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29 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1922–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Arianna M.green2 sentences2014Furthermore, the trial court’s “findings of fact are accorded deference and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Kaleb U. [Heather V. — Ryan U], 77 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2010]; see Matter of Arianna M. [Brian M.], 105 AD3d 1401 , 1401 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 862 [2013]). 2014Furthermore, the trial court’s “findings of fact are accorded deference and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Kaleb U. [Heather V. — Ryan U], 77 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2010]; see Matter of Arianna M. [Brian M.], 105 AD3d 1401 , 1401 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 862 [2013]). | 3 | 3 |
In re Kaleb U.green2 sentences2014Furthermore, the trial court’s “findings of fact are accorded deference and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Kaleb U. [Heather V. — Ryan U], 77 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2010]; see Matter of Arianna M. [Brian M.], 105 AD3d 1401 , 1401 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 862 [2013]). 2014Furthermore, the trial court’s “findings of fact are accorded deference and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Kaleb U. [Heather V. — Ryan U], 77 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2010]; see Matter of Arianna M. [Brian M.], 105 AD3d 1401 , 1401 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 862 [2013]). | 2 | 3 |
Nicholson v. Scoppettagreen2 sentences2014Inasmuch as the petition alleged that the mother neglected the children in violation of Family Court Act § 1012 (f) (i) (B), the burden was on petitioner to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence ‘first, that [the] child[ren]’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, that the actual or threatened harm to the child [ren] is a consequence of the failure of the parent ... to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child[ren] with proper supervision or guardianship’ ” (Matter of Ilona H. [Elton HJ, 93 A 2014Inasmuch as the petition alleged that the mother neglected the children in violation of Family Court Act § 1012 (f) (i) (B), the burden was on petitioner to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence ‘first, that [the] child[ren]’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, that the actual or threatened harm to the child [ren] is a consequence of the failure of the parent ... to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child[ren] with proper supervision or guardianship’ ” (Matter of Ilona H. [Elton HJ, 93 A | 2 | 3 |
Adinolfi v. Adinolfigreen2 sentences2013Moreover, at the hearing on the parties’ petitions, the mother failed to request either a reallocation of the parties’ responsibility for fees for the attorney for the children or a hearing on the matter (cf. Adinolfi v Adinolfi, 168 AD2d 401, 402 [1990]). 2013Moreover, at the hearing on the parties’ petitions, the mother failed to request either a reallocation of the parties’ responsibility for fees for the attorney for the children or a hearing on the matter (cf. Adinolfi v Adinolfi, 168 AD2d 401, 402 [1990]). | 2 | 2 |
In re Alyshia M.R.green2 sentences2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 ; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 ; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061-1062 , lv d 2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 [2010]; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 [2009]; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061 | 1 | 2 |
Veronica S. v. Philip R.S.green2 sentences2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 ; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 ; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061-1062 , lv d 2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 [2010]; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 [2009]; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061 | 1 | 2 |
Brown v. Eleygreen1 sentence2021"We must remain vigilant that the ultimate issue here is what is in the children's best interests, not whether the mother should be punished for her actions" ( Matter of Brown v Eley , 107 AD3d 1334, 1336 [2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Siler v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2017We further conclude that, based upon the instability of the mother’s living arrangements and its impact upon the children’s education and the evidence of domestic violence, the requisite change in circumstances exists warranting a best interests of the children analysis (see Matter of Hamilton v Anderson, 99 AD3d 1077, 1078-1079 [2012]; Matter of Siler v Wright, 64 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Andersongreen1 sentence2017We further conclude that, based upon the instability of the mother’s living arrangements and its impact upon the children’s education and the evidence of domestic violence, the requisite change in circumstances exists warranting a best interests of the children analysis (see Matter of Hamilton v Anderson, 99 AD3d 1077, 1078-1079 [2012]; Matter of Siler v Wright, 64 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Normile v. Stalkergreen1 sentence2017The various factors that a court must assess in determining the best interests of the children include “maintaining stability in the children’s lives, the wishes of the children, the parties’ fitness and ability to provide for the children’s intellectual and emotional development, the willingness of each parent to foster a relationship