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29 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1822–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Kimballgreen2 sentences2018Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce [ 567 Pa. 186 ], 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa.2001),· Commonwealth v. Kimball [ 555 Pa. 299 ], 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa.1999). 2018Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce [ 567 Pa. 186 ], 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa.2001),· Commonwealth v. Kimball [ 555 Pa. 299 ], 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa.1999). | 9 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Piercegreen2 sentences2018Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce [ 567 Pa. 186 ], 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa.2001),· Commonwealth v. Kimball [ 555 Pa. 299 ], 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa.1999). 2018Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce [ 567 Pa. 186 ], 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa.2001),· Commonwealth v. Kimball [ 555 Pa. 299 ], 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa.1999). | 9 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Gribblegreen2 sentences2019“It is settled that the test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [] (1984).” Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa. 2004). -2- J-S19007-19 [T]he constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effect 2018“It is settled that the test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [] (1984).” Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa. 2004). [T]he constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interes | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2001In Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 285 , 733 A.2d 593 (1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the notification/sexually violent predator portions of the original version of the Act as “violative of the procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Specifically, the court found those portions of the Act, which placed a burden on a defendant to rebut the presumption that the defendant was a sexually violent predator, were contrary to fundamental constitutional principles. 2001In Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 285 , 733 A.2d 593 (1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the notification/sexually violent predator portions of the original version of the Act as “violative of the procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Specifically, the court found those portions of the Act, which placed a burden on a defendant to rebut the presumption that the defendant was a sexually violent predator, were contrary to fundamental constitutional principles. | 1 | 2 |
Lockhart v. Fretwellgreen1 sentence2023The PCRA court’s assessment of due diligence relied exclusively upon the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstructed the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and evaluated the attorney’s efforts not from the attorney’s perspective at the time but 35 Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005) (“Thus, the constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Spotzgreen1 sentence2023The PCRA court’s assessment of due diligence relied exclusively upon the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstructed the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and evaluated the attorney’s efforts not from the attorney’s perspective at the time but 35 Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005) (“Thus, the constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sneedgreen1 sentence2023The PCRA court’s assessment of due diligence relied exclusively upon the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstructed the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and evaluated the attorney’s efforts not from the attorney’s perspective at the time but 35 Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005) (“Thus, the constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Millergreen1 sentence2023The PCRA court’s assessment of due diligence relied exclusively upon the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstructed the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and evaluated the attorney’s efforts not from the attorney’s perspective at the time but 35 Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005) (“Thus, the constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2023The PCRA court’s assessment of due diligence relied exclusively upon the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstructed the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and evaluated the attorney’s efforts not from the attorney’s perspective at the time but 35 Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005) (“Thus, the constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed 2023The PCRA court’s assessment of due diligence relied exclusively upon the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstructed the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and evaluated the attorney’s efforts not from the attorney’s perspective at the time but 35 Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005) (“Thus, the constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sheppardgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 324 A.2d 522, 524 (Pa.Super. 1974) (“In placing the burden upon the defendant to rebut a presumption of guilt, the court committed an error of basic and fundamental dimensions . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Peterkingreen1 sentence2018Appellant presents the following issues for our review: ____________________________________________ 1 In Butler, supra, our Supreme Court held that the “strike two” sentencing statute, which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence on a high-risk dangerous offender, violates due process by placing the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption that he is a high-risk dangerous offender. 2 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998) (observing that “the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA” and the writ of | 1 | 1 |
