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20 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Monsanto Co. v. Davisgreen2 sentences2006In a written order and without stating any grounds, the trial court denied Richard’s motion the day after its filing — and without Valerie having filed a response. 2 A trial court has no discretion to refuse to order a child’s compelled attendance when that refusal has the obvious effect of excluding a presumptively competent child witness from testifying in a modification proceeding. 3 In the absence of notice to Richard that the trial court would require him to subpoena Valerie to bring the children to the hearing, there was no legal basis for the trial court’s refusal to grant Richard’s mot 2006In a written order and without stating any grounds, the trial court denied Richard's motion the day after its filingand without Valerie having filed a response. [2] A trial court has no discretion to refuse to order a child's compelled attendance when that refusal has the obvious effect of excluding a presumptively competent child witness from testifying in a modification proceeding. [3] In the absence of notice to Richard that the trial court would require him to subpoena Valerie to bring the children to the hearing, there was no legal basis for the trial court's refusal to grant Richard's m | 3 | 3 |
Bartlett v. Bartlettgreen2 sentences2003See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 293 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that where the father had remarried and moved to another state since the divorce decree, his taking the child out of the state when he had custody of her, contrary to agreement of the parties, was sufficient to show change in conditions since former award of divided custody, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding full control and custody of the child to her mother). 2003See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 293 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Tex. Civ. | 3 | 3 |
in the Interest of D.R.A. and A.F., Childrengreen2 sentences2019See In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 533 . 2019See In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 533 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re HVgreen2 sentences2013See Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373 (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal defense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code). 2013See, e.g., Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644 , 17 S.W. 372, 373 (1891) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal de fense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code); 419 S.W.3d. at 299. | 2 | 2 |
Holley v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2015Initially, N.D. argues that the trial court failed to apply the proper standard in its best interest analysis because the correct standard is that articulated in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976), not “totality of the circumstances.” While we agree that we are to assess the best interest of the children by applying the factors set out by the supreme court in Holley, the trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interest of a minor child, Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982), and we do not agree that the trial court’s reference to its consi 2008Dale’s argument commences with the best interest of the children analysis in Holley . 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 . | 1 | 6 |
In the Interest of E.N.C., J.A.C., S.A.L., N.A.G. and C.G.L.green1 sentence2021See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724 (“Abusive and violent criminal conduct by a parent can produce an environment that endangers the well-being of a child.”); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that abusive or violent conduct by parent supports conclusion that child’s surroundings endanger his physical or emotional well-being pursuant to subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D)); In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d at 652 (stating that factfinder can infer from parent’s lack of contact with child and parent’s absence from child’s life that such behavior endangered child’s emotio | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Dosseygreen1 sentence2021See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724 (“Abusive and violent criminal conduct by a parent can produce an environment that endangers the well-being of a child.”); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that abusive or violent conduct by parent supports conclusion that child’s surroundings endanger his physical or emotional well-being pursuant to subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D)); In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d at 652 (stating that factfinder can infer from parent’s lack of contact with child and parent’s absence from child’s life that such behavior endangered child’s emotio | 1 | 1 |
In Re JTGgreen1 sentence2021See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724 (“Abusive and violent criminal conduct by a parent can produce an environment that endangers the well-being of a child.”); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that abusive or violent conduct by parent supports conclusion that child’s surroundings endanger his physical or emotional well-being pursuant to subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D)); In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d at 652 (stating that factfinder can infer from parent’s lack of contact with child and parent’s absence from child’s life that such behavior endangered child’s emotio | 1 | 1 |
In re R.A.G.green1 sentence2021See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724 (“Abusive and violent criminal conduct by a parent can produce an environment that endangers the well-being of a child.”); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that abusive or violent conduct by parent supports conclusion that child’s surroundings endanger his physical or emotional well-being pursuant to subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D)); In re R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d at 652 (stating that factfinder can infer from parent’s lack of contact with child and parent’s absence from child’s life that such behavior endangered child’s emotio | 1 | 1 |
