continuation standard in New Jersey

2020Pond Run, 397 N.J.

2012In each, either the application of the doctrine resulted in the extension of the time to pursue a cause of action that would otherwise be barred, as through the use of the discovery rule, see Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 274 , 300 A.2d 563 , or the continuing violation doctrine, see Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. at 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 , or the application of the doctrine resulted in the continuation of a claim notwithstanding the failure to strictly comply with a statutory requirement, as in the Affidavit of Merit statute, see Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 182 , 836 A.2d 794 .

2012In each, either the application of the doctrine resulted in the extension of the time to pursue a cause of action that would otherwise be barred, as through the use of the discovery rule, see Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 274 , 300 A.2d 563 , or the continuing violation doctrine, see Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. at 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 , or the application of the doctrine resulted in the continuation of a claim notwithstanding the failure to strictly comply with a statutory requirement, as in the Affidavit of Merit statute, see Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 182 , 836 A.2d 794 .

2012In each, either the application of the doctrine resulted in the extension of the time to pursue a cause of action that would otherwise be barred, as through the use of the discovery rule, see Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 274 , 300 A.2d 563 , or the continuing violation doctrine, see Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. at 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 , or the application of the doctrine resulted in the continuation of a claim notwithstanding the failure to strictly comply with a statutory requirement, as in the Affidavit of Merit statute, see Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 182 , 836 A.2d 794 .

2012In each, either the application of the doctrine resulted in the extension of the time to pursue a cause of action that would otherwise be barred, as through the use of the discovery rule, see Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 274 , 300 A.2d 563 , or the continuing violation doctrine, see Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. at 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 , or the application of the doctrine resulted in the continuation of a claim notwithstanding the failure to strictly comply with a statutory requirement, as in the Affidavit of Merit statute, see Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 182 , 836 A.2d 794 .

2012In each, either the application of the doctrine resulted in the extension of the time to pursue a cause of action that would otherwise be barred, as through the use of the discovery rule, see Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 274 , 300 A.2d 563 , or the continuing violation doctrine, see Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. at 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 , or the application of the doctrine resulted in the continuation of a claim notwithstanding the failure to strictly comply with a statutory requirement, as in the Affidavit of Merit statute, see Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 182 , 836 A.2d 794 .

2012In each, either the application of the doctrine resulted in the extension of the time to pursue a cause of action that would otherwise be barred, as through the use of the discovery rule, see Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 274 , 300 A.2d 563 , or the continuing violation doctrine, see Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. at 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 , or the application of the doctrine resulted in the continuation of a claim notwithstanding the failure to strictly comply with a statutory requirement, as in the Affidavit of Merit statute, see Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 182 , 836 A.2d 794 .

1992Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. at 503 , 569 A. 2d 770 ; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 502 , 453 A. 2d 527 ; Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 69 , 275 A. 2d 132 (1971).

1992Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. at 503 , 569 A. 2d 770 ; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 502 , 453 A. 2d 527 ; Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 69 , 275 A. 2d 132 (1971).

1985In Dawejko v. Jorgensen, 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106 (1981), the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the product line theory for awarding compensatory damages but in Martin , the court applied the continuation test to a claim for punitive damages.

1985In Dawejko v. Jorgensen, 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106 (1981), the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the product line theory for awarding compensatory damages but in Martin , the court applied the continuation test to a claim for punitive damages.

1985Thus, the separate purposes accomplished by each enables them to operate co-extensively. [3] The California District Court in Asbestos, supra, 566 F. Supp. at 821 , is in accord.

1985Thus, the separate purposes accomplished by each enables them to operate co-extensively. [3] The California District Court in Asbestos, supra, 566 F. Supp. at 821 , is in accord.

1985After determining that Ray v. Alad could not be expanded to include punitive damages liability, the court considered whether liability could be imposed under the continuation test set forth by the court in Moe v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 21 Cal. App. 3d 289 , 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971).

1985After determining that Ray v. Alad could not be expanded to include punitive damages liability, the court considered whether liability could be imposed under the continuation test set forth by the court in Moe v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 21 Cal. App. 3d 289 , 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971).

1985In Martin, supra, 469 A. 2d at 667 , the court noted that the continuation requirement may be satisfied by fewer persons who are directly responsible for the egregious conduct.

1985Martin, 469 A.2d at 667 .

1983With respect to the first difference — the finality of the decision — courts long have had the power to reopen the record to admit additional evidence prior to the entry of a final judgment. 5 Since administrative agencies have the inherent authority to reopen, modify, or rehear even final orders, a fortiori, they like courts, possess the right to reopen or continue hearings prior to the entry of a final order. 6 See, e.g., In re Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347 (1982); Duvin v. State, 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179 (1975); Ruvoldt v. Nolan, 63 N.J. 171 (1973);

1983With respect to the first difference — the finality of the decision — courts long have had the power to reopen the record to admit additional evidence prior to the entry of a final judgment. 5 Since administrative agencies have the inherent authority to reopen, modify, or rehear even final orders, a fortiori, they like courts, possess the right to reopen or continue hearings prior to the entry of a final order. 6 See, e.g., In re Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347 (1982); Duvin v. State, 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179 (1975); Ruvoldt v. Nolan, 63 N.J. 171 (1973);

1983With respect to the first difference — the finality of the decision — courts long have had the power to reopen the record to admit additional evidence prior to the entry of a final judgment. 5 Since administrative agencies have the inherent authority to reopen, modify, or rehear even final orders, a fortiori, they like courts, possess the right to reopen or continue hearings prior to the entry of a final order. 6 See, e.g., In re Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347 (1982); Duvin v. State, 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179 (1975); Ruvoldt v. Nolan, 63 N.J. 171 (1973);

1983With respect to the first difference — the finality of the decision — courts long have had the power to reopen the record to admit additional evidence prior to the entry of a final judgment. 5 Since administrative agencies have the inherent authority to reopen, modify, or rehear even final orders, a fortiori, they like courts, possess the right to reopen or continue hearings prior to the entry of a final order. 6 See, e.g., In re Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347 (1982); Duvin v. State, 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179 (1975); Ruvoldt v. Nolan, 63 N.J. 171 (1973);

1983With respect to the first difference — the finality of the decision — courts long have had the power to reopen the record to admit additional evidence prior to the entry of a final judgment. 5 Since administrative agencies have the inherent authority to reopen, modify, or rehear even final orders, a fortiori, they like courts, possess the right to reopen or continue hearings prior to the entry of a final order. 6 See, e.g., In re Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347 (1982); Duvin v. State, 76 N.J. 203, 207 (1978); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179 (1975); Ruvoldt v. Nolan, 63 N.J. 171 (1973);

1978This additional, “alternative remedy” theory was advanced generations ago as a justification for retaining interspousal tort immunity in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 , 31 S. Ct. 111 , 54 L.

1978This additional, “alternative remedy” theory was advanced generations ago as a justification for retaining interspousal tort immunity in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 , 31 S. Ct. 111 , 54 L.

1975This court, in State v. Kuske, supra , acknowledged the continuation of this rule when it held that letters written by a defendant should have been admitted when offered on the State's case since they were "competent as admissions or admissions against interest." 109 N.J.

1975This court, in State v. Kuske, supra , acknowledged the continuation of this rule when it held that letters written by a defendant should have been admitted when offered on the State's case since they were "competent as admissions or admissions against interest." 109 N.J.