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29 California opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ervingreen2 sentences2016(See People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 677 (Padilla) [“We hold that evidence of a hallucination—a perception with no objective reality—is . . . admissible to negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder”].) Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that instructions on the effect of a defendant’s mental disease or disorder on his or her mental 17 state need not be given sua sponte; rather, they are “in the nature of pinpoint instructions required to be given only on request where the evidence supports the defense theory.” (People v. E 2016(See People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 677 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 889 ] (Padilla) [“We hold that evidence of a hallucination—a perception with no objective reality—is . . . admissible to negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder”].) Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that instructions on the effect of a defendant’s mental disease or disorder on his or her mental state need not be given sua sponte; rather, they are “in the nature of pinpoint instructions required to be given only on request where the evidence supports the defense | 2 | 3 |
People v. Padillagreen2 sentences2021(People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 677 [evidence of a hallucination admissible to negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder] (Padilla).) CALCRIM No. 627 is a pinpoint instruction to be given on request when the evidence supports the defense theory. 2016(See People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 677 (Padilla) [“We hold that evidence of a hallucination—a perception with no objective reality—is . . . admissible to negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder”].) Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that instructions on the effect of a defendant’s mental disease or disorder on his or her mental 17 state need not be given sua sponte; rather, they are “in the nature of pinpoint instructions required to be given only on request where the evidence supports the defense theory.” (People v. E | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Kennedygreen2 sentences1967The only contrary evidence consists in broad generalizations charging, in effect, that rights of inheritance are worthless in a "Communist regime of socialized property." (Stoicoiu, op. cit. supra, pp. 227, 244.) Rumania has admittedly "embarked upon a program of socialization," but it has not attempted to "nationalize every conceivable kind of property." (Estate of Kennedy (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 621, 629 [ 235 P.2d 837 ].) (Cf. Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 85 .) The record before us suggests that Rumania, like the Soviet Union, has found it economically and politically impossible t 1967The only contrary evidence consists in broad generalizations charging, in effect, that rights of inheritance are worthless in a “Communist regime of socialized property.” (Stoicoiu, op. cit. supra, pp. 227, 244.) Bumania has admittedly “embarked upon a program of socialization,’’ but it has not attempted to “nationalize every conceivable kind of property.” (Estate of Kennedy (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 621, 629 [ 235 P.2d 837 ].) (Cf. Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 85 .) The record before us suggests that Bumania, like the Soviet Union, has found it economically and politically impossible | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kimblegreen2 sentences2022Those cases instruct that Green’s clarifying language was not intended to become an ““‘element” of such special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction.’” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 113-114 , quoting People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480 , 501 and citing Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505 [no error in giving a “truncated instruction” where no significant motive of murder exists other than robbery].) Accordingly, we find no instructional error. 2003(Id. at p. 62.) However, in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 148 , 749 P.2d 803 ], also cited by Harden, the court stated: “[W]e reject the dissent’s novel suggestion that Green’s clarification of the scope of felony-murder special circumstances has somehow become an ‘element’ of such special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Saillegreen2 sentences2000(See also People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648 , 945 P.2d 1197 ( Castillo ).) Instead, these instructions are more in the nature of pinpoint instructions required to be given only on request where the evidence supports the defense theory. ( Ibid.; Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 , 820 P.2d 588 .) By similar reasoning, sua sponte instructions on the actual effect of the defendant's mental disease or disorder on his relevant mental state became unnecessary with the abolition of the mental disease/diminished capacity doctrine. (ง 28, subd. (a 2000(See also People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648 , 945 P.2d 1197 ( Castillo ).) Instead, these instructions are more in the nature of pinpoint instructions required to be given only on request where the evidence supports the defense theory. ( Ibid.; Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 , 820 P.2d 588 .) By similar reasoning, sua sponte instructions on the actual effect of the defendant's mental disease or disorder on his relevant mental state became unnecessary with the abolition of the mental disease/diminished capacity doctrine. (ง 28, subd. (a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Castillogreen2 sentences2015(See also People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 .) Instead, these instructions are more in the nature of pinpoint instructions required to be given only on request where the evidence supports the defense theory. 2000(See also People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648 , 945 P.2d 1197 ( Castillo ).) Instead, these instructions are more in the nature of pinpoint instructions required to be given only on request where the evidence supports the defense theory. ( Ibid.; Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 , 820 P.2d 588 .) By similar reasoning, sua sponte instructions on the actual effect of the defendant's mental disease or disorder on his relevant mental state became unnecessary with the abolition of the mental disease/diminished capacity doctrine. (ง 28, subd. (a | 1 | 2 |
