defendant to rebut presumption in Connecticut

2025Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285 , 290-91, 308 A.3d 564 (2024).

2025Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285 , 290-91, 308 A.3d 564 (2024).

1999Erisoty v. Merrow Machine Co., 34 Conn. App. 708 , 710 (1994).

1996The plaintiff then must satisfy her burden of persuading the factfinder that she was the victim of discrimination by `either directly by persuading the court [or jury] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." (Citations omitted.) Erisoty v. Merrow Machine Co. , 34 Conn. App. 708 , 711 (1994).

1998The court goes on to say that "[i]f the plaintiff meets this initial burden [by a preponderance of the evidence], the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of CT Page 2504 discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions." Id., 53-54 .

1996"If the plaintiff meets his initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by providing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions." Ford v. Blue Cross Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40 , 53-54 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990).

1961"So too it should be understood that merely colorable dissent, or a prohibition . . . , however publicly or frequently repeated, if not made bona fide, will not avail." State v. Lamperelli, 141 Conn. 430 , 436 .

1961“So too it should be understood that merely colorable dissent, or a prohibition . . . , however publicly or frequently repeated, if not made bona fide, will not avail.” State v. Lamperelli, 141 Conn. 430, 436 .

2025Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285 , 290-91, 308 A.3d 564 (2024); see also Stubbs v. ICare Management, LLC, supra, 198 Conn. App. 521 ; Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 170 Conn. App. 79, 95 , 153 A.3d 687 (2017).

2025Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn. App. 285 , 290-91, 308 A.3d 564 (2024); see also Stubbs v. ICare Management, LLC, supra, 198 Conn. App. 521 ; Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 170 Conn. App. 79, 95 , 153 A.3d 687 (2017).

2025Under this framework, the 11 See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 252-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089 , 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802-804, 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11 Begley v. State plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. . . .

2025Under this framework, the 11 See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 252-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089 , 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802-804, 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11 Begley v. State plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. . . .

2024Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn. App. 312 , 327, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 470 , 153 A.3d 615 (2016).

2024Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn. App. 312 , 327, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 470 , 153 A.3d 615 (2016).

2022Taing v. CAMRAC, LLC, 189 Conn. App. 23, 28 , 206 A.3d 194 (2019).

2022Taing v. CAMRAC, LLC, 189 Conn. App. 23, 28 , 206 A.3d 194 (2019).

2018Because the plaintiff's initial prima facie case does not require proof of discriminatory intent, the McDonnell Douglas - Burdine model does not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. Dept. of Children & Families , 172 Conn. App. 14 , 24-25, 158 A.3d 356 (2017) In its memorandum of decision, the court noted the two models of analysis utilized in employment discrimination cases.

2018Because the plaintiff's initial prima facie case does not require proof of discriminatory intent, the McDonnell Douglas - Burdine model does not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. Dept. of Children & Families , 172 Conn. App. 14 , 24-25, 158 A.3d 356 (2017) In its memorandum of decision, the court noted the two models of analysis utilized in employment discrimination cases.

2006Cf. *1182 Smith v. Atkinson, supra, 771 So.2d at 437-38 ("[b]ecause the approach we adopt today to [third party spoliation of evidence] is distinct from the approaches adopted by other [s]tates, observations [concerning a windfall to the plaintiff] fail to consider the additional protection provided [by] ... the element of a rebuttable presumption that would shift the burden of proof"); Hannah v. Heeter, supra, 213 W.Va. at 715 , 584 S.E.2d 560 (adopting full compensatory damages as measure of damages for reasons articulated in Smith ).

2006Cf. *1182 Smith v. Atkinson, supra, 771 So.2d at 437-38 ("[b]ecause the approach we adopt today to [third party spoliation of evidence] is distinct from the approaches adopted by other [s]tates, observations [concerning a windfall to the plaintiff] fail to consider the additional protection provided [by] ... the element of a rebuttable presumption that would shift the burden of proof"); Hannah v. Heeter, supra, 213 W.Va. at 715 , 584 S.E.2d 560 (adopting full compensatory damages as measure of damages for reasons articulated in Smith ).

2001If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beizer v. Dept. of Labor, 56 Conn. App. 347, 356 , 742 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 1 (2000).

2001If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beizer v. Dept. of Labor, 56 Conn. App. 347, 356 , 742 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 1 (2000).

2001The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut this presumption." Dionne v. Markie, 38 Conn. App. 852 , 854 , 663 A.2d 420 (1995).

2001The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut this presumption." Dionne v. Markie, 38 Conn. App. 852 , 854 , 663 A.2d 420 (1995).

2001If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beizer v. Dept. of Labor, 56 Conn. App. 347, 356 , 742 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 1 (2000).

2001If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beizer v. Dept. of Labor, 56 Conn. App. 347, 356 , 742 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 1 (2000).

2000Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason "Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination is created . . . [and] the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating (not proving) some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ann Howard's Apricots Restaurant v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 237 Conn. 209 , 225 , 676 A.2d 844 (1996).

2000Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason "Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination is created . . . [and] the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating (not proving) some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ann Howard's Apricots Restaurant v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 237 Conn. 209 , 225 , 676 A.2d 844 (1996).