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28 California opinions name it 3 courts 1996–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp.green2 sentences2024If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement . . . that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.” ( Rosenthal, supra, at p. 413 .) 9. 2021Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [“If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement — either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation … that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense”]) and Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [“a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense”] citing Rosenthal, at p. 413. 11 It simil | 6 | 16 |
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.green2 sentences2021Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [“If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement — either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation … that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense”]) and Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [“a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense”] citing Rosenthal, at p. 413. 11 It simil 2021Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [“If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement — either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation … that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense”]) and Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [“a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense”] citing Rosenthal, at p. 413. 11 It simil | 5 | 11 |
Condee v. Longwood Management Corp.green2 sentences2013If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement—either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation [citation]—that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 413.) The high court reiterated these procedures in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951 , 972 and noted, “[i]n these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other d 2013If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement—either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation [citation]—that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 413.) The high court reiterated these procedures in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951 , 972 and noted, “[i]n these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other d | 2 | 4 |
Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLCgreen2 sentences2022Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 ; accord, Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236 .) We review an order denying a motion to compel arbitration based on findings of fact for substantial evidence. 2022Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 ; accord, Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236 .) We review an order denying a motion to compel arbitration based on findings of fact for substantial evidence. | 2 | 2 |
Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Ctr. CA2/7green2 sentences2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision 2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision | 2 | 2 |
Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associatesgreen2 sentences2013(Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 683, fn. 3 ; Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632 , 645 & fn. 6.) On appeal, “[w]e do not review the trial court‟s reasoning, but rather its ruling. 2013(Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 683, fn. 3 ; Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632 , 645 & fn. 6.) On appeal, “[w]e do not review the trial court‟s reasoning, but rather its ruling. | 2 | 2 |
Strauch v. Eyringgreen2 sentences1996If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement—either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation (see § 1281.2, subds. (a), (b))—that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense, (Strauch v. Eyring, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 186 .) Defendants urge us to hold a party opposing arbitration must show fraud not only by a preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence. 1996If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement — either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation (see § 1281.2 , subds. (a), (b)) — that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense. ( Strauch v. Eyring, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 186 .) Defendants urge us to hold a party opposing arbitration must show fraud not only by a preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 2 |
Cox v. Bonnigreen1 sentence2021Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; accord, Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287, 303 (Cox); Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 438, 447 (Gloster).) Generally, a determination of waiver is a question of fact, and we will affirm the trial court’s finding if supported by substantial evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc.green1 sentence2021Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; accord, Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287, 303 (Cox); Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 438, 447 (Gloster).) Generally, a determination of waiver is a question of fact, and we will affirm the trial court’s finding if supported by substantial evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc.green1 sentence2020Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 761 (Hotels Nevada).) According to Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. | 1 | 1 |
Eng. & Architects Assn. v. Community Dev. Dept. of City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision 2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision | 1 | 1 |
Mesa Shopping Center-East v. O Hillgreen2 sentences2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision 2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision | 1 | 1 |
In Re Clarkred1 sentence2012We held as much in Clark , explaining that “the petitioner . . . bears the initial burden of alleging the facts on which he relies to explain and justify delay and/or a successive petition.” (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 798, fn. 35.) Although Clark did not involve claims barred by rules other than those involving timeliness and successiveness, the principle is the same: If a petition raises a claim that according to controlling legal authority is procedurally improper, the petition must disclose that fact and forthrightly address why the court should nevertheless consider the claim. | 1 | 1 |
Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc.green2 sentences2010Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ]; accord, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 938 P.2d 903 ]; Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 453 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 65 ].) “Petitions to compel arbitration are resolved by a summary procedure that allows the parties to submit declarations and other documentary testimony and, at the trial court’s discretion, to provide oral testimony.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 ].) The 2010Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ]; accord, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 938 P.2d 903 ]; Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 453 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 65 ].) “Petitions to compel arbitration are resolved by a summary procedure that allows the parties to submit declarations and other documentary testimony and, at the trial court’s discretion, to provide oral testimony.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 ].) The | 1 | 1 |
Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLCgreen2 sentences2010Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ]; accord, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 938 P.2d 903 ]; Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 453 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 65 ].) “Petitions to compel arbitration are resolved by a summary procedure that allows the parties to submit declarations and other documentary testimony and, at the trial court’s discretion, to provide oral testimony.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 ].) The 2010Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ]; accord, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 938 P.2d 903 ]; Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 453 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 65 ].) “Petitions to compel arbitration are resolved by a summary procedure that allows the parties to submit declarations and other documentary testimony and, at the trial court’s discretion, to provide oral testimony.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 ].) The | 1 | 1 |
Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2006If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement—either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation (see § 1281.2, subds. (a), (b))—that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.” (Rosenthal, supra, at p. 413 .) According to Rosenthal , facts relevant to enforcement of the arbitration agreement must be determined “ ‘in the manner . . . provided by law for *762 the . . . hearing of motions.’ ” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413 , quoti 2006If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement—either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation (see § 1281.2, subds. (a), (b))—that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.” (Rosenthal, supra, at p. 413 .) According to Rosenthal , facts relevant to enforcement of the arbitration agreement must be determined “ ‘in the manner . . . provided by law for *762 the . . . hearing of motions.’ ” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413 , quoti | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Intertec Design, Inc.green2 sentences2006In Owens v. Intertec Design, Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 72, 74-75 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 ], the Court of Appeal reversed an order denying a petition to compel arbitration because the trial court made the decision in “an evidentiary vacuum,” as “[pjlaintiff presented no evidence, by declaration or otherwise, in support of the ‘facts’ underlying his arguments in opposition to the petition.” Similarly, in Strauch v. Eyring (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 181, 183 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 ], the court unequivocally “h[e]ld that a petition to compel arbitration may not be denied on the ground of fraud alleged in a 2006In Owens v. Intertec Design, Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 72, 74-75 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 ], the Court of Appeal reversed an order denying a petition to compel arbitration because the trial court made the decision in “an evidentiary vacuum,” as “[pjlaintiff presented no evidence, by declaration or otherwise, in support of the ‘facts’ underlying his arguments in opposition to the petition.” Similarly, in Strauch v. Eyring (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 181, 183 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 ], the court unequivocally “h[e]ld that a petition to compel arbitration may not be denied on the ground of fraud alleged in a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [“If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement — either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation … that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense”]) and Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [“a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense”] citing Rosenthal, at p. 413. 11 It simil 2021Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 [“If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement — either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation … that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense”]) and Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [“a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense”] citing Rosenthal, at p. 413. 11 It simil | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Pagett v. Hawaiian Insurance
green
2 sentences2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision 2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013(Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 683, fn. 3 ; Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632 , 645 & fn. 6.) On appeal, “[w]e do not review the trial court‟s reasoning, but rather its ruling. 2013(Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 683, fn. 3 ; Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632 , 645 & fn. 6.) On appeal, “[w]e do not review the trial court‟s reasoning, but rather its ruling. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Saint Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California
green
1 sentence2021Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; accord, Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287, 303 (Cox); Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 438, 447 (Gloster).) Generally, a determination of waiver is a question of fact, and we will affirm the trial court’s finding if supported by substantial evidence. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Spears
green
1 sentence2012When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence . . . .‖ 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481, fn. 21; People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1322 ; In re Spears (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1209-1210 .) The petition raises claim Nos. 67 and 68 with no apparent awareness the claims are barred by the Lindley rule, and neither the petition nor the informal reply includes any allegations attempting to justify their presentation here. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Espinoza
green
1 sentence2012When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence . . . .‖ 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481, fn. 21; People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1322 ; In re Spears (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1209-1210 .) The petition raises claim Nos. 67 and 68 with no apparent awareness the claims are barred by the Lindley rule, and neither the petition nor the informal reply includes any allegations attempting to justify their presentation here. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Commission
green
1 sentence2003Because it must therefore be deemed a decision on the merits, our denial of such a petition raises the bar of res judicata against relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies.” (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 901 .) In conclusion, the only error the superior court made was in deciding Labor Code section 5955 did not deprive it of jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.