defendant to rebut presumption in North Carolina

1968It is open to interpretation that the burden was on the defendant to rebut the presumption of his guilt, whereas the presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property ‘is to be considered by the jury merely as an evidential fact, along with the other evidence in the case, in determining whether the State has car *721 ried the burden of satisfying the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.’ S. v. Baker, supra [ 213 N.C. 524 , 196 S.E. 829 ].” The doctrine of recent possession and the guiding principles for its application are explained with care and precision b

1968It is open to interpretation that the burden was on the defendant to rebut the presumption of his guilt, whereas the presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property ‘is to be considered by the jury merely as an evidential fact, along with the other evidence in the case, in determining whether the State has car *721 ried the burden of satisfying the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.’ S. v. Baker, supra [ 213 N.C. 524 , 196 S.E. 829 ].” The doctrine of recent possession and the guiding principles for its application are explained with care and precision b

1900The defendant was convicted in Wilkes Superior Court of carrying a concealed weapon, and sentenced *1067 to be “confined in the common jail of Wilkes County for the term of two years, and assigned to* work on the public roads of Eorsytí County, the term of this sentence to begin at the expiration of tbe sentence in Number 259.” (Which was another conviction of the defendant at the same term.) The first exception is that the Court instructed the jury that “if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the pistol about his person, and was off his own lands, such possess

1897State v. McMa nus, 89 N. C., 555 ; State v. Lilly, 116 N. C., 1049 .

2015Indeed, as defendant correctly points out, the burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption, which “ ‘may be overcome by evidence that the child did not use the care which a child of its age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience would ordinarily have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” Hoots, 272 N.C. at 651 , 159 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Weeks v. Barnard, 265 N.C. 339, 340 , 143 S.E.2d 809, 810 (1965)).

2015Indeed, as defendant correctly points out, the burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption, which “ ‘may be overcome by evidence that the child did not use the care which a child of its age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience would ordinarily have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” Hoots, 272 N.C. at 651 , 159 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Weeks v. Barnard, 265 N.C. 339, 340 , 143 S.E.2d 809, 810 (1965)).

2013Sunbelt, 174 N.C.

1977In our decision filed 4 February 1976, we recognized that the instructions given by the trial court, in placing the burden of proof on the defendant to rebut the presumption of malice and unlawfulness, violate the concept of due process announced for the first time in Mullaney and followed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632 , 220 S.E. 2d 575 (1975).

1977In our decision filed 4 February 1976, we recognized that the instructions given by the trial court, in placing the burden of proof on the defendant to rebut the presumption of malice and unlawfulness, violate the concept of due process announced for the first time in Mullaney and followed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632 , 220 S.E. 2d 575 (1975).

1969State v. Holbrook, supra; State v. Hayes, 273 N.C. 712 , 161 S.E. 2d 185 .

1969State v. Holbrook, supra; State v. Hayes, 273 N.C. 712 , 161 S.E. 2d 185 .

1954It is not a conclusive presumption, but is a presumption that may be overcome or may be rebutted by showing that the party in possession did not, in fact, steal or carry away the goods.” This instruction, like the one held erroneous in S. v. Holbrook, 223 N.C. 622 (625), 27 S.E. 2d 725 (727), is “open to interpretation that the burden was on the defendant to rebut the presumption of his guilt, whereas the presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property ‘is to be considered by the jury merely as an evidential fact, along with the other evidence in the case, in determining whet

1954It is not a conclusive presumption, but is a presumption that may be overcome or may be rebutted by showing that the party in possession did not, in fact, steal or carry away the goods.” This instruction, like the one held erroneous in S. v. Holbrook, 223 N.C. 622 (625), 27 S.E. 2d 725 (727), is “open to interpretation that the burden was on the defendant to rebut the presumption of his guilt, whereas the presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property ‘is to be considered by the jury merely as an evidential fact, along with the other evidence in the case, in determining whet

1918McLeod v. Bullard , 86 N.C. 210 ; Jones v. Pullen , 115 N.C. 471 .

1917R., 24 N. C., 138 , is that a presumption of negligence arises from proof of the origin of the fire, and that when this is shown the burden is “on the defendant to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from proof connecting it with the origin of the fire, by evidence which would satisfy the jury that the engine was properly equipped, that competent men were in charge of it, and that it was prudently operated.” Currie v. R.

1914In Triplett v. Foster, 115 N. C., 335 , it is held that when, in an action to foreclose a mortgage given to secure notes, assigned to plaintiff, the answer did not state facts sufficient to amount to a plea of illegality or fraud in the inception or transfer of the note, and there was no evidence tending to support such a defense, the production of the'notes by the plaintiff was prima facie evidence of ownership, and it devolved on the defendant to rebut the presumption.

1900The defendant was convicted in Wilkes Superior Court of carrying a concealed weapon, and sentenced *1067 to be “confined in the common jail of Wilkes County for the term of two years, and assigned to* work on the public roads of Eorsytí County, the term of this sentence to begin at the expiration of tbe sentence in Number 259.” (Which was another conviction of the defendant at the same term.) The first exception is that the Court instructed the jury that “if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the pistol about his person, and was off his own lands, such possess

1897State v. McMa nus, 89 N. C., 555 ; State v. Lilly, 116 N. C., 1049 .

1894Jackson v. Love, 82 N. C., 405 ; Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C., 670 ; Ballinger v. Cureton, 104 N. C., 474 ; Bank v. Burgwyn, 108 N. C., 62 .

1894Jackson v. Love, 82 N. C., 405 ; Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C., 670 ; Ballinger v. Cureton, 104 N. C., 474 ; Bank v. Burgwyn, 108 N. C., 62 .

1894Jackson v. Love, 82 N. C., 405 ; Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C., 670 ; Ballinger v. Cureton, 104 N. C., 474 ; Bank v. Burgwyn, 108 N. C., 62 .

1894Jackson v. Love, 82 N. C., 405 ; Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C., 670 ; Ballinger v. Cureton, 104 N. C., 474 ; Bank v. Burgwyn, 108 N. C., 62 .

1883The defendant relied upon State v. Gilbert, 87 N. C., 527 , in regard to the question of intent.