with the other, each parent’s past performance and the quality of the respective home environments” (Matter of Normile v Stalker, 140 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2016] [internal brackets, quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Snow v Dunbar, 147 AD3d 1242, 1 | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Snow v. Dunbargreen1 sentence2017The various factors that a court must assess in determining the best interests of the children include “maintaining stability in the children’s lives, the wishes of the children, the parties’ fitness and ability to provide for the children’s intellectual and emotional development, the willingness of each parent to foster a relationship with the other, each parent’s past performance and the quality of the respective home environments” (Matter of Normile v Stalker, 140 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2016] [internal brackets, quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Snow v Dunbar, 147 AD3d 1242, 1 | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Davisgreen1 sentence2016We accord due deference to Family Court’s findings and credibility determinations and will not disturb them so long as they are supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Trimble v Trimble, 125 AD3d 1153, 1154 [2015]; Matter of Poremba v Poremba, 93 AD3d 1115, 1117 [2012]; Matter of Robinson v Davis, 58 AD3d 1041, 1042 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Poremba v. Porembagreen1 sentence2016We accord due deference to Family Court’s findings and credibility determinations and will not disturb them so long as they are supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Trimble v Trimble, 125 AD3d 1153, 1154 [2015]; Matter of Poremba v Poremba, 93 AD3d 1115, 1117 [2012]; Matter of Robinson v Davis, 58 AD3d 1041, 1042 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Millsgreen1 sentence2016While Family Court’s order did not specifically recite the facts forming its basis for finding a change in circumstances, because we have the authority to independently review the record and make this determination, it is unnecessary to remit the matter on this issue (see Matter of Martin v Mills, 94 AD3d 1364, 1365 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Trimble v. Trimblegreen1 sentence2016We accord due deference to Family Court’s findings and credibility determinations and will not disturb them so long as they are supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Trimble v Trimble, 125 AD3d 1153, 1154 [2015]; Matter of Poremba v Poremba, 93 AD3d 1115, 1117 [2012]; Matter of Robinson v Davis, 58 AD3d 1041, 1042 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Menhennett v. Bixbygreen1 sentence2016Initially, when a party seeks a modification of an existing custody order, such party must first show a change in circumstances, and when this showing is satisfied, the court then undertakes a best interests of the children analysis to see if a modification is warranted (see Matter of Bush v Miller, 136 AD3d 1238, 1239 [2016]; Matter of Menhennett v Bixby, 132 AD3d 1177, 1179 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Bush v. Millergreen1 sentence2016Initially, when a party seeks a modification of an existing custody order, such party must first show a change in circumstances, and when this showing is satisfied, the court then undertakes a best interests of the children analysis to see if a modification is warranted (see Matter of Bush v Miller, 136 AD3d 1238, 1239 [2016]; Matter of Menhennett v Bixby, 132 AD3d 1177, 1179 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
| Gomez v. Floral Park-Bellrose Union Free School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shannon J. v. Aaron P.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Mahogany Z.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re of Amber C.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Albert Francis B.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Matthew C.green | 1 | 1 |
| In the Matter of Amber C.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Evangeline X.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Karl L.green | 1 | 1 |
| Orlando v. Orlandogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weiss v. Weissgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Finlay v. Finlaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Ilona H.
green
2 sentences2014Inasmuch as the petition alleged that the mother neglected the children in violation of Family Court Act § 1012 (f) (i) (B), the burden was on petitioner to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence ‘first, that [the] child[ren]’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, that the actual or threatened harm to the child [ren] is a consequence of the failure of the parent ... to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child[ren] with proper supervision or guardianship’ ” (Matter of Ilona H. [Elton HJ, 93 A 2014Inasmuch as the petition alleged that the mother neglected the children in violation of Family Court Act § 1012 (f) (i) (B), the burden was on petitioner to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence ‘first, that [the] child[ren]’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, that the actual or threatened harm to the child [ren] is a consequence of the failure of the parent ... to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child[ren] with proper supervision or guardianship’ ” (Matter of Ilona H. [Elton HJ, 93 A | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Shockome v. Shockome
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). 2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
David V. v. Rosalind W.
