holder privilege in Louisiana

2000The abuses so delineated, however, are not exclusive; and the holder of a privilege, whether arising from the attorney-client or other protected relationships, may waive it by engaging in affirmative acts that "creates some further detriment to the truth-seeking process in addition to that already taken into account in the creation of the privilege itself." Succession of Smith, 513 So.2d at 1143 , citing Richard L.

1996Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So.2d 1138 (La.1987) (the client is the holder of the privilege, and only he or his attorney or agent acting with his authority, can waive it).

2014However, the trial court “did recognize the conundrum with which [the priest] is presented, and I know his solution to that is going to be that he is not going to say anything about any confession.” On supervisory writ, the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion and granted its own peremptory exception of no cause |4of action. [Parents of Minor Child] v. Charlet, 13-0316 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/21/13) , 135 So.3d 724 , 2013 WL 5712245 .

2014However, the trial court “did recognize the conundrum with which [the priest] is presented, and I know his solution to that is going to be that he is not going to say anything about any confession.” On supervisory writ, the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion and granted its own peremptory exception of no cause |4of action. [Parents of Minor Child] v. Charlet, 13-0316 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/21/13) , 135 So.3d 724 , 2013 WL 5712245 .

1995In rejecting the analogy, the Illinois court noted that right against self-incrimination is a constitutional guarantee whereas the privilege between doctor and patient, like the privilege between attorney and client, may be effectively waived by the holder of the privilege and once disclosure occurs, to assert the privilege would be "`to seek to preserve a privacy which exists in legal fiction only.'" Id. (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2389(4), at 860-61 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).

1979Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Company, 153 So. 17 (La.1934); Weber v. Press of N. H.

1963See LSA-R.S. 7:56; Collins v. Magee, 15 La.App. 66 , 130 So. 267, 269 .

1963See LSA-R.S. 7:56; Collins v. Magee, 15 La.App. 66 , 130 So. 267, 269 .

1929Clark v. Whitaker, 117 La. 298 , 41 So. 580 .

1929Clark v. Whitaker, 117 La. 298 , 41 So. 580 .

1928Lapeyre & McCaleb, 48 La.

1926Bertie Sugar Company, 145 La. 700 , 82 South. 857 , wherein the trial judge, in that case, the judges of this court and the writer of this opinion then sitting in the Supreme Court, were of a different opinion, clearly establishes the doctrine that the holder of a privilege on a thing, a movable, which has become part of the realty, an immovable, loses his privilege who permits the whole immovable to be sold in a foreclosure sale, without provoking a separate appraisement of the thing on which he claims a privilege.

1926Bertie Sugar Company, 145 La. 700 , 82 South. 857 , wherein the trial judge, in that case, the judges of this court and the writer of this opinion then sitting in the Supreme Court, were of a different opinion, clearly establishes the doctrine that the holder of a privilege on a thing, a movable, which has become part of the realty, an immovable, loses his privilege who permits the whole immovable to be sold in a foreclosure sale, without provoking a separate appraisement of the thing on which he claims a privilege.

1892Creditors, 2 Rob. 241 ; Ventress vs.

1845Under a similar provision in the charter of the Canal and Banking Company, we held, in the case of Bartlett v. The Canal Bank ( 1 Rob. 543 ), that the holder of a claim could recover the interest only from the time of a demand, or putting in default,-and not from the period at which a general suspension of specie payments took place, without such demand.