EFCO Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc.green2 sentences2007EFCO v. Norman Highway Constr., 606 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 2000), citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-316 , 84 S.Ct. 411 , 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held, ‘it is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.”). 4 ¶ 13 Under Iowa law once a plaintiff, in this case appellee, is able to establish the presumption of jurisdiction by invoking a forum selection clause, the burden shifts to the defe 2007EFCO v. Norman Highway Constr., 606 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 2000), citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-316 , 84 S.Ct. 411 , 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964) ("[T]he Supreme Court has held, `it is settled . . . that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether."). [4] ¶ 13 Under Iowa law once a plaintiff, in this case appellee, is able to establish the presumption of jurisdiction by invoking a forum selection clause, the burden shifts to the | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Carsongreen2 sentences2007Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 233 (2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987)). 2007Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 233 (2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987)). | 1 | 1 |
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhentgreen2 sentences2007EFCO v. Norman Highway Constr., 606 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 2000), citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-316 , 84 S.Ct. 411 , 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held, ‘it is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.”). 4 ¶ 13 Under Iowa law once a plaintiff, in this case appellee, is able to establish the presumption of jurisdiction by invoking a forum selection clause, the burden shifts to the defe 2007EFCO v. Norman Highway Constr., 606 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 2000), citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-316 , 84 S.Ct. 411 , 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held, ‘it is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.”). 4 ¶ 13 Under Iowa law once a plaintiff, in this case appellee, is able to establish the presumption of jurisdiction by invoking a forum selection clause, the burden shifts to the defe | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Piercegreen2 sentences2007Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 233 (2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987)). 2007Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 233 (2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987)). | 1 | 1 |
OmniLingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc.green1 sentence2007See OmniLingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa Ct.App.1993); see also Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Best Litho, Inc., 737 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa Ct.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Best Litho, Inc.green2 sentences2007See OmniLingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa Ct.App.1993); see also Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Best Litho, Inc., 737 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa Ct.App.2007). 2007See OmniLingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc., 500 *681 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa Ct.App.1993); see also Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Best Litho, Inc., 737 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa Ct.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wynngreen2 sentences2003See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 567 Pa. 183 , 786 A.2d 202 (2001) (per curiam) (remanding for resentencing where defendant sentenced under prior version of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1)); Commonwealth v. Love, 565 Pa. 470 , 776 A.2d 937 (2001) (per curiam) (same). 18 III. 2003See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 567 Pa. 183 , 786 A.2d 202 (2001) (per curiam) (remanding for resentencing where defendant sentenced under prior version of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1)); Commonwealth v. Love, 565 Pa. 470 , 776 A.2d 937 (2001) (per curiam) (same). 18 III. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1974See Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557 , 248 A.2d 301 (1968). 1974See Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557 , 248 A.2d 301 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Butler
green
2 sentences2018Appellant presents the following issues for our review: ____________________________________________ 1 In Butler, supra, our Supreme Court held that the “strike two” sentencing statute, which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence on a high-risk dangerous offender, violates due process by placing the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption that he is a high-risk dangerous offender. 2 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998) (observing that “the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA” and the writ of 2014On May 30, 2003, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence of death, vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence for his remaining offenses, and remanded for resentencing in light of our decision in Commonwealth v. Butler, 563 Pa. 324 , 760 A.2d 384 (2000) (holding 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(1) violated procedural due process rights by placing the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption that he is a high risk dangerous offender). | 4 | 2003–2018 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019“It is settled that the test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [] (1984).” Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa. 2004). -2- J-S19007-19 [T]he constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effect 2018“It is settled that the test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [] (1984).” Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa. 2004). [T]he constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interes | 2 | 2018–2019 |
