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29 California opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Linesgreen2 sentences1957In the present case the jury was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part of defendant merely because an accident had happened." (See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d 284, 287-288 [ 259 P.2d 743 ]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [ 240 P.2d 672 ]; Seedborg v. Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456 [ 233 P.2d 943 ].) It thus appears th 1957In the present case the jury was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part of defendant merely because an accident had happened." (See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d 284, 287-288 [ 259 P.2d 743 ]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [ 240 P.2d 672 ]; Seedborg v. Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456 [ 233 P.2d 943 ].) It thus appears th | 2 | 2 |
Lemons v. Regents of University of Californiagreen2 sentences1982“Prejudice appears ‘[w]here it seems probable that the jury’s verdict may have been based on the erroneous instruction. . . . ’” (LeMons v. Regents of University of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 869, 875 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 582 P.2d 946 ].) Here, the general verdict form submitted to the jury prevents us from knowing which theory the jury relied upon in reaching its verdict on the “business claim.” But, the strength of respondents’ evidence of price fixing, when compared with that of the other restraint of trade allegations, leads us to conclude that the instructions here at issue did not mate 1982“Prejudice appears ‘[w]here it seems probable that the jury’s verdict may have been based on the erroneous instruction. . . . ’” (LeMons v. Regents of University of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 869, 875 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 582 P.2d 946 ].) Here, the general verdict form submitted to the jury prevents us from knowing which theory the jury relied upon in reaching its verdict on the “business claim.” But, the strength of respondents’ evidence of price fixing, when compared with that of the other restraint of trade allegations, leads us to conclude that the instructions here at issue did not mate | 1 | 1 |
People v. De Leongreen2 sentences1968It is my opinion that the question was properly determined adversely to the appellant’s contention herein in People v. De Leon, 236 Cal.App.2d 530, 533-534 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 241 ]. 1968It is my opinion that the question was properly determined adversely to the appellant’s contention herein in People v. De Leon, 236 Cal.App.2d 530, 533-534 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 241 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Fransongreen2 sentences1961Upon the respective parties, therefore, rests the burden of proof of such allegations.” (Emphasis added.) In Davis v. Franson (1956), 141 Cal.App.2d 263, 273 [ 296 P.2d 600 ], the criticized instruction read that the burden of proving any “affirmative defenses” was on the defendant. 1961Upon the respective parties, therefore, rests the burden of proof of such allegations.” (Emphasis added.) In Davis v. Franson (1956), 141 Cal.App.2d 263, 273 [ 296 P.2d 600 ], the criticized instruction read that the burden of proving any “affirmative defenses” was on the defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Comstock v. Morsegreen2 sentences1961The court upheld the instruction after stating that the jury are presumed “ ‘. . . to possess ordinary intelligence and to understand the meaning and use of words in their common and ordinary application. ’ ’ ’ that ‘ ‘ The words 1 affirmative defense’ have a well-known meaning in accordance with the common usage of the English language. ’ ’ The same reasoning may be applied to the words “allegations in the answers.” A similar instruction to the one complained of here was upheld in Comstock v. Morse (1930), 107 Cal.App. 71, 75 [ 290 P. 108 ]. 1961The court upheld the instruction after stating that the jury are presumed “ ‘. . . to possess ordinary intelligence and to understand the meaning and use of words in their common and ordinary application. ’ ’ ’ that ‘ ‘ The words 1 affirmative defense’ have a well-known meaning in accordance with the common usage of the English language. ’ ’ The same reasoning may be applied to the words “allegations in the answers.” A similar instruction to the one complained of here was upheld in Comstock v. Morse (1930), 107 Cal.App. 71, 75 [ 290 P. 108 ]. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stanhopegreen2 sentences1957The first paragraph begins: “If you find from the evidence”; the second paragraph begins: “If you should find.” (Cf. People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649, 658-659 [ 55 P.2d 1161 ] ; People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d 631, 636 [ 99 P.2d 1075 ] ; People v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503, 521 [ 159 P.2d 445 ].) A party is entitled to have proper instructions given to the jury on his theory of the ease if it is reasonable and there is evidence to support it. 1957The first paragraph begins: “If you find from the evidence”; the second paragraph begins: “If you should find.” (Cf. People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649, 658-659 [ 55 P.2d 1161 ] ; People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d 631, 636 [ 99 P.2d 1075 ] ; People v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503, 521 [ 159 P.2d 445 ].) A party is entitled to have proper instructions given to the jury on his theory of the ease if it is reasonable and there is evidence to support it. | 1 | 1 |