Zuliani v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 ; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 . | 1 | 1 |
Gillespie v. Gillespiegreen1 sentence2015Initially, N.D. argues that the trial court failed to apply the proper standard in its best interest analysis because the correct standard is that articulated in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976), not “totality of the circumstances.” While we agree that we are to assess the best interest of the children by applying the factors set out by the supreme court in Holley, the trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interest of a minor child, Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982), and we do not agree that the trial court’s reference to its consi | 1 | 1 |
Foote v. Sewallgreen1 sentence2013See Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373 (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal defense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code). | 1 | 1 |
Searcy v. Huntergreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644 , 17 S.W. 372, 373 (1891) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal de fense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code); 419 S.W.3d. at 299. 2013See, e.g., Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644 , 17 S.W. 372, 373 (1891) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal de fense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code); 419 S.W.3d. at 299. | 1 | 1 |
Rosscer Craig Tucker, Ii v. Lizabeth Thomasgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644 , 17 S.W. 372, 373 (1891) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal de fense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code); 419 S.W.3d. at 299. | 1 | 1 |
Askey v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2013See Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373 (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal defense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code). 2013See Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373 (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294 , 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (holding that attorney’s fees are necessaries for the criminal defense of a child); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327 n. 55 (Tex.2008) (noting that a parent has a duty to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the children for their defense of a criminal prosecution under section 151.001(c) of the Family Code). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Callicott v. Callicott
green
2 sentences2006But if a trial court does not have discretion to refuse to permit a child to testify in a custody proceeding, see Callicott, 364 S.W.2d at 457-58 , it only follows that a trial court does not have discretion to refuse to compel a child’s attendance to testify at a custody proceeding when the obvious effect of that refusal is to exclude the child as a witness. . 2006But if a trial court does not have discretion to refuse to permit a child to testify in a custody proceeding, see Callicott, 364 S.W.2d at 457-58 , it only follows that a trial court does not have discretion to refuse to compel a child's attendance to testify at a custody proceeding when the obvious effect of that refusal is to exclude the child as a witness. [11] I have decided not to address the personalized comments in the concurring opinion. | 3 | 2006–2006 |
Thompson v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2006Cf. Thompson, 380 S.W.2d at 639 . 2006Cf. Thompson, 380 S.W.2d at 639 . | 3 | 2006–2006 |
Saxton v. State
green
1 sentence2016See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 ; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Olds v. Burton
green
1 sentence1969Wilson v. Elliott, supra; Olds v. Burton, 181 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1944, no writ); Pennington v. Pennington, supra. Appellant contends, however, that there is no evidence of her misconduct since the original judgment of custody to corroborate. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Pennington v. Pennington
green
2 sentences1969Appellant correctly states the general rule that proof of misconduct of either party prior to the rendition of the original judgment is not ordinarily admissible in a subsequent proceeding brought for change of custody of the children and that the rule of res adjudicata applies in such case (see Wilson v. Elliott, 96 Tex. 472 , 73 S.W. 946 (1903); Pennington v. Pennington, 195 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1946, no writ), but appellant acknowledges that a recognized exception to this rule exists where prior acts of misconduct are offered in evidence to corroborate similar acts in a procee 1969Wilson v. Elliott, supra; Olds v. Burton, 181 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1944, no writ); Pennington v. Pennington, supra. Appellant contends, however, that there is no evidence of her misconduct since the original judgment of custody to corroborate. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Wilson v. Elliott
green
2 sentences1969Appellant correctly states the general rule that proof of misconduct of either party prior to the rendition of the original judgment is not ordinarily admissible in a subsequent proceeding brought for change of custody of the children and that the rule of res adjudicata applies in such case (see Wilson v. Elliott, 96 Tex. 472 , 73 S.W. 946 (1903); Pennington v. Pennington, 195 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1946, no writ), but appellant acknowledges that a recognized exception to this rule exists where prior acts of misconduct are offered in evidence to corroborate similar acts in a procee 1969Appellant correctly states the general rule that proof of misconduct of either party prior to the rendition of the original judgment is not ordinarily admissible in a subsequent proceeding brought for change of custody of the children and that the rule of res adjudicata applies in such case (see Wilson v. Elliott, 96 Tex. 472 , 73 S.W. 946 (1903); Pennington v. Pennington, 195 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1946, no writ), but appellant acknowledges that a recognized exception to this rule exists where prior acts of misconduct are offered in evidence to corroborate similar acts in a procee | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.