York County Savings Bank v. Wentworth
green
1 sentence2016In Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 83 9 A.2d 265 , 269- 70 (2003) the Court stated: A law may constitute a prohibited ex post facto provision in one of four ways: 1st. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Bomar
green
2 sentences2014Bomar I, 826 A.2d at 862 . 2014Bomar I, 826 A.2d at 862 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2006According to Appellant, the trial court's use of the word "reject" both "suggested that a death sentence is the rule and a life sentence is the exception" and "requir[ed] the defendant to rebut a presumption of death resulting from findings of enumerated aggravating circumstances." ( Id. ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Eddings
neutral
2 sentences2003The Majority correctly holds that the “three-strikes” provision, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2), does not violate a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Butler, 563 Pa. 324 , 760 A.2d 384 (2000), because, unlike the “two-strikes” provision in subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not require a defendant to rebut a presumption that he is a “high risk dangerous offender.” In so holding, the Majority recognizes the very point that was the subject of my Dissenting Statement in Commonwealth v. Eddings, 565 Pa. 256 , 772 A.2d 956 (2001), wh 2003The Majority correctly holds that the “three-strikes” provision, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2), does not violate a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Butler, 563 Pa. 324 , 760 A.2d 384 (2000), because, unlike the “two-strikes” provision in subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not require a defendant to rebut a presumption that he is a “high risk dangerous offender.” In so holding, the Majority recognizes the very point that was the subject of my Dissenting Statement in Commonwealth v. Eddings, 565 Pa. 256 , 772 A.2d 956 (2001), wh | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Savage
neutral
2 sentences2003See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 567 Pa. 183 , 786 A.2d 202 (2001) (per curiam) (remanding for resentencing where defendant sentenced under prior version of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1)); Commonwealth v. Love, 565 Pa. 470 , 776 A.2d 937 (2001) (per curiam) (same). 18 III. 2003See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 567 Pa. 183 , 786 A.2d 202 (2001) ( per curiam ) (remanding for resentencing where defendant sentenced under prior version of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1)); Commonwealth v. Love, 565 Pa. 470 , 776 A.2d 937 (2001) ( per curiam ) (same). [18] III. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Coleman
neutral
2 sentences2003See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 567 Pa. 183 , 786 A.2d 202 (2001) (per curiam) (remanding for resentencing where defendant sentenced under prior version of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1)); Commonwealth v. Love, 565 Pa. 470 , 776 A.2d 937 (2001) (per curiam) (same). 18 III. 2003See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 567 Pa. 183 , 786 A.2d 202 (2001) ( per curiam ) (remanding for resentencing where defendant sentenced under prior version of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1)); Commonwealth v. Love, 565 Pa. 470 , 776 A.2d 937 (2001) ( per curiam ) (same). [18] III. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
McMillan v. Pennsylvania
red
2 sentences2000We disagree. ¶ 10 While we acknowledge due process at sentencing typically requires the Commonwealth to prove sentence-enhancing factors by a preponderance of the evidence, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), we, nonetheless, find Mr. Wynn’s rebanee on Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, to be misplaced. 2000We disagree. ¶ 10 While we acknowledge due process at sentencing typically requires the Commonwealth to prove sentence-enhancing factors by a preponderance of the evidence, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), we, nonetheless, find Mr. Wynn’s rebanee on Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, to be misplaced. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Janes's Estate
green
2 sentences1955In Janes’s Estate, 147 Pa. 527, 531 , 23 A. 892 , the Court said: ‘A child born or begotten in wedlock is presumed to be legitimate, and neither the mother nor her husband can bastardize it by testifying to non-access.’ ” In the opinion of the court below it is stated that, the prosecutrix being concededly the wife of the defendant, “the burden was upon the defendant to rebut the presumption of legitimacy by sufficient competent proof to sustain the finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of nonaccess by her husband during the period the child had been conceived or begotten. 1955In Janes’s Estate, 147 Pa. 527, 531 , 23 A. 892 , the Court said: ‘A child born or begotten in wedlock is presumed to be legitimate, and neither the mother nor her husband can bastardize it by testifying to non-access.’ ” In the opinion of the court below it is stated that, the prosecutrix being concededly the wife of the defendant, “the burden was upon the defendant to rebut the presumption of legitimacy by sufficient competent proof to sustain the finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of nonaccess by her husband during the period the child had been conceived or begotten. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
James Rees & Sons Co. v. Western Exposition Society
green
1 sentence1936The principle of the McCullough case was affirmed in 1910 by this court in the case of Rees & Sons Co., Inc. v. Western Exposition Society, 44 Pa. Superior Ct. 381 , where the court said, beginning at p. 383: “There can be no doubt of the existence of a general rule which in substance declares that where the personal property of one has been wrongfully taken by another and remains in his possession, the owner cannot recover its price or value in an action of assumpsit....... | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Laing v. Colder green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Trimble v. Thorne green | 1 | 1822–1822 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.