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). 2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Mohabir v. Singh
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). 2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Krasner v. Krasner
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). 2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Robert AA. v. Colleen BB.
green
2 sentences2014While not determinative, we note that the position advanced by the attorney for the children at the hearing and on appeal is in accord with Family Court’s determination (see Matter of Robert AA. v Colleen BB., 101 AD3d 1396 , 1399 n 2 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 860 [2013]). 2014While not determinative, we note that the position advanced by the attorney for the children at the hearing and on appeal is in accord with Family Court’s determination (see Matter of Robert AA. v Colleen BB., 101 AD3d 1396 , 1399 n 2 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 860 [2013]). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Anaya v. Hundley
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). 2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In re Ice S.
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). 2014Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the father not to contact the children unless they initiate such contact and to not contact the mother regarding the children (see Matter of Krasner v Krasner, 94 AD3d 763 [2012]; Matter of David V. v Rosalind W., 62 AD3d 717 [2009]; Matter of Mohabir v Singh, 78 AD3d 1056 [2010]; Matter of Shockome v Shockome, 53 AD3d 618 [2008]; see also Family Ct Act § 844; cf. Matter of Ice S., 30 AD3d 428 [2006]; Matter of Anaya v Hundley, 12 AD3d 594 [2004]). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In re Tonjaleah H.
green
2 sentences2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 ; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 ; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061-1062 , lv d 2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 [2010]; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 [2009]; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061 | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Matter of Alyshia MR
green
2 sentences2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 ; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 ; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061-1062 , lv d 2011With respect to the brothers, the Referee determined that she “was unable to assess whether the children or foster parent had changed their positions because they were not present.” We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of the children from the hearing was not a rational basis for rejecting the permanency goal of APPLA where the Referee had sufficient information to determine the best interests of the children (see generally Veronica S. v Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1460 [2010]; Matter of Tonjaleah H., 63 AD3d 1611 [2009]; Matter of Alyshia M.R., 53 AD3d 1060, 1061 | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Matter of Quinones v. Quinones
green
1 sentence2021The mother's contention that the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to appoint an attorney for the children at the hearing is unpreserved for appellate review, since it was not raised before the Family Court ( see Matter of Quinones v Quinones , 139 AD3d 1072 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Matter of Melissa F. v. Raymond E.
green
1 sentence2021We also find that the mother established a meritorious defense to the father's petitions because, prior to awarding the father custody, Family Court failed to take sworn testimony in support of his petitions at an evidentiary hearing, and the court did not make the threshold change in circumstances determination or conduct a best interests of the children analysis ( see M atter of Melissa F. v Raymond E. , 193 AD3d at 1126 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Rosenstock v. Rosenstock
green
1 sentence2018During the proceedings, the defendant absconded for approximately 18 months out of the state with the parties' children in violation of court orders ( see Rosenstock v Rosenstock, 149 AD3d 887 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| MATTER OF VALENTI v. Valenti green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Baker v. Baker green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Dintruff v. McGreevy green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Powell v. Blumenthal green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Matter of Mahogany Z. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Matter of Kurt J. neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| MATTER OF JESSUP v. D'Elia green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Lyng v. Lyng neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Blake v. Blake green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Eschbach v. Eschbach green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Daghir v. Daghir green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Daghir v. Daghir green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Bennett v. Jeffreys green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Matter of Tienken green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Ray v. Fowler neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.