Santa Clara County Department of Family and Childrren's Services v. J.J.green2 sentences2015(In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 554-555 [ 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ].) As explained in DM., “The interest in providing a child with two parents is not a factor unless the evidence supports the presumption of parenthood. [][] We recognize that one important policy concern is ensuring that children have two parents. 2015(In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 554-555 [ 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ].) As explained in DM., “The interest in providing a child with two parents is not a factor unless the evidence supports the presumption of parenthood. [][] We recognize that one important policy concern is ensuring that children have two parents. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Bartongreen2 sentences2013(See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 153-163 . . . [discussing charge of completed murder]; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 , 201 . . . [same].)” (Boldface in original.) In deciding whether the evidence supports an instruction, the court does not evaluate the credibility of witnesses. 2007(People v. Barton *1265 (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) As we have stated, “neither the prosecution nor the defense should be allowed, based on their trial strategy, to preclude the jury from considering guilt of a lesser offense included in the crime charged.” (Ibid.) Indeed, “ ‘California decisions have held for decades that even absent a request, and even over the parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser. [Ci | 1 | 2 |
People v. Navarettegreen2 sentences2022Those cases instruct that Green’s clarifying language was not intended to become an ““‘element” of such special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction.’” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 113-114 , quoting People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480 , 501 and citing Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505 [no error in giving a “truncated instruction” where no significant motive of murder exists other than robbery].) Accordingly, we find no instructional error. 2022Those cases instruct that Green’s clarifying language was not intended to become an ““‘element” of such special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction.’” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 113-114 , quoting People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480 , 501 and citing Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505 [no error in giving a “truncated instruction” where no significant motive of murder exists other than robbery].) Accordingly, we find no instructional error. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sandovalgreen2 sentences2016(See People v. Sandoval (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433, fn. 1 [failure to make argument is not waiver when it would have been futile].) The record does not support this contention. 2016(See People v. Sandoval (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433, fn. 1 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 504 ] [failure to make argument is not waiver when it would have been futile].) The record does not support this contention. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Avilagreen2 sentences2015(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 208 P.3d 634 ].) We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction because there was no evidence that defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed Facundo presented an imminent threat of physical harm to Charlene when defendant killed him. 2015(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 , 208 P.3d 634 ].) We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction because there was no evidence that defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed Facundo presented an imminent threat of physical harm to Charlene when defendant killed him. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Princegreen2 sentences2015(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 , 317 P.3d 1148 ].) “The duty applies whenever there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but not the greater, offense. [Citations.] That voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder is undisputed.” (Ibid.) Ultimately, “[i]t is for the court alone to decide whether the evidence supports instruction on a lesser included offense.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1264 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ].) On appeal, we independently 2015(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 , 317 P.3d 1148 ].) “The duty applies whenever there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but not the greater, offense. [Citations.] That voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder is undisputed.” (Ibid.) Ultimately, “[i]t is for the court alone to decide whether the evidence supports instruction on a lesser included offense.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1264 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ].) On appeal, we independently | 1 | 1 |
People v. Duffgreen2 sentences2015(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 , 317 P.3d 1148 ].) “The duty applies whenever there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but not the greater, offense. [Citations.] That voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder is undisputed.” (Ibid.) Ultimately, “[i]t is for the court alone to decide whether the evidence supports instruction on a lesser included offense.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1264 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ].) On appeal, we independently 2015(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 , 317 P.3d 1148 ].) “The duty applies whenever there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but not the greater, offense. [Citations.] That voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder is undisputed.” (Ibid.) Ultimately, “[i]t is for the court alone to decide whether the evidence supports instruction on a lesser included offense.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1264 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ].) On appeal, we independently | 1 | 1 |