Seedborg v. Lakewood Gardens Civic Ass'ngreen2 sentences1957In the present case the jury was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part of defendant merely because an accident had happened." (See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d 284, 287-288 [ 259 P.2d 743 ]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [ 240 P.2d 672 ]; Seedborg v. Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456 [ 233 P.2d 943 ].) It thus appears th 1957In the present case the jury was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part of defendant merely because an accident had happened." (See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d 284, 287-288 [ 259 P.2d 743 ]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [ 240 P.2d 672 ]; Seedborg v. Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456 [ 233 P.2d 943 ].) It thus appears th | 1 | 1 |
Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc.green2 sentences1957In the present case the jury was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part of defendant merely because an accident had happened." (See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d 284, 287-288 [ 259 P.2d 743 ]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [ 240 P.2d 672 ]; Seedborg v. Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456 [ 233 P.2d 943 ].) It thus appears th 1957In the present case the jury was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part of defendant merely because an accident had happened." (See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d 284, 287-288 [ 259 P.2d 743 ]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [ 240 P.2d 672 ]; Seedborg v. Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456 [ 233 P.2d 943 ].) It thus appears th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knockegreen2 sentences1957The court’s remarks, however, were not inappropriate (see People v. Knocke, 94 Cal.App. 55, 60 [ 270 P. 468 ]), and we do not believe that they brought defense counsel into disfavor with the jury or worked to the prejudice of defendant. 1957The court’s remarks, however, were not inappropriate (see People v. Knocke, 94 Cal.App. 55, 60 [ 270 P. 468 ]), and we do not believe that they brought defense counsel into disfavor with the jury or worked to the prejudice of defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Driver v. Normangreen2 sentences1957In Driver v. Norman, 106 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [ 236 P.2d 6 ], Parker v. Womack, supra, is cited as authority for the rule that ‘the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident is proper unless the defendant is negligent as a matter of law.’ ” (Citing cases.) It appears from the record herein that all the elements of defendants’ liability under the evidence presented are covered by the instructions, and since we have concluded that the defendants were not negligent as a matter of law, we find no error in the giving of the criticized instruction. 1957In Driver v. Norman, 106 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [ 236 P.2d 6 ], Parker v. Womack, supra, is cited as authority for the rule that ‘the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident is proper unless the defendant is negligent as a matter of law.’ ” (Citing cases.) It appears from the record herein that all the elements of defendants’ liability under the evidence presented are covered by the instructions, and since we have concluded that the defendants were not negligent as a matter of law, we find no error in the giving of the criticized instruction. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coltringreen2 sentences1957The first paragraph begins: “If you find from the evidence”; the second paragraph begins: “If you should find.” (Cf. People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649, 658-659 [ 55 P.2d 1161 ] ; People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d 631, 636 [ 99 P.2d 1075 ] ; People v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503, 521 [ 159 P.2d 445 ].) A party is entitled to have proper instructions given to the jury on his theory of the ease if it is reasonable and there is evidence to support it. 1957The first paragraph begins: “If you find from the evidence”; the second paragraph begins: “If you should find.” (Cf. People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649, 658-659 [ 55 P.2d 1161 ] ; People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d 631, 636 [ 99 P.2d 1075 ] ; People v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503, 521 [ 159 P.2d 445 ].) A party is entitled to have proper instructions given to the jury on his theory of the ease if it is reasonable and there is evidence to support it. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chaitgreen2 sentences1957The first paragraph begins: “If you find from the evidence”; the second paragraph begins: “If you should find.” (Cf. People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649, 658-659 [ 55 P.2d 1161 ] ; People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d 631, 636 [ 99 P.2d 1075 ] ; People v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503, 521 [ 159 P.2d 445 ].) A party is entitled to have proper instructions given to the jury on his theory of the ease if it is reasonable and there is evidence to support it. 1957The first paragraph begins: “If you find from the evidence”; the second paragraph begins: “If you should find.” (Cf. People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649, 658-659 [ 55 P.2d 1161 ] ; People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d 631, 636 [ 99 P.2d 1075 ] ; People v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503, 521 [ 159 P.2d 445 ].) A party is entitled to have proper instructions given to the jury on his theory of the ease if it is reasonable and there is evidence to support it. | 1 | 1 |
