In re Estate of Wood, 818 A.2d 568 (Pa.Super.2003), where an attorney who had represented the deceased was ordered to disclose certain reports in estate litigation among the deceased's surviving daughters, we implicitly recognized an attorney is also a holder of the privilege under the work-product doctrine. . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Steen v. First Nat. Bank
green
1 sentence1994Steen v. First National Bank, 298 F. 36 (8th Cir.1924). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Boyd v. Kilmer
green
2 sentences1993Id. at 539-40 , 132 A. at 711-12 . 1993Id. at 539-40 , 132 A. at 711-12 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Erb v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence1924Ordinarily, a servitude created by deed can be removed only by a grant of like dignity, but where the abandonment of an easement can be established, the holder of the privilege, or those claiming through him, cannot thereafter complain: Erb v. Brown, 69 Pa. 216 . | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.