continuation exception in Pennsylvania

2002In determining whether the harm in question can be remedied by damages, courts are to look not at past damage, but rather to “the unbridled threat of the continuation of the violation.” Id.

2001In determining whether the harm in question can be remedied by damages, courts are to look not at past damage, but rather to “the unbridled threat of the continuation of the violation.” Id.

2022“The primary elements of the continuation exception are identity of the officers, directors, or shareholders, and the existence of a single corporation following the transfer.” Continental I, 810 A.2d at 134-35 .

2022“The primary elements of the continuation exception are identity of the officers, directors, or shareholders, and the existence of a single corporation following the transfer.” Continental I, 810 A.2d at 134-35 .

1978Because of the desirability of the objectives sought to be obtained by enforcement of this requirement and the unequivocal notice to the bench and the bar that strict compliance would be expected as to motions filed after our Blair decision, there is no longer a justification for a continuation of an exception of the application . . . .” Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 237 .

1978Because of the desirability of the objectives sought to be obtained by enforcement of this requirement and the unequivocal notice to the bench and the bar that strict compliance would be expected as to motions filed after our Blair decision, there is no longer a justification for a continuation of an exception of the application . . . .” Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 237 .

1987Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 231 ; (footnote omitted; emphasis supplied).

1978Because of the desirability of the objectives sought to be obtained by enforcement of this requirement and the unequivocal notice to the bench and the bar that strict compliance would be expected as to motions filed after our Blair decision, there is no longer a justification for a continuation of an exception of the application . . . .” Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 237 .

2007Id. ¶ 7 To support his claim that Trooper Smith lacked probable cause under these circumstances, Fulton asserts that we should apply Commonwealth v. Garcia, 859 A.2d 820 (Pa.Super.2004) (no pinpoint cite provided by Fulton), for the proposition that where a vehicle is driven outside the lane of traffic for a moment in a minor manner, stopping the vehicle is not warranted. 7 Fulton is mistaken that Garcia is controlling however, as Garcia applied the probable cause standard enunciated in Gleason, supra. Despite being alerted to the amendments to Section 6308 during the hearing on his post-sente

2002Fiber-Lite, supra; Widerman v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 1997 WL 539684 (E.D.Pa.1997) (citations omitted). ¶ 18 Similarly, when determining if a de facto merger has occurred, courts generally consider four factors: (1) continuity of ownership; (2) cessation of the ordinary business by, and dissolution of, the predecessor as soon as practicable; (3) assumption by the successor of liabilities ordinarily necessary for uninterrupted continuation of the business; and (4) continuity of the management, personnel, physical location, and the general business operation.

2001It argued that this action was nothing more than a continuation of the challenge of its authority to assign and transfer claims to a third party, although that issue was previously decided in the companion case of Maierhoffer v. GLS Capital, Inc., 730 A.2d 547 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 561 Pa. 680 , 749 A.2d 473 (2000), and it believed it was best situated to assert its rights as a tax lienholder and defend longstanding tax collection and enforcement practices. 5 After GLS filed an answer to the amended complaint and the pleadings were closed, GLS filed a motio

2001The Superior Court recently explained why equitable relief is necessary in virtually all of these cases: “ ‘[i]t is not the initial breach of the covenant which necessarily establishes the existence of irreparable harm but rather the unbridled threat of the continuation of the violation,’ and incumbent disruption of the employer’s customer relationships.” West Penn Specialty, supra at 299 (quoting Bryant, 471 Pa. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1167 ). (emphasis added) “[G]rounds for an injunction are established ‘where the plaintiff’s proof of injury, although small in monetary terms, foreshadows the dism

2001The Superior Court recently explained why equitable relief is necessary in virtually all of these cases: “ ‘[i]t is not the initial breach of the covenant which necessarily establishes the existence of irreparable harm but rather the unbridled threat of the continuation of the violation,’ and incumbent disruption of the employer’s customer relationships.” West Penn Specialty, supra at 299 (quoting Bryant, 471 Pa. at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1167 ). (emphasis added) “[G]rounds for an injunction are established ‘where the plaintiff’s proof of injury, although small in monetary terms, foreshadows the dism

2001The effect of such disruption may manifest itself in a loss of new business not subject to documentation, the quantity and quality of which are ‘inherently unascertainable.’ ” Id. at 299 (quoting New Castle Orthopedic, supra at 466, 392 A.2d at 1386 and Bryant, supra at 8 , 369 A.2d at 1167 ).