People v. Montalvogreen1 sentence2014The ultimate burden is on the prosecution to prove the possession or transportation is unlawful. ( Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 479-483 [a defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his or her possession of the drug is lawful because of a valid prescription]; People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 333, fn. 3 .) Whether the evidence supports an instruction on this defense should be determined by the usual rules. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holtgreen1 sentence2013Thus, whether section 289, subdivision (a) and sexual battery under section 243.4, subdivision (a)—both crimes against adults—contain the element of an unconsented act does not aid our analysis. 9 commit sexual penetration on his victim but was “unsuccessful in the attempt.” (See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 674 [rejecting argument that sua sponte attempted rape instruction was required where there was no evidence “that defendant intended to commit rape but was unsuccessful in the attempt”].) Here, although the evidence supports the instruction, the trial court’s failure to instruct o | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Christian S.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cordraygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Selinsky v. Olsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Breverman
green
2 sentences2021As the California Supreme Court explained in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 (Breverman), “an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is [not] necessarily prejudicial, on the premise that if the evidence was substantial enough to warrant lesser offense instructions in the first place[;] [the evidence] must have been strong enough to affect the outcome had the instructions not been omitted.” (Id. at p. 177.) The standard used to determine whether the evidence supports the instruction be given and the standard used to determine whether the error affected the outcome 2015(People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 157 .) If the court believes that the evidence supports a defense not proffered by the defendant, the court should ascertain from the defendant whether he or she wants instructions on the alternative theory. | 3 | 2013–2021 |
People v. Prettyman
red
2 sentences2024It was not until 1996 in Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248 that the Supreme Court held that, when the prosecution relies on the natural and probable consequences theory of accomplice liability and the evidence supports an instruction on that theory, the trial court must give “an instruction describing or defining the elements of the target 17 crime.” (Id. at p. 266; see People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566 , 572, fn. 6 [because the defendant’s trial predated Prettyman, the “natural and probable consequences jury instruction did not specify the target crime he was charged with aiding and ab 2024It was not until 1996 in Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248 that the Supreme Court held that, when the prosecution relies on the natural and probable consequences theory of accomplice liability and the evidence supports an instruction on that theory, the trial court must give “an instruction describing or defining the elements of the target 17 crime.” (Id. at p. 266; see People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566 , 572, fn. 6 [because the defendant’s trial predated Prettyman, the “natural and probable consequences jury instruction did not specify the target crime he was charged with aiding and ab | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Eduardo Velasquez-Rios v. William Barr
green
2 sentences2023(See Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson (9th Cir. 2021) 988 F.3d 1081 , 15 1089.)10 “It is clear that federal statutes can specify when removal is permissible and also when a cancellation of removal is warranted. [T]hose federal law standards cannot be altered or contradicted retroactively by state law actions, and cannot be manipulated after the fact by state laws modifying sentences that at the time of conviction permitted removal or that precluded cancellation.” (Velasquez-Rios, at p. 1089.)11 We agree that defendant was misadvised, and the evidence supports his claim that he believed he would not 2023(See Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson (9th Cir. 2021) 988 F.3d 1081 , 15 1089.)10 “It is clear that federal statutes can specify when removal is permissible and also when a cancellation of removal is warranted. [T]hose federal law standards cannot be altered or contradicted retroactively by state law actions, and cannot be manipulated after the fact by state laws modifying sentences that at the time of conviction permitted removal or that precluded cancellation.” (Velasquez-Rios, at p. 1089.)11 We agree that defendant was misadvised, and the evidence supports his claim that he believed he would not | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Estate of Larkin
green
2 sentences1967The only contrary evidence consists in broad generalizations charging, in effect, that rights of inheritance are worthless in a "Communist regime of socialized property." (Stoicoiu, op. cit. supra, pp. 227, 244.) Rumania has admittedly "embarked upon a program of socialization," but it has not attempted to "nationalize every conceivable kind of property." (Estate of Kennedy (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 621, 629 [ 235 P.2d 837 ].) (Cf. Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 85 .) The record before us suggests that Rumania, like the Soviet Union, has found it economically and politically impossible t 1967The only contrary evidence consists in broad generalizations charging, in effect, that rights of inheritance are worthless in a “Communist regime of socialized property.” (Stoicoiu, op. cit. supra, pp. 227, 244.) Bumania has admittedly “embarked upon a program of socialization,’’ but it has not attempted to “nationalize every conceivable kind of property.” (Estate of Kennedy (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 621, 629 [ 235 P.2d 837 ].) (Cf. Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 85 .) The record before us suggests that Bumania, like the Soviet Union, has found it economically and politically impossible | 2 | 1967–1967 |
Estate v. American Trust Co.