O'Meara v. Swortfiguergreen2 sentences1954We cannot assume that the verdict was based upon evidence of contributory negligence, but in determining whether instructions given are correct, ‘we must assume that the jury might have believed the evidence upon which the instruction favorable to the losing party was predicated, and that if the correct instruction had been given upon that subject the jury might have rendered a verdict in favor of the losing party.’ (Cole v. Ridings, supra, p. 142 , quoting O’Meara v. Swortfiguer, 191 Cal. 12, 15 [ 214 P. 975 ].)” Defendants argue that the criticized instruction merely advised the jury that th 1954We cannot assume that the verdict was based upon evidence of contributory negligence, but in determining whether instructions given are correct, ‘we must assume that the jury might have believed the evidence upon which the instruction favorable to the losing party was predicated, and that if the correct instruction had been given upon that subject the jury might have rendered a verdict in favor of the losing party.’ (Cole v. Ridings, supra, p. 142 , quoting O’Meara v. Swortfiguer, 191 Cal. 12, 15 [ 214 P. 975 ].)” Defendants argue that the criticized instruction merely advised the jury that th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chavezgreen2 sentences1949The authorities cited by appellant as condemnatory of the criticized instruction (People v. Brow, 90 Hun 509 [ 35 N.Y.S. 1009 ]; State v. Chavez, 19 N.M. 325, 329-330 [ 142 P. 922 , Ann.Cas. 1917B 127]; Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. 1949The authorities cited by appellant as condemnatory of the criticized instruction (People v. Brow, 90 Hun 509 [ 35 N.Y.S. 1009 ]; State v. Chavez, 19 N.M. 325, 329-330 [ 142 P. 922 , Ann.Cas. 1917B 127]; Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Russellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daniel v. Asbillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carmichaelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blanton v. Currygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Silvey v. Harmgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Neilson v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'Brien v. Edensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crooks v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olsen v. Standard Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hall
green
2 sentences1956All of that concept is inherent in the first of the italicized sentences of the instruction quoted supra, pages 217-218: “The discretion which the law invests in you ... is to be employed only when you are satisfied that the lighter punishment should be imposed.” This erroneous concept should have been regarded as overruled (if not by People v. Leary (1895), supra, 105 Cal. 486, 496 ) at least as early as People v. Hall (1926), supra, 199 Cal. 451, 456-458 , wherein the court in a then liberal, if not revolutionary, decision took a definite turn toward the statute and the Leary ( 105 Cal. 486 1956All of that concept is inherent in the first of the italicized sentences of the instruction quoted supra, pages 217-218: "The discretion which the law invests in you ... is to be employed only when you are satisfied that the lighter punishment should be imposed." This erroneous concept should have been regarded as overruled (if not by People v. Leary (1895), supra, 105 Cal. 486, 496 ) at least as early as People v. Hall (1926), supra, 199 Cal. 451, 456-458 , wherein the court in a then liberal, if not revolutionary, decision took a definite turn toward the statute and the Leary ( 105 Cal. 486 | 2 | 1956–1956 |
People v. Leary
green
2 sentences1956All of that concept is inherent in the first of the italicized sentences of the instruction quoted supra, pages 217-218: “The discretion which the law invests in you ... is to be employed only when you are satisfied that the lighter punishment should be imposed.” This erroneous concept should have been regarded as overruled (if not by People v. Leary (1895), supra, 105 Cal. 486, 496 ) at least as early as People v. Hall (1926), supra, 199 Cal. 451, 456-458 , wherein the court in a then liberal, if not revolutionary, decision took a definite turn toward the statute and the Leary ( 105 Cal. 486 1956All of that concept is inherent in the first of the italicized sentences of the instruction quoted supra, pages 217-218: “The discretion which the law invests in you ... is to be employed only when you are satisfied that the lighter punishment should be imposed.” This erroneous concept should have been regarded as overruled (if not by People v. Leary (1895), supra, 105 Cal. 486, 496 ) at least as early as People v. Hall (1926), supra, 199 Cal. 451, 456-458 , wherein the court in a then liberal, if not revolutionary, decision took a definite turn toward the statute and the Leary ( 105 Cal. 486 | 2 | 1956–1956 |
People v. Corona
green