1999As the report of Professor Warren makes clear, the nature of the transaction between the Schneider Companies, the banks and the Vanadium defendants ‘accomplish, in substance, the continuation of the Schneider enterprise for a new corporate group under modified corporate names and controlled by Schneider and his affiliates.’ (Warren report p. 4, exhibit 10.)” Brief in oppo sition to the Vanadium defendants’ motion for summary judgment at 26-27. (citation omitted) Continental contends that its position that the continuation exception applies where the new company purchases the assets from a secu

1989Every policy described in subdivision 1 shall contain a provision which permits continuation of coverage under the policy for the insured’s former spouse . . . upon entry of a valid decree of dissolution of marriage.’ ” Id. at 451. (emphasis supplied) „ In Bone, supra, the Minnesota court did not find a state statutory termination event which applied to the appellant and therefore concluded that COBRA would govern the parties’ agreement to that effect.

1981The court was of the opinion, however, that to deny recovery simply because there was no continuation would be unjust: The purpose of the rule of strict tort liability “is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 701 , 377 P.2d 897, 901 .) However, the rule “does not rest on the analysis of the financial strength or bargaining power of the

1981The court was of the opinion, however, that to deny recovery simply because there was no continuation would be unjust: The purpose of the rule of strict tort liability “is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 701 , 377 P.2d 897, 901 .) However, the rule “does not rest on the analysis of the financial strength or bargaining power of the

1978In Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172 , 386 A.2d 495 (1978) (Concurring Opinion by Nix, J.).

1978In Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172 , 386 A.2d 495 (1978) (Concurring Opinion by Nix, J.).

1970Sentence 4 No tenant shall be evicted for any reason whatsoever while rent is deposited in escrow.” In National Council of the Junior Order of United American Mechanics v. Roberson, 214 Pa. Superior Ct. 9, 18 , 248 A. 2d 861 (1969), the Superior Court held: “We find nothing in the Act which provides for a continuation of the privilege of the tenant to pay his rent into the escrow account or to occupy the premises beyond the six month period set forth in the Act.

1970Sentence 4 No tenant shall be evicted for any reason whatsoever while rent is deposited in escrow.” In National Council of the Junior Order of United American Mechanics v. Roberson, 214 Pa. Superior Ct. 9, 18 , 248 A. 2d 861 (1969), the Superior Court held: “We find nothing in the Act which provides for a continuation of the privilege of the tenant to pay his rent into the escrow account or to occupy the premises beyond the six month period set forth in the Act.

1951Rather more liberal expressions appear in the Supreme Court cases of Gasner v. Pierce et al., 286 Pa. 529 (1926) ; O’Malley v. O’Malley, 272 Pa. 528 (1923); Berhalter v. Berhalter et al., 315 Pa. 225 (1934) ; Madden et al., v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Company, 331 Pa. 476 (1938), and Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49 (1938).

1951Rather more liberal expressions appear in the Supreme Court cases of Gasner v. Pierce et al., 286 Pa. 529 (1926) ; O’Malley v. O’Malley, 272 Pa. 528 (1923); Berhalter v. Berhalter et al., 315 Pa. 225 (1934) ; Madden et al., v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Company, 331 Pa. 476 (1938), and Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49 (1938).

1951Rather more liberal expressions appear in the Supreme Court cases of Gasner v. Pierce et al., 286 Pa. 529 (1926) ; O’Malley v. O’Malley, 272 Pa. 528 (1923); Berhalter v. Berhalter et al., 315 Pa. 225 (1934) ; Madden et al., v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Company, 331 Pa. 476 (1938), and Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49 (1938).

1951Rather more liberal expressions appear in the Supreme Court cases of Gasner v. Pierce et al., 286 Pa. 529 (1926) ; O’Malley v. O’Malley, 272 Pa. 528 (1923); Berhalter v. Berhalter et al., 315 Pa. 225 (1934) ; Madden et al., v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Company, 331 Pa. 476 (1938), and Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49 (1938).

1951Rather more liberal expressions appear in the Supreme Court cases of Gasner v. Pierce et al., 286 Pa. 529 (1926) ; O’Malley v. O’Malley, 272 Pa. 528 (1923); Berhalter v. Berhalter et al., 315 Pa. 225 (1934) ; Madden et al., v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Company, 331 Pa. 476 (1938), and Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49 (1938).

1951The cases of Wakefield v. Wakefield, 149 Pa. Superior Ct. 9 (1942) ; Weiner v. Weiner, 68 D. & C. 51 (1949), and Cullinan v. Cullinan, 72 D. & C. 146 (1949), take the view that the sanctity of marriage requires a continuation of the doctrine of per tout et non per my until the marriage is dissolved by divorce, and that the presumption of joint beneficial use must persist until then.