neutral
2 sentences1967The only contrary evidence consists in broad generalizations charging, in effect, that rights of inheritance are worthless in a "Communist regime of socialized property." (Stoicoiu, op. cit. supra, pp. 227, 244.) Rumania has admittedly "embarked upon a program of socialization," but it has not attempted to "nationalize every conceivable kind of property." (Estate of Kennedy (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 621, 629 [ 235 P.2d 837 ].) (Cf. Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 85 .) The record before us suggests that Rumania, like the Soviet Union, has found it economically and politically impossible t 1967The only contrary evidence consists in broad generalizations charging, in effect, that rights of inheritance are worthless in a “Communist regime of socialized property.” (Stoicoiu, op. cit. supra, pp. 227, 244.) Bumania has admittedly “embarked upon a program of socialization,’’ but it has not attempted to “nationalize every conceivable kind of property.” (Estate of Kennedy (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 621, 629 [ 235 P.2d 837 ].) (Cf. Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 85 .) The record before us suggests that Bumania, like the Soviet Union, has found it economically and politically impossible | 2 | 1967–1967 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2024(Prettyman, at p. 268.) Moreover, unlike the instruction in Estrada, the instruction given at Johnson’s trial included the language “equally guilty,” which the Judicial Council removed from CALJIC No. 3.00 in 2010 for being potentially “misleading.” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600 , 640 & fn. 5.) Lastly, we cannot conclusively say, as the court did in Estrada, that the prosecutor in Johnson’s trial did not rely on the natural and probable consequences doctrine because the People did not provide us with the trial transcripts. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Valdez
green
1 sentence2022Those cases instruct that Green’s clarifying language was not intended to become an ““‘element” of such special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction.’” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 113-114 , quoting People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480 , 501 and citing Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505 [no error in giving a “truncated instruction” where no significant motive of murder exists other than robbery].) Accordingly, we find no instructional error. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Beltran
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 ; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 177‒178.) Under Watson, “ ‘a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’ ” (People v. Beltran, at p. 955.) The test “ ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. McDaniel
green
1 sentence2021(People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 747-748 .) It is for the court to decide whether the evidence supports the instruction, and we review 16 independently whether the trial court erred. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2021As the California Supreme Court explained in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 (Breverman), “an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is [not] necessarily prejudicial, on the premise that if the evidence was substantial enough to warrant lesser offense instructions in the first place[;] [the evidence] must have been strong enough to affect the outcome had the instructions not been omitted.” (Id. at p. 177.) The standard used to determine whether the evidence supports the instruction be given and the standard used to determine whether the error affected the outcome | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 271 .) Simple assault is an unlawful attempt, combined with the present ability, to commit a violent injury on another. (§ 240.) Simple assault does not require the specific intent to cause injury, or the subjective awareness that an injury might occur, but only “an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another.” (People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 .) As the jury was instructed, assault with a deadl | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. McCarrick
green
1 sentence2021(People v. McCarrick (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 227, 243 .) CALCRIM No. 3428 guides the jury in deciding whether a defendant had the requisite mental state; here, whether defendant had the specific intent to kill and acted with premeditation and deliberation. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Trujeque
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 271 .) Simple assault is an unlawful attempt, combined with the present ability, to commit a violent injury on another. (§ 240.) Simple assault does not require the specific intent to cause injury, or the subjective awareness that an injury might occur, but only “an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another.” (People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 .) As the jury was instructed, assault with a deadl | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Cavitt
green
1 sentence2016The CALCRIM Bench Notes explained that Cavitt does not impose a “ ‘sua sponte duty to clarify the principles of the requisite relationship between the felony and the homicide without regard to whether the evidence supports such an instruction.’ ” (Former CALCRIM No. 549 (Jan. 2006 new), quoting Cavitt, supra, at p. 204 .) The Bench Notes further explained, however, “If the evidence raises an issue of whether the felony and the homicide were part of one continuous transaction, give this instruction.” Former CALCRIM No. 549 remained in publication until 2013, when Wilkins was decided. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Mower
green
1 sentence2014The ultimate burden is on the prosecution to prove the possession or transportation is unlawful. ( Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 479-483 [a defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his or her possession of the drug is lawful because of a valid prescription]; People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 333, fn. 3 .) Whether the evidence supports an instruction on this defense should be determined by the usual rules. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Leever green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Aguilar green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Green green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Baird v. Madsen green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.