2 sentences2006In Corona , the court concluded defense counsel was ineffective by not investigating the defendant's mental condition before deciding not to seek a competency hearing and not presenting a mental condition defense. ( Id. at pp. 715-716, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894 .) The court criticized defense counsel's decision not to have the defendant plead not guilty by reason of insanity based solely on his conversations with the defendant and his own judgment and without the assistance of an expert. ( Id. at p. 715, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894 .) Corona noted that defense counsel "acted as the sole determiner of Corona's m 2006In Corona , the court concluded defense counsel was ineffective by not investigating the defendant's mental condition before deciding not to seek a competency hearing and not presenting a mental condition defense. ( Id. at pp. 715-716, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894 .) The court criticized defense counsel's decision not to have the defendant plead not guilty by reason of insanity based solely on his conversations with the defendant and his own judgment and without the assistance of an expert. ( Id. at p. 715, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894 .) Corona noted that defense counsel "acted as the sole determiner of Corona's m | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fraijo v. Hartland Hospital
green
2 sentences1991In Fraijo v. Hartland Hospital, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 331 , the court criticized the instruction because it appeared to place an undue emphasis on “nearness.” Nonetheless, “despite the criticism of the ‘but for’ language in BAJI No. 3.75, the most recent edition of California Jury Instructions (Civil) [citation] . . . allow[s] the trial judge to exercise a discretion in selecting his preference between . . . the ‘proximate cause’ instruction found in BAJI No. 3.75, or the ‘legal cause’ instruction found in BAJI No. 3.76.” (Id., at p. 346.) The Fraijo court said, “We agree that BAJI No. 3.75—the 1991In Fraijo v. Hartland Hospital, supra, 99 Cal. App.3d 331 , the court criticized the instruction because it appeared to place an undue emphasis on "nearness." Nonetheless, "despite the criticism of the `but for' language in BAJI No. 3.75, the most recent edition of California Jury Instructions (Civil) [citation] ... allow[s] the trial judge to exercise a discretion in selecting his preference between ... the `proximate cause' instruction found in BAJI No. 3.75, or the `legal cause' instruction found in BAJI No. 3.76." ( Id., at p. 346.) The Fraijo court said, "We agree that BAJI No. 3.75 — the | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Rupp v. Summerfield
green
2 sentences1976As we have previously pointed out, a reviewing court will adopt the construction of an instruction which will support rather than defeat the judgment if it is reasonably susceptible to such interpretation. ( Rupp v. Summerfield, supra, 161 Cal. App.2d at p. 667 .) Thus, while the criticized instruction was technically erroneous, we cannot conclude that, standing alone, it warrants reversal of the compensatory damage award. (8) However, we agree with Standard that the compensatory damage award of $267,294.52 is so disproportionate to the injuries and losses suffered by plaintiff that it must be 1976(Rupp v. Summerfield, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d at p. 667 .) Thus, while the criticized instruction was technically erroneous, we cannot conclude that, standing alone, it warrants reversal of the compensatory damage award. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Loop
green
2 sentences1964In People v. Loop, 127 Cal.App.2d 786 , at page 805 [ 274 P.2d 885 ], the court criticized an instruction which appears to us less prejudicial than plaintiff’s argument here. 1964In People v. Loop, 127 Cal.App.2d 786 , at page 805 [ 274 P.2d 885 ], the court criticized an instruction which appears to us less prejudicial than plaintiff’s argument here. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Nova v. Flaherty
green
2 sentences1959We see no ground of distinction between the instruction which stated that the publication in question was a libel on its face and the instruction given in Nova v. Flaherty, 145 Cal. App.2d 761 [ 303 P.2d 382 ], that the statements in question were libelous as a matter of law, which was held to be error. 1959We see no ground of distinction between the instruction which stated that the publication in question was a libel on its face and the instruction given in Nova v. Flaherty, 145 Cal. App.2d 761 [ 303 P.2d 382 ], that the statements in question were libelous as a matter of law, which was held to be error. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
People v. Suesser
green
2 sentences1957The degree of guilt is the same as it would have been if the attempt had resulted in the death of the person at whom it was aimed. ’ ’ The crime may be murder although the person killed was not the one whom the accused intended to kill. (40 C.J.S. 864, § 18.) One of the first cases in this state applying the so-called doctrine of transferred intent appears to have been People v. Suesser, 142 Cal. 354 [ 75 P. 1093 ], in which the first paragraph of the criticized instruction was given and expressly approved. 1957The degree of guilt is the same as it would have been if the attempt had resulted in the death of the person at whom it was aimed. ’ ’ The crime may be murder although the person killed was not the one whom the accused intended to kill. (40 C.J.S. 864, § 18.) One of the first cases in this state applying the so-called doctrine of transferred intent appears to have been People v. Suesser, 142 Cal. 354 [ 75 P. 1093 ], in which the first paragraph of the criticized instruction was given and expressly approved. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Creamer v. Cerrato
green
2 sentences1956(See Creamer v. Cerrato, 1 Cal.App.2d 441 [ 36 P.2d 1094 ] ; Botti v. Savill, 97 Cal.App. 524 [ 275 P. 1029 ].) Plaintiff complains of the following instruction: “Where the evidence is as consistent with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the injured person as it is with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the person charged with causing the injury, the injured party cannot recover in an action for damages for the injury sustained, if any.” It is contended that this instruction neglects to state that plaintiff’s neglect of duty must be a proximate cause of the accident. 1956(See Creamer v. Cerrato, 1 Cal.App.2d 441 [ 36 P.2d 1094 ] ; Botti v. Savill, 97 Cal.App. 524 [ 275 P. 1029 ].) Plaintiff complains of the following instruction: “Where the evidence is as consistent with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the injured person as it is with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the person charged with causing the injury, the injured party cannot recover in an action for damages for the injury sustained, if any.” It is contended that this instruction neglects to state that plaintiff’s neglect of duty must be a proximate cause of the accident. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Botti v. Savill
neutral
2 sentences1956(See Creamer v. Cerrato, 1 Cal.App.2d 441 [ 36 P.2d 1094 ] ; Botti v. Savill, 97 Cal.App. 524 [ 275 P. 1029 ].) Plaintiff complains of the following instruction: “Where the evidence is as consistent with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the injured person as it is with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the person charged with causing the injury, the injured party cannot recover in an action for damages for the injury sustained, if any.” It is contended that this instruction neglects to state that plaintiff’s neglect of duty must be a proximate cause of the accident. 1956(See Creamer v. Cerrato, 1 Cal.App.2d 441 [ 36 P.2d 1094 ] ; Botti v. Savill, 97 Cal.App. 524 [ 275 P. 1029 ].) Plaintiff complains of the following instruction: “Where the evidence is as consistent with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the injured person as it is with a neglect of duty or care on the part of the person charged with causing the injury, the injured party cannot recover in an action for damages for the injury sustained, if any.” It is contended that this instruction neglects to state that plaintiff’s neglect of duty must be a proximate cause of the accident. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Westover v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. 1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| McChristian v. Popkin green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Bee v. Tungstar Corp.
green
2 sentences1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. 1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| People v. Ranney green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Dawson v. Boyd
green
2 sentences1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. 1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Hunt v. Becker neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
People v. Brow
neutral
2 sentences1949The authorities cited by appellant as condemnatory of the criticized instruction (People v. Brow, 90 Hun 509 [ 35 N.Y.S. 1009 ]; State v. Chavez, 19 N.M. 325, 329-330 [ 142 P. 922 , Ann.Cas. 1917B 127]; Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. 1949The authorities cited by appellant as condemnatory of the criticized instruction (People v. Brow, 90 Hun 509 [ 35 N.Y.S. 1009 ]; State v. Chavez, 19 N.M. 325, 329-330 [ 142 P. 922 , Ann.Cas. 1917B 127]; Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Smith v. . Lehigh Valley R.R. Co.
green
2 sentences1949Co., 170 N.Y. 394 [ 63 N.E. 338 ]; Hunt v. Becker, 173 App.Div. 9 [ 160 N.Y.S. 45 ]; Beers v. Metropolitan St. 1949Co., 170 N.Y. 394 [ 63 N.E. 338 ]; Hunt v. Becker, 173 App.Div. 9 [ 160 N.Y.S. 45 ]; Beers v. Metropolitan St. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Wells v. Lloyd
green
2 sentences1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. 1949(Westover v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635 [ 128 P.2d 350 ]; Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452 [ 132 P.2d 471 ]; Dawson v. Boyd, 61 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 143 P.2d 373 ]; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 171 P.2d 85 ]; Bee v. Tungstar Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 729 [ 151 P.2d 537 ].) The reasoning in these cases is particularly appropriate here whether or not the criticized instruction should properly be considered as being one which was formula in character. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Broun v. Blair green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| La Rue v. Powell green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| People v. Koenig red | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| People v. Holt green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Cleveland v. Petrusich green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Cummings v. Kendall green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Mudrick v. Market Street Railway Co. green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| County of Riverside v